Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan by McDonald, Kate
UC Santa Barbara
UCSB Open Access Publishing Fund Supported 
Publications
Title
Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8pk9p2dm
ISBN
978-0-520-96723-6
Author
McDonald, Kate
Publication Date
2017-08-01
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 4.0
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
M
cD
O
N
A
LD
 |  
P
L
A
C
IN
G
 E
M
P
IR
E
 
Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan
placing 
empire
kate mcdonald
Luminos is the Open Access monograph publishing program from 
UC Press. Luminos provides a framework for preserving and rein-
vigorating monograph publishing for the future and increases the 
reach and visibility of important scholarly work. Titles published 
in the UC Press Luminos model are published with the same high 
standards for selection, peer review, production, and marketing as 
those in our traditional program. www.luminosoa.org

Placing Empire
The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support of 
the Philip E. Lilienthal Asian Studies Endowment Fund of the 
University of California Press Foundation, which was established 
by a major gift from Sally Lilienthal.
Placing Empire
Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan
Kate McDonald
UNIVERSIT Y OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university 
presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by  advancing 
scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its 
activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic 
contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, 
visit www.ucpress.edu.
University of California Press
Oakland, California
© 2017 by Kate McDonald
Suggested citation: McDonald, Kate. Placing Empire: Travel and the Social 
Imagination in Imperial Japan. Oakland: University of California Press, 
2017. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.34
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND license. 
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses.
This project was supported in part by funding from the University of 
California Presidential Faculty Research Fellowships in the Humanities, 
MR-15-328710.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: McDonald, Kate, 1981- author.
Title: Placing empire : travel and the social imagination in imperial Japan / 
   Kate McDonald.
Description: Oakland, California : University of California Press, [2017] | 
   Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2017009063 (print) | LCCN 2017012735 (ebook) | ISBN 
   9780520967236 (ebook) | ISBN 9780520293915 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Tourism--Japan--20th century. | Tourism--Political 
   aspects--Japan--20th century. | Japan--Colonies--Description and 
   travel--20th century. | Korea--Description and travel--20th century. | 
   Manchuria (China)--Description and travel--20th century. | 
   Taiwan--Description and travel--20th century.
Classification: LCC G155.J27 (ebook) | LCC G155.J27 M44 2017 (print) | 
DDC    306.4/819089956051--dc23 
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017009063
26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For Max
For, whatever else it may be, nationalism always involves a struggle 
for land, or an assertion about rights to land; and the nation, almost 
by definition, requires a territorial base in which to take root and 
fulfill the needs of its members.
—anthony d. smith
It’s not just like Japan. It is Japan.
—arakawa seijirō, upon disembarking at the port of pusan, 
korea (1918)
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Preface and Acknowled gments
This project started with a simple question. What did Japanese travelers see 
when they went to colonial Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan? Put differently, what 
did it mean to “see” Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan as a Japanese traveler under 
empire—what did it mean to see territories that were once decidedly foreign and 
then, suddenly, were not? Japanese travelers in the early 1900s remembered clearly 
the transformation of these lands into Japanese colonies. But the issue is not one of 
Japanese history alone. Early American travelers to Hawai’i traveled with memo-
ries of the independent Hawaiian kingdom and its overthrow by American colo-
nists in 1893. And though travelers from Great Britain and France operated within 
empires of longer standing, they too found themselves struggling to negotiate how 
the many pasts of colonized lands could reasonably be transformed into evidence 
of the progressive history of their imperial nations.
Because of the global context in which we might ask this question, its answer 
bears directly on long-held assumptions about the uniqueness of Japanese imperi-
alism. In the first major English-language study of the Japanese Empire as a whole, 
Mark R. Peattie set out what would become the standard framework for defining 
the Japanese Empire within the larger history of modern imperialism. “As the only 
non-Western imperium of recent times,” he wrote, “the Japanese colonial empire 
stands as an anomaly of modern history.” He further elaborated on the peculiar 
nature of Japanese imperialism: “Because it was assembled at the apogee of the 
‘new imperialism’ by a nation which was assiduously striving to emulate West-
ern organizational models, it is not surprising that it was formally patterned after 
the tropical empires of modern Europe. Yet the historical and geographic circum-
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stances of the overseas Japanese empire set it apart from its European counterparts 
and gave it a character and purpose scarcely duplicated elsewhere.”1
For Peattie, the unique circumstances were three. One, Japan had become an im-
perial power at precisely the moment when it extracted itself from its own unequal 
treaties with the United States and other Western powers. Thus, the Japanese gov-
ernment saw clearly the significance of territorial expansion to geopolitical power. 
Two, the Japanese Empire was late to the scene, in the sense that Japan acquired 
its first formal colony, Taiwan, in 1895. The lateness of Japan’s empire meant that 
there were few unclaimed territories, especially in Asia, which had been the site 
of intense colonization by European empires for over a hundred years. And three, 
the cultural and ethnic makeup of the territories Japan did acquire was markedly 
different from what the world had seen in European and American empires. “Be-
cause it was an Asian empire,” Peattie argued, “its most important colonies, Taiwan 
and Korea, were well-populated lands whose inhabitants were racially akin to their 
Japanese rulers with whom they shared a common cultural heritage. This sense of 
cultural affinity profoundly shaped Japanese attitudes toward colonial governance 
once the empire was established.”2
The idea that its geographic contiguity and internal cultural cohesion set the 
Japanese Empire apart from European and, indeed, all other modern empires, has 
had a long life. In their widely influential introduction to Tensions of Empire, Ann 
Stoler and Frederick Cooper refrained from addressing “the meaning of empire 
in regard to contiguous territory . . . in which the colonial pattern of reproducing 
difference might in theory be mitigated by the geographic possibility of absorp-
tion more readily than was the case overseas.”3 Though Stoler and Cooper have 
each more recently revised this earlier position, other broad, comparative studies 
within the growing field of “new imperialism studies” have similarly excluded ter-
ritorially contiguous empires while simultaneously slipping between theoretical 
discussions of “modern imperialism” and “modern Western imperialism.”4
Yet, as did their imperial counterparts in the United States, Great Britain, and 
France, hundreds of thousands of Japanese people traveled to the Japanese colo-
nies of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan during the first half of the twentieth  century 
to pursue precisely this question of whether their imperial territories were, or 
would necessarily produce, a coherent political, historical, linguistic, and cultural 
space. Indeed, it was the apparent need for an answer to this question that moti-
vated their travel in the first place. Querying what it meant for a Japanese traveler 
to “see” Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule thus became a 
concrete approach for exploring questions of deep relevance not just to the provin-
cial realm of modern Japanese history but also to the history of modern empire: 
what do representations of place have to do with the production and reproduction 
of imperial formations in the context of colonialism, capitalism, and nationalism? 
How does place bear on the postcolonial history of settler colonialism, which, 
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since most colonial empires did not abandon the entirety of their colonial hold-
ings, is not so “post” colonial after all? And what does imperial tourism, a phe-
nomenon of equally global provenance, have to do with all of the above?
The answer that this book proposes is that place was a key tool for sustain-
ing imperialism in a period in which the world’s major empires, including the 
Japanese, largely disavowed territorial conquest as a practice of legitimate states. 
The shift from empire as a project of territorial acquisition to one of territorial 
maintenance necessitated the production of new social and spatial imaginaries 
of the nation that could coexist with the imperial territory of the state. In this en-
deavor, place, like race and ethnicity, served both as an axis along which colonial 
difference could be defined and exploited and as a symbol of national identity that 
could encompass the entirety of the imperial territory without distinction. Tour-
ism emerged in this era as the technology par excellence for producing firsthand 
experiences and representations of the space of the nation and of the colonies 
as places within it. These experiences and representations legitimated imperial 
claims to colonized land while at the same time presenting the colonies as spaces 
of exception to metropolitan political, economic, and social norms.5
While many of the conflicts that motivated the spatial politics of Japanese im-
perialism had contours that were specific to the Japanese Empire, the underlying 
need to legitimate the territorial claims of the state in the language of nationalist 
attachments to the land was rooted in the broader social and historical forces that 
shaped the global transition from a world of empires to a world of nation-states 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From this perspective, the historical 
significance of the geography of the Japanese Empire is not the uniqueness of 
its contiguity or the cultural cohesion that this contiguity implied. Rather, it is 
the variety of ways in which colonial boosters and imperial travelers made the 
relationships between the empire’s places meaningful. From history to language 
to memory and to movement itself, imperial travelers and colonial boosters saw 
and experienced colonized lands in ways that legitimated their  incorporation 
into the Japanese Empire and promoted the territorialization of a Japanese 
national identity on colonized land. In other words, the historical significance of 
the geography of the Japanese Empire lies not its uniqueness but rather in how it 
exposes the centrality of spatial politics to the survival of empire in the twentieth 
century.
I began this project over ten years ago, in a research seminar led by Tak Fujitani. 
The question I explored then was of the politics of tourist guidebooks. In the inter-
vening years, I have found it necessary to expand and revise my analysis of tourism 
in the Japanese Empire from one that focused on how tourist guidebooks reflected 
broader discourses of Japanese imperialism to one that argues that tourism was 
essential to the maintenance of empire itself. In a nearly decade of research, I dis-
covered a truly astonishing quantity and geographic diversity of materials related 
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to travel and tourism in the Japanese Empire—ranging from travel accounts to 
anticolonial manifestos to the history of national parks. The most important forces 
behind the evolution of this project, however, were the generous encouragements, 
suggestions, and critiques that colleagues, editors, fellow panelists, and interested 
individuals offered at every stage of the project. I am truly grateful for their time 
and engagement.
My greatest debts are to my advisors, Tak Fujitani and Stefan Tanaka, who guided 
me through the difficult task of analyzing nationalism and imperialism historically 
and who, through their regular and rigorous feedback, constantly pushed me to 
embrace ambiguity and complexity. Sanae Isozumi at the University of  California, 
San Diego Library introduced me to the Japan Travel Bureau library and its collec-
tion of the travel magazine Tabi. In Japan, I had the great pleasure of working with 
Mizuno Naoki and Komagome Takeshi at Kyōto University, two scholars whose 
attention to the inadequacy of general categorizations such as “inner” and “outer” 
territory to frame the history of the Japanese Empire deeply influenced my own 
approach. Patrick Patterson introduced me to the history of tourism as a field and 
gave generously of his time to teach me how to write effective fellowship proposals 
and presentations, both of which were essential to the completion of this project. 
Gary Fields introduced me to critical human geography, which shaped the argu-
ment of this book and, more broadly, my very approach to history. Max Rorty has 
been my first and last reader, strongest supporter, and bluntest critic. Every part of 
this book has benefited from her attention.
Ten years offers a lot of time for research, writing, and thinking. Yet the time 
would not have been so valuable if not for the many people and institutions whose 
invitations made it possible for me to develop and receive feedback on each as-
pect of the project. In Japan, Mizuno Naoki and the Institute for Research in Hu-
manities at Kyōto University hosted me during 2008–2010 for my initial research. 
Yanagisawa Asobu’s generous offer of a temporary visiting appointment at Keiō 
University’s Faculty of Economics in the summer of 2013 allowed me to complete 
the research for the manuscript. Daniel Milne and Andrew Elliott’s invitation to 
participate in a workshop and special issue on war and tourism for Japan Review 
provided a crucial framework for the revision of chapter 1. Cho Sŏng-un, Itagaki 
Hiroshi, Kim Baek-Young, Aleksandra Kobiljski, Sang-Ho Ro, Senjū Hajime, and 
Suzuki Nobuko offered essential conversations, sources, and funding at key points 
in the project’s development.
In the United States, I am grateful to Chris Hanscom, Todd Henry, Shigehisa 
Kuriyama, Tamara Loos, Ian Miller, Morgan Pitelka, Nathaniel Smith, Dennis 
Washburn, and Sam Yamashita for inviting me speak on their campuses. These 
talks were essential proving grounds for the theoretical and historical framework 
of the project, and the comments and critiques that I received from faculty mem-
bers and graduate students on each campus enriched the book immensely. Paul 
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Barclay has been a generous colleague and interlocutor since the first days of my 
graduate research; many of the images in this book come from the East Asia Digi-
tal Images Collection at Lafayette College Libraries, of which he is the director. An 
encounter with David Ambaras at the Association for Asian Studies annual meet-
ing sparked an ongoing conversation, which fundamentally altered how I thought 
about the spatial politics of tourism’s mobility and led to the research that became 
chapter 3. At the University of California, Santa Barbara, Sabine Frühstück, W. 
Patrick McCray, and Luke Roberts have been extraordinary mentors and 
collaborators.
I owe a special thank you to those individuals who read and commented on 
the manuscript. In addition to David Ambaras, my modern Japan colleagues 
Andre Haag, Helen J. S. Lee, and Ryan Moran, as well as my UCSB colleagues Peter 
Alagona, Sherene Seikaly, and Gabriela Soto Laveaga, each read and commented 
on the manuscript in its entirety. Mary V. Rorty read the entire penultimate draft 
and offered many constructive criticisms. Three anonymous readers pushed me to 
go further in analyzing not just the what of imperial tourism but the why as well. 
These gifts of time and attention are the foundation of the scholarly enterprise, yet 
they are the ones that are the least rewarded. The insightful comments and cri-
tiques that each reader offered helped me to refine the foundation and argument 
of each chapter as well as the manuscript as a whole.
The research and writing for this project would not have been possible without 
generous financial assistance from the Fulbright IIE Graduate Research Program, 
the University of California Pacific Rim Foundation, the Joseph K. Naiman Fellow-
ship in Japanese Studies, the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian 
Studies, the University of California President’s Faculty Research Fellowship in the 
Humanities, the Graduate Division of UC San Diego, and the Academic Senate 
at UC Santa Barbara. The UCSB Open Access Fund made it possible to publish 
this book in an open-access format. An earlier version of chapter 5 appeared as 
“Speaking Japanese: Language and the Expectation of Empire,” in The Affect of 
Difference: Representations of Race in the Japanese Empire, edited by Christopher P. 
Hanscom and Dennis Washburn, 159–79 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 
2016). I thank the University of Hawai’i Press for permission to print a revised and 
expanded version of the chapter here. Ellen Broidy at Academic Editorial clarified 
many of the manuscript’s key points and streamlined each chapter. Eun-Joo Ahn, 
Seokwon Choi, Brett Collins, ChunHui Chuang, Julie Johnson, and Ema Parker 
provided essential research assistance. The constant good cheer, good sense, and 
rapid responses of Bart Wright at Lohnes+Wright Cartography made the produc-
tion of the maps a pleasure. Jennifer Eastman carefully copyedited each page of the 
manuscript and adjusted her schedule to fit my own, for which I am profoundly 
grateful. At UC Press, Reed Malcolm and Zuha Khan kept the project on time and 
on point. Thank you.

1This book is about the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism, that is, how the 
Japanese Empire possessed colonized lands by domesticating, disavowing, and 
disappearing other claims to that same land. It illuminates how  territorializing 
a Japanese national identity on colonized land shaped the modern Japanese 
nation and brings into focus how ideas of place sustained the legitimacy of 
colonialism in a period when the world’s major empires, including the Japanese, 
largely disavowed territorial conquest. This book explores the spatial politics of 
empire through a study of imperial tourism, which was one of the few  institutions 
of the era to operate on a truly empire-wide scale and one that was uniquely 
concerned with producing firsthand experiences of colonized land.
Japan was a great imperial power during the first half of the twentieth century. 
This much is well known. But it is perhaps less well known that between 1868, 
when the new Meiji government formally colonized the island of Hokkaidō, and 
1952, when the Japanese government formally renounced sovereignty over Taiwan, 
Korea, the Kuriles, the southern portion of the island of Karafuto (Russian [here-
after, R.] Sakhalin), and the League of Nations Mandate Territory in Micronesia 
(Japanese [J.] Nan’yō), the Japanese government possessed no single mechanism 
for differentiating, legally or politically, between colonized and Japanese territory. 
Even after the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, generally used to mark the begin-
ning of Japan’s formal empire, there was never a coherent practice of referring to 
colonized lands as “colonies” (shokuminchi). Instead, they were the “new territo-
ries”; they were “regions”; they were “territories governed by governors general.” 
Anything but colonies. In fact, the spatial order of the empire was so liminal that 
when the administration of Korea and Taiwan was placed under the aegis of a new 
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Ministry of Colonial Affairs in 1929, Japanese residents of Korea complained so 
vociferously that Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi was forced to assure them that the 
ministry would “not treat Korea as a colony.”1
In hindsight, it is obvious that Korea and Taiwan were colonies. The Japanese 
state acquired these lands by conquest and treaty but opted not to extend the 
full rights and responsibilities of citizenship to their residents. Moreover, the 
governors general and the imperial government treated these territories as “ag-
ricultural appendages” of Japan, setting policies that encouraged the production 
of basic commodities such as rice and sugar for the metropolitan market while 
discouraging local industrialization.2 Internal border controls and overt dis-
crimination in education limited the physical and social mobility of colonized 
subjects in ways not applied to most Japanese residents of the empire. Similar 
policies, varying only in their details, were applied to the remainder of Japan’s 
colonized lands—local governments distributed political and economic rights 
unevenly in Hokkaidō, Okinawa, the Kuriles, Karafuto, and the League of  Nations 
Mandate Territory in Micronesia. At the same time, colonial governments 
fostered a cultural hierarchy that marked the Japanese language and official 
culture as the basis for public life.
To put it bluntly, there was an element of instability about the place of these 
lands within Japan, about the relationship between colonized land, the territory of 
the state, and the space of the nation. This book examines this instability from the 
late nineteenth century until the post–World War II period. Through a study of 
imperial tourism to Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, I delineate how the question 
of where the colonies were shaped the conceptualization of the Japanese imperial 
nation and how, in turn, this spatio-social imaginary affected the way colonial dif-
ference was conceptualized and enacted. In so doing, I explore the significance of 
spatial politics to the maintenance of colonial hierarchies in a world in which the 
nation-state form has been globalized but political emancipation has not.
Japan was an empire, thus it is fair to ask why the history of its spatial poli-
tics is relevant to the larger colonial and postcolonial history of nationalism and 
nation-states. Indeed, despite the flexibility with which Japanese officials defined 
the territories of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria in relation to Japan, they were 
not so shy about describing Japan as “Great Japan,” “the Japanese Empire,” or the 
“Great Japanese Empire.” Yet the distinction between nation-state and empire was 
not at all clear. As Ann Stoler has argued, “distinctly rendered boundaries repre-
sent  .  .  . only one end of the spectrum” of empire. Imperial formations operate 
precisely at the “troubled, ill-defined” boundaries of citizenship, territory, and le-
gal rights.3 The “externalization of empire,” the idea that nation-state and empire 
comprise two entirely different spaces and histories, is best considered a political 
narrative that arose after World War II than an accurate representation of the rela-
tionship between empires and nation-states.4
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The early twentieth century was a time of global transition. Between the 
late nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth, the emergence of the 
modern system of international relations, with its commitment to the territorial 
nation-state as the basis for human social and political organization, and the shift 
from mercantile to monopoly capitalism produced contradictory spatial forma-
tions within which imperialist and anti-imperial nationalists struggled to claim 
a place in the world. Like other new empires, such as the United States and Ger-
many, the Japanese Empire faced these tensions by creating a regional empire that 
could be used as a resource base for capitalist expansion. In this context, imperial-
ism mediated between the territorializing impulses of the modern state and the 
de-territorializing impulses of capitalism.5 Rather than drawing firm boundaries 
between empire and nation, Japan and other new empires were what we might 
consider “imperial nation-states.”6 The result was a hybrid form of empire in which 
the state territorialized a sphere of influence that exceeded the boundaries of the 
nation but could nevertheless be made available for capitalist exploitation. On the 
one hand, the idea that the territory of the state was the patrimony of the nation 
legitimated the state’s sovereignty over colonized land. On the other, the need to 
maintain colonized lands as territories to be exploited in the name of national 
strength authorized the creation of uneven forms of citizenship and the treatment 
of the colonies as spaces of exception to national norms.7
Over the course of the early twentieth century, the economic, administrative, 
and discursive structure of empire and nation in the Japanese imperium shifted in 
such a way that it is difficult, even now, to draw a firm line between the institutions 
and discourses of the Japanese nation and those of the empire. As scholars working 
on the history of modern Japan and the Japanese Empire have no doubt encoun-
tered, imperial discourse described the space of empire in terms of its places— 
Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan; Japan; the inner and outer territories. Yet these places 
did not generally correspond to distinct territorial or institutional jurisdictions; 
place names appeared as indices to a geographical structure of empire that was it-
self a chimera.8 Such is the case, for example, with the term naichi, “inner territory.” 
Scholarship on the Japanese Empire routinely uses naichi to signify the imperial 
metropole in contrast to the colonies, or “outer territories.” Yet this description 
implies a concrete-ness of reference that did not exist in practice. The term gaichi, 
“outer territories,” only came into official use in 1929, some thirty-five years after 
the colonization of Taiwan. The term naichi was used in a number of ways that 
were neither geographically nor conceptually overlapping. Naichi first appeared 
as the territorial opposite of the foreign settlements in Japanese treaty ports in the 
1850s—ports that the unequal treaties with Western powers had opened to foreign 
trade. “Inner territory” simply meant “places that foreigners cannot live.” Yet in 
the 1910s the Government General of Korea used “Japanification” (naichika, liter-
ally, “becoming like the inner territory”) to refer to the industrialization of Korean 
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urban areas, while in the 1930s, travelers used “like the naichi” (naichi no yō) to 
describe Japanese-language speech that approximated that of a Japanese native, in 
contrast to the “textbook speech” of colonized subjects. Throughout the history 
of the Japanese Empire, “inner territory” was a territory, a relative location on a 
universal trajectory of development, and an essentialized sensibility.
Recent research shows that imperial legal, educational, and political institu-
tions did not create wholly distinct metropolitan and colonial territories. Presti-
gious metropolitan secondary schools enrolled elite colonized subjects, who had 
formative political experiences in Tokyo dormitories. The “colonial” legal system 
was actually at least two in Korea (one for ethnic Japanese and one for colonized 
subjects) but perhaps three in Taiwan (with separate treatments for Taiwanese 
Chinese, Japanese, and indigenous inhabitants). Penal systems in the colonies de-
ployed spatial referents to justify treating “people of the inner territory” (naichi-
jin) less harshly than “people of this island” (hontōjin)—a reference to Taiwanese 
Chinese—“savages” (banjin), and Koreans (Senjin). In the case of Taiwan, we must 
also consider what Hiroko Matsuda has termed the “everyday politics of distinc-
tion,” which shaped the self-representation of and encounters between migrant 
laborers from Okinawa, Japanese settlers from the main islands, and Taiwanese 
Chinese. Unskilled Okinawan migrants to Taiwan, for example, were categorized 
as Japanese, but Taiwanese Chinese often referred to them as “Japanese aborigi-
nes,” and Japanese settlers informally excluded them from the elite institutions of 
settler society, such as the most prestigious schools.9
To build on the words of Barbara Brooks, the Japanese Empire was “profoundly 
conflicted” not only about the status of non-Japanese subjects but also about the 
status of colonized and metropolitan land.10 In fact, the spatial politics of the 
 Japanese Empire parallel much more closely the complicated and contradictory 
history of defining “Japanese” ethnicity and citizenship than they do the history 
of the expansion and contraction of the Japanese state’s territory. It is often ar-
gued that, although some rights and responsibilities were divided based on one’s 
place of residence, the household registration system (koseki seido) created a “clear 
dividing line between ‘Japanese proper’ and ‘colonial subjects.’ ”11 For example, 
white-collar workers whose households were registered within the main islands, 
Okinawa, or Hokkaidō received a “colonial bonus” when they worked in Taiwan.12 
The location of one’s household registry also determined one’s eligibility for mili-
tary service (until 1938, when, in the first years of total war, colonized subjects were 
allowed to enlist).13 And yet, ethnicity and gender also profoundly influenced the 
location of one’s household registry. A 1921 law formally recognized the intermar-
riage of Japanese and Korean subjects, for example, but mandated that the location 
of the household registry be determined by the ethnicity of the male half of the 
household. A Japanese woman who married a Korean man was entered into the 
man’s Korean household registration, thus legally transforming her into a Korean 
Introduction    5
woman. Korean women who married Japanese men, however, were entered into 
the Japanese registration. They became Japanese women. A different set of rules 
applied to children of mixed unions. A child born to a married Korean man and 
Japanese woman would be entered into the Korean household registry. But if the 
parents were unwed, the mother could enter the child in her Japanese registry as 
an illegitimate child, thus conferring upon her offspring the privileges of Japanese 
classification.14
The blurry lines between the space of the nation and the space of empire were 
not accidental. Rather, the instability of spatial and social boundaries was an es-
sential component of the operation of early twentieth-century imperialism in the 
Japanese imperium and elsewhere. The present study examines this aspect of the 
Japanese Empire’s spatial formation, the fixing and refixing of colonized lands 
within the space of the Japanese nation and the concomitant fixing of the  Japanese 
nation on colonized land. For despite this instability, people did talk about 
 places—indeed, an entire industry, tourism, emerged to produce the experience of 
place, which, as this book argues, became the spatial foundation for the practices of 
exclusion and dispossession that sustained imperialism after World War I.
TOURISM AND THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF EMPIRE
One way to understand the history of tourism is to see it as an attempt to stabilize 
and standardize understandings of place—to produce, in other words, a hegemonic 
socio-spatial order anchored in specific understandings of place.15 As an industry, 
tourism emerged in concert with the expansion of railways and the industrializa-
tion of labor.16 Yet it also emerged during a time of intense geopolitical turmoil, 
which saw the shocking destruction of the First World War, the reorganization of 
empires, and the establishment of an organization (the League of Nations) that 
would, in theory, allow self-determining nations to protect the peace by agreeing 
upon practices of global imperialism and capitalism that could be imposed upon 
other, non-self-determining nations.17 In other words, tourism—an industry de-
voted to selling experiences of places—was born at precisely the moment when the 
determination of boundaries, location, and essence was imbued with concrete and 
intensely debated political stakes. In this sense, tourism and the places it sold were 
an argument about the global social and geopolitical order.
There is a rich and diverse literature on the subject of tourism and empire. 
Much of it focuses on how the tropes of touristic literature facilitated and justi-
fied formal and informal conquests of colonized lands and on how colonial set-
tlers deployed tourism to articulate their own place within their imperial nations, 
however geographically distant from the imperial center they were.18 I am in-
debted to this literature, particularly to the works of Christine Skwiot, Vernadette 
Vicuña-Gonzalez, and Jason Ruiz, whose studies of U.S. tourism to Hawai’i, Cuba, 
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the Philippines, and Mexico have laid bare the ways in which particular repre-
sentations of these destinations and their peoples were—and are—embedded in 
much broader and long-running attempts by settlers and national governments to 
sustain claims to colonized lands.19 Likewise, the works of Ellen Furlough and In-
derpal Grewal expose how imperial tourism served as a vehicle for consolidating 
ideals of national citizenship while at the same time reinforcing the boundaries 
between metropolitan and colonial territories and between metropolitan and 
colonized subjects.20 Together, these works show that the territorialization of the 
nation did not occur in the empty space of terra nullius—territory that  colonial 
states claimed was not under the sovereignty of any state and was therefore 
 available for colonization—but rather through a mutually constitutive process of 
displacement and appropriation, of possession by dispossession.21
This book contributes the first comprehensive study of tourism in the Japanese 
Empire to the growing field of tourism and empire studies. Earlier studies have 
illuminated how imperial tourism functioned as “self-administered citizenship 
training” and as a “memory industry” that encouraged the production of nation-
alist sentiment toward and the romanticization of colonized lands.22 Yet the field 
as a whole has focused on studies of single colonies, and often only in the 1930s. As 
a result, the striking similarities between touristic representations of Korea, Man-
churia, and Taiwan—and the stark contrasts between earlier and later practices of 
placing—have been overlooked. To explore the significance of these similarities, 
this book deploys a unique, transcolonial archive of tourist materials from 1906, 
when the first tours left for Manchuria and Korea, to the late 1930s, when the out-
break of the Sino-Japanese War and the rise of the total war ideology led to a nar-
rowing of tourist discourses and an increased emphasis on the imperial house. The 
conclusion carries the analysis forward into the early postwar period, when for-
mer imperial officials, the Ministry of Education, and the U.S. Occupation worked 
to reterritorialize the Japanese nation in Asia after the end of formal empire.
A central argument of this book is that the challenge of anti-imperial national-
ism and anticolonial liberalism led to a significant change in how imperial trav-
elers and colonial boosters made sense of the place of colonized lands within 
Japan. In the early years of imperial tourism, representations of the place of Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan within Japan were structured by a “geography of civili-
zation.”23 Under this geography, imperial travelers and colonial boosters placed 
the colonies within Japan using three modes: a historical mode, which used the 
notion of “transition” to naturalize the transfer of power from indigenous states 
to Japanese colonial governments and the incorporation of colonized lands into 
the space of Japanese history; an economic mode, which described the colonies 
and their commodities as part of a network of production, circulation, and ex-
change made possible through Japanese intervention; and a nationalist mode, 
which encouraged travelers to forge affective connections to colonized lands and a 
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sense of themselves as national subjects by using sites in the colonies to reenact a 
 Japanese national past. As travelers used these modes to lay claim to the colonies as 
Japanese national land, they also used them to explain why colonized  subjects 
could be dispossessed of their lands. Under the geography of civilization, 
imperial travelers emphasized colonized subjects’ lack of historical, nationalist, 
or economic consciousness to legitimate Japanese colonial rule. The result was a 
core-periphery geography in which colonized lands were imagined to be quickly 
becoming—or in the case of the nationalist mode, already part of—the national 
land. Imperial travelers and colonial boosters treated colonized inhabitants as out 
of place in their own lands.
But the denial of coevalness that the geography of civilization represented 
could not be sustained in the face of widespread protests, from colonized subjects 
and Japanese settlers alike, against the uneven territorial-administrative structure 
of Japanese imperial rule. Starting in the late 1910s, the geography of civilization 
began to give way to a geography of cultural pluralism, under which imperial 
travelers re-placed the colonies using an ethnographic mode, which represented 
the space of the imperial nation as one composed of diverse cultural regions and 
ethnic peoples. If, under the geography of civilization, the colonization of Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan was justified by marking colonized subjects as out of 
place in the national land, under the geography of cultural pluralism, the notion 
of “from-ness”—of subjects who were essentially and unchangingly in place in one 
specific region and only that region—became a key way that imperial travelers 
and colonial administrations conceptualized and enacted colonial difference. The 
geography of cultural pluralism fostered new forms of dispossession, internal bor-
dering, and differentiation between colonized and metropolitan subjects in the 
name of appreciating the essential differences between the empire’s cultural re-
gions and its distinct ethnic populations.
What emerges from the transcolonial approach to the study of imperial tour-
ism is the idea that tourism was not just useful for justifying individual instances 
of colonialism. Rather, tourism was central to the maintenance of empire itself. 
Imperial tourism was one manifestation of what I call the “spatial politics of em-
pire,” the use of concepts of place to naturalize uneven structures of rule.24 For 
historians of tourism, spatial politics offers an answer to the question of why tour-
ism emerged as the solution to the particular crises of so many imperial forma-
tions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It draws together the 
insights of myriad national case studies of tourism to expose the critical role that 
imperial tourism played in the colonial and postcolonial history of the modern 
world. It shows how tourism made spatial relationships meaningful in ways that 
suited the overall goal of sustaining colonialism and how these spatializations 
changed over time and in response to broader shifts in concepts of sovereignty 
and economic structures.25
8    Introduction
For historians of modern Japan, the concept of spatial politics illuminates how 
the dramatic changes that the territory of the Japanese state underwent between 
the late nineteenth century and the end of the U.S. Occupation were not merely a 
matter of expanding and contracting borders but rather a cause for serious engage-
ment with the problem that imperial territory posed to conceptualizations of the 
nation.26 Previous studies have argued that the parameters of the modern  Japanese 
spatial imaginary were set by the early twentieth century.27 Yet, as the history of 
the empire’s spatial politics makes evident, the problem of maintaining an impe-
rial territory in a world increasingly dominated by the ideals of the nation-state 
imposed new demands on the spatial and social imaginary of Japan. From the first 
years of Japanese imperialism, tourism emerged as one of the primary vehicles for 
spatial politics as Japanese colonial boosters sought to fix and refix colonized lands 
in ways amenable to the image of Japan as a territorial nation-state rather than an 
expansive empire.28
PL ACE BET WEEN EMPIRE AND NATION
Spatial politics engages a phenomenon central to the history of imperial tourism: 
the intense focus on producing and circulating firsthand experiences of colonized 
lands in relation to, but not subsumed within, the politics of race, culture, and 
language. As Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose argued decades ago, the construc-
tion of national identities and of differences within the nation took place on terms 
that were sometimes racial and sometimes spatial.29 Yet while numerous works 
have shown that capitalism and nationalism require the constant production and 
reproduction of notions of racial, gender, and class difference in order to create 
the conditions in which exploitation and identity-formation take place, the study 
of the problem of spatial difference and spatial politics within the nation-state 
 remains a niche issue—the domain of activist scholars of settler colonialism rather 
than a problem central to the history of the modern world.30 This book argues that 
the management of ideas of place was central to the maintenance of empire pre-
cisely because, unlike the other two axes of colonial difference, race and culture, its 
politics directly addressed the problem of colonized land to the territorial nation. 
Place did not operate in a vacuum. It drew on, buttressed, and challenged prevail-
ing notions of racial and cultural difference. At the same time, to ignore place and 
the problem of land that it reveals contributes to the erasure of the ongoing nature 
of colonialism in the postcolonial world.
Place is central to how societies understand themselves and how individuals 
understand their position within a society. As geographer Tim Cresswell writes, 
“Looking at the world as a set of places in some way separate from each other is 
both an act of defining what exists (ontology) and a particular way of seeing and 
knowing the world (epistemology and metaphysics). . . . In other words, place is 
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not simply something to be observed, researched, and written about but is itself 
part of the way we see, research, and write.”31 Human geographers, who have been 
at the forefront of attempts to grasp the humanistic significance of place, treat 
place both as a social construction and as a phenomenon that makes possible “the 
very possibility of the social.”32 It is more than a set of ideographically distinct 
regions. Rather, place has multiple elements. It can be a locale, a site where events 
occur. It can also be a location or status, a place in relative space. And, of course, 
it can be an essence or sense, as in the atmosphere of a place or the sense that one 
gets of being in a unique place.33
When shared, understandings of place produce a common language for de-
scribing the world and our relations within it.34 But as geographers from the femi-
nist tradition emphasize, it is, in fact, impossible to conceive of or even analyze 
place outside of the “power-geometry” of how different groups relate to movement 
and to each other. In other words, an ontological definition of place always occurs 
within, not prior to, an epistemology of space and a materiality of social relations. 
“What gives place its specificity,” Doreen Massey argues, “is not some long inter-
nalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of 
relations, articulated together at a particular locus.”35
Place is thus both a noun and a verb. David Harvey once described place as a 
way of “carving out permanences” in space and time, and it is in this sense that I 
use it here.36 Place is both an action and a tool—we use it to identify and individu-
ate objects, people, and events as if it were a static or objective category. At the 
same time, each time we do so, we create or sustain a particular spatial order of 
our world. Locating, naming, and bounding places are political acts that represent 
and reproduce social relationships and political orders. Place is also subject to 
“perpetual perishing.” We enact place each time we use it to describe the world 
“out there.” As we do so, we extend its conceptual life a little bit longer. On the 
other hand, the enactment of a new place can challenge the dominance of an old 
order. Place is thus an act of world-making that cannot be reduced to geography 
or territory—place is an articulation of social relations that is always made from a 
particular perspective.
Of primary importance to this book’s argument is the rise of the territorial 
 nation-state as the “global archetype” of sovereignty and political freedom over the 
course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.37 One of the distinguishing 
features of nationalism is that the nation imagines itself to have emerged from, and 
to be anchored in, a particular territory.38 It claims a place. In the words of Edward 
W. Soja, in the modern era of nation-states, social definitions of territory have 
been replaced by territorialized definitions of society.39 For this reason, if none 
other, the nation-state form placed a new emphasis on territory as the “media-
tor” between state and people, especially in situations of contested sovereignty.40 
Starting in the late nineteenth century and cresting with the establishment of 
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the League of Nations and later the United Nations, the imperial powers—both 
the Great and the Late—embraced exclusive territorial jurisdictions as the prin-
cipal boundaries of sovereignty and the nation-state as the principal guarantor 
of political freedom. Congruent with theories of state sovereignty established in 
the late nineteenth century, the nation-state form was based on an understand-
ing that the ideal form of sovereignty was the possession of exclusive jurisdiction 
over a discrete territory.41 Yet this process took place without empires abandon-
ing the entirety of their colonized lands or granting political emancipation to all 
colonized subjects. Indeed, from Hawai’i to Puerto Rico to Australia to Hokkaidō, 
postimperial states sustained colonialism in new forms. Patrick Wolfe famously 
underscored this ongoing nature of colonialism when he defined conquest not as 
an event in the history of colonial nation-states but rather as its structure.42
It is in this context that spatial politics took their modern form. Attachments 
to territory were powerful not because they were primordial, but because inter-
national relations and official nationalisms increasingly “attribute[d]  .  .  . power 
and meaning to them.”43 Through geography education, museums, cartography, 
and collective memory, nationalists sought to produce affective attachments to the 
state’s territory by defining it as the place of the nation. The names for these places 
were localized, although the concept was not—for example, Heimat in Germany, 
kyōdo in Japan, and the swadeshi movement in India. Indeed, it is no accident that 
Ernest Renan’s famous 1882 speech Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (What is a nation?) 
took as its object the problem of Alsace and Lorraine, a region with a distinctly 
Germanic population that had been recently conquered by Germany but nonethe-
less remained, in Renan’s argument, a legitimate part of French state territory and 
French national identity. Although for Renan the nation was a form of conscious-
ness, a voluntarist state of mind rather than an organic ethnic identity, part of that 
voluntarism involved rising out of one’s local place to lay claim to the entirety of 
the territory of the state. Even organicist visions, as Anthony D. Smith argues, 
relied on an element of voluntarism in that “primordial attachments rest on per-
ception, cognition, and belief.”44 The representation of the territory of the state as 
the space of the nation, what Thongchai Winikachul has called the “geobody of the 
nation,” thus became a central element in the production of the nation itself as it 
“provide[d] the ground upon which to stake the claim for nation.”45
Yet it is perhaps more profitable to think of the idea of the nation as a territo-
rialized community—a nation-state that governs a particular place—as an ideal 
rather than a reality. The formulation takes for granted what has been a constant 
struggle for much of modern world history.46 Nation and state are two distinct 
and “asymmetrical” spatial identities.47 The modern state is a product of the mod-
ern concept of sovereignty. Its spatial identity is one of territorial administration, 
of defining jurisdictions, governing the human and material resources contained 
within the territory, and controlling borders with other sovereign states. In con-
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trast, the spatial identity of the nation is discursive; it is an unstable collection of 
cultural, historical, and environmental relations that tie a particular community to 
a particular space but do not limit it to that space. While some nations are able to 
link themselves to particular states, this has not always been the case. Between the 
late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, the asymmetry manifested in a num-
ber of ways, including separatist movements and other sub-state nationalisms, 
contested borderlands and areas of blurred nationalities, and diasporic communi-
ties with a transnational scope but a specific territorial homeland.48 It was also seen 
in situations of settler colonialism, when the territory of the state expanded far 
beyond the spatial identity of the nation or, as in the case of Japanese-controlled 
Manchuria, the space of the nation expanded beyond the territory of the state.
A map published in a 1919 Japanese geography primer illustrates the problem. 
The islands of Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū, and Okinawa are the dark-
est; the legend informs us that they defined the extent of Great Japan (dai Nihon) 
in 1888, twenty years after the Meiji Restoration. Karafuto and Taiwan are slightly 
lighter, indicating that in 1898, Japan included these territories as well. The Kwan-
tung Leased Territory, the railway line between Dairen (Chinese [C.]: Dalian) and 
Chōshun (C. Changchun), and Korea are even lighter, marking these territories 
as part of Japan by 1907 (a slight fib, since Korea was only a Japanese protectorate 
in 1905 and was not formally annexed until 1910, while Manchuria was never part 
of the sovereign territory of Japan). The shading ends with Micronesia, which the 
legend tells us has been part of Japan since 1914. In contrast to the legend, the ac-
companying text notes that Micronesia “was under the management of the League 
of Nations” and that Japan merely leased the Kwantung Leased Territory from 
China.49
The map showed Japan as a historical and territorial entity. Produced by 
Yamazaki Naomasa, one of the most prominent geographers of the era, it displayed 
visually what other geographers, such as Odauchi Michitoshi, represented textu-
ally through descriptions of Japan’s “national land” as divided into “new” and “old” 
territory (shin and kyū kokudo). These depictions committed the sleight-of-hand 
of equating the spatial identity of the state with that of the nation. To put it more 
precisely, Yamazaki and Odauchi did not differentiate between the two at all. Yet 
as we have seen, there were real differences in the administration of colonial and 
metropolitan territory, and in many respects, these administrative and institu-
tional differences grew more pronounced over time. The space of the nation never 
fully encompassed the territory of the state. It was in the tension between the two 
that concepts of imperial nationhood took form.
Indeed, only a couple years before Yamazaki published his map and a couple 
years after Odauchi published his primer, another definition of the relationship 
between the territory of the state and the place of the nation appeared, one that 
helps us to square the circle of spatial politics between empire and nation. In 1915, 
Figure 1. Map of “Great Japan.”
source: Yamazaki Naomasa, Futsū kyōiku Nihon chiri kyōkasho (Tokyo: Tokyo kaiseikan, 1919). Courtesy of the 
 National Diet Library.
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Nitobe Inazō, Japan’s most famous scholar of colonial policy, gave a lecture in 
which he defined colony as a “new territory of the state” (shin ryōdo). To justify 
this definition, Nitobe surveyed the meaning of the word colony from the Roman 
Empire to the British Empire, tracing its meaning in relation to cognate terms such 
as territory, plantation, province, and dependency. In its widest meaning, Nitobe 
concluded, colony could refer to an ethnic enclave, as in the case of referring to 
the treaty port town of Yokohama as a “colony of Westerners.” In its narrowest 
definition, it might refer to just the area in a colonized territory where settlers 
from the colonizing country reside. Admitting that, “it probably was not precise 
in the scientific sense,” Nitobe offered a middle ground. “All definitions have two 
components: genus and species,” he argued. In this case, “ ‘colony’ is of the genus 
‘territory’; species, ‘new.’ ”50
The working definition encapsulated what Nitobe defined as the most impor-
tant components of a colony: people, land, and “the political relationship with the 
motherland.”51 But it also illuminated the unstable position of colonies between 
the territory of the state and the space of the nation. Newness, for example, was 
subjective. Nitobe defined new from the perspective of the colonizing nation. 
“Through language, customs, institutions, thought, etc., as long as the national 
people (kokumin) think of it as somehow different, the territory is new.”52 Like-
wise, he chose the word meaning “territory of the state” (ryōdo) carefully. Simply 
referring to a colony as a new territory (shinchi) would not do, because a colony 
is always constituted within a political relationship to the colonizing country—in 
his words, the “mother country.”53 The term shin ryōdo, “new territory of the state,” 
defined colonies as phenomena that were both temporary and permanent at the 
same time. Indeed, part of Nitobe’s purpose in defining colony was to offer the 
field of “colonial policy” and “colonial policy studies” in the service of managing 
these tensions: “ ‘colonial policies’ are the policies that attempt to make permanent 
the benefits that the mother country accrues vis-à-vis a phenomenon that tends 
toward the temporary.”54
Thus, as I use it here, place is not in opposition to territory. Rather, place and 
territory worked in conversation with one another to produce hegemonic spa-
tial imaginaries that fed and were fed by material and political structures of 
power—the spatial imaginaries that kept the colonies “new” in the eyes of the 
nation. Imperial discourse used places as signifiers—as the seemingly concrete 
site of historical events; as territorial homelands for cultures, languages, and eth-
nicities; as territories in particular spatial and temporal relations to other territo-
ries. Placing the colonies and the nation was, in this sense, not distinct from the 
drawing of borders and the implementation of policy. It was an inherent part of 
maintaining the uneven forms of citizenship and spaces of exception that defined 
the colony within the imperial nation-state. Much like Edward Said’s imaginative 
geographies, spatial politics were a way of using representations of place to justify 
territorial-administrative divisions and the uneven treatment of different popula-
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tions. They were a way of sustaining particular spatial imaginaries by amplifying 
and disseminating them to the nation at large through institutions such as educa-
tion, the print media, and, as the case is here, tourism. As I show, these spatial poli-
tics were linked to specific institutions of possession and dispossession—from the 
use of local color to deny political emancipation to Taiwanese Chinese in colonial 
Taiwan to the use of theories of native rootedness to legitimate the exploitation 
of Korean and Chinese labor and to the use of place- and race-based language 
expectations to limit the social and physical mobility of colonized subjects within 
imperial society. The geographies of civilization and of cultural pluralism that 
structured the spatial politics of the Japanese Empire were imaginative, but they 
were also purposeful.55
OVERVIEW
During the era of Japanese imperialism, tourists visited all corners of the empire, 
including wartime conquests in China.56 Of these destinations, I focus on Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan. This is for three reasons. One, these territories were ex-
plicitly outside of the jurisdiction of the 1889 Constitution but within (sometimes 
ambiguously so) the territory of the Japanese Empire. For this reason, they posed 
a more troublesome conundrum to travelers attempting to make sense of their 
relationship to Japan than did Okinawa or Hokkaidō, which had been annexed 
outright in 1879 and 1868, respectively, and incorporated into the juridical terri-
tory of the nation-state as subordinate administrative units. Two, these territories 
were the site of multiple, well-publicized challenges to imperial rule. Therefore, 
the place of these lands and their peoples within the territory of the state and the 
space of the nation were a subject of considerable discussion. There are a plethora 
of sources, primary and secondary relating to the place of these territories that 
we can use to explore the relationship between spatial politics and imperial  tourism 
in the Japanese Empire. Three, among all the destinations for imperial travel, 
Manchuria and Korea—generally referred to as a single destination, Man-Sen—were 
by far the biggest draw. By the 1920s and 1930s, an increasing number of Japanese 
travelers reached out to Taiwan as well. These territories were the first destinations 
for imperial tourists and later came to possess the largest and most organized im-
perial tourist industries. Indeed, as we see in chapter 1, it was the desire to send 
influential metropolitan Japanese to the new territories of Manchuria and Korea 
that sparked the formation of an imperial tourism industry in the first place. Later, 
the domestic arm of the Japan Tourist Bureau, the Japanese government’s official 
tourist organization, largely came into being in order to facilitate travel by metro-
politan Japanese to Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan.
Manchuria is, in this regard, somewhat of a special case. In contrast to the 
Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Korea relationships, the relationship of Japan to Man-
churia is generally described as one of informal imperialism.57 As a spoil of  victory 
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after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained possession of the Russian railway con-
cession in Manchuria. This concession was unique among railway concessions in 
China in that it granted the owner the right of “exclusive and absolute administra-
tion” over a 438-mile stretch of railway between Dairen and Chōshun, including 
a mile of territory on either side of the tracks; this became known as the “Railway 
Zone.” In 1906, these formerly Russian tracks became the trunk line of the South 
Manchuria Railway Company, a joint-stock company in which the Japanese gov-
ernment held a 51 percent stake.58 In 1932, the Japanese army stationed in Man-
churia attacked Chinese garrisons in Manchuria’s major towns, and claimed a far 
wider territory for a new, putatively independent state, which they called “Man-
chukuo.” From 1932 until 1945, Manchukuo was a puppet state of Japan. In contrast 
to Korea and Taiwan, which were part of the territory of the Japanese state, Man-
churia/Manchukuo was a significant Japanese colony but never formally under 
Japanese sovereignty.
Yet, despite the many ways in which the political history of the Japan-Manchuria 
relationship differs from that of the Japan-Taiwan and Japan-Korea relation-
ships, this book finds many similarities in how imperial travelers made sense of 
these lands as places that were both inside and outside of the social and political 
boundaries of imperial Japan. While Manchuria presented special challenges to 
 colonial boosters, the practices of placing that they deployed were rarely unique. 
To the contrary, they were similar in ways that are worth paying attention to. The 
 similarities illuminate how the changes in the geopolitical order that motivated the 
Japanese government to establish Manchukuo as a puppet state rather than a for-
mal colony also forced colonial boosters and imperial travelers to re-conceptualize 
the relationship between Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.
We begin our story of imperial tourism and the spatial politics of empire in 
the city of Port Arthur at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula, which was located, 
depending on which nationalist spatial imaginary you employed, either in the 
Three Eastern Provinces of China or in Manchuria, a place that had always been 
rather distinct, Japanese imperialists insisted, from China itself. There, a group 
of Japanese settlers established a society to preserve the battlefield ruins from the 
Russo-Japanese War. Unlike memorials to the war dead that were established at 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and elsewhere in the inner territory, the Society for the 
Preservation of Manchuria’s Battlefield Ruins sought not only to “comfort the spir-
its of the war dead” but also to “foster unwavering loyalty to the national land.”59 
Manchuria was not part of the sovereign territory of the Japanese Empire. It would 
seem that only a very capacious definition of national land would include it.
But it was in the pursuit of affective connections to a national land that ex-
ceeded the boundaries of the imperial state that imperial tourism was born, thus 
it is with this chimeric concept that we begin our investigation of spatial politics 
between empire and nation. Part 1 explores spatial politics under the geography 
of civilization. Chapter 1 shows how imperial travel began to reify the abstract 
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concept of a national land by fostering emotional ties between imperial travel-
ers and a small number of sites in Korea and Manchuria. The idea of a national 
land (kokudo) was, like the concept of a national people (kokumin), extralegal 
and inconsistently defined. At the same time, it was, also like the concept of a 
national people, an extraordinarily powerful discursive object upon which people 
acted and which acted upon them. In a reversal of the extant practice of “colonial 
tours of the metropole,” which sought to induce submission to and desire for the 
metropole among colonized subjects by bringing elite members of these societ-
ies to see Tokyo and other urban areas, imperial travel arose to make meaning of 
the national land by creating a body of subjects who had firsthand experience of 
it and whose social position authorized them to disseminate their experiences as 
authentic knowledge.
If affective ties to a national land were the first way in which colonial boosters 
sought to place the Japanese nation on colonized land, they did little to address 
what imperial travelers found to be the obvious differences between life in the ur-
ban metropole and the colonies. Chapter 2 traces how the Governments General 
of Taiwan and Korea, as well as the South Manchuria Railway Company, quickly 
adopted imperial tourism and its central tools, tourist guidebooks and standard-
ized itineraries, to teach imperial travelers to see Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan 
as places within the space of the Japanese nation. Rather than simply denying the 
coevalness of colonized territory, tourist guidebooks used three modes—the his-
torical, economic, and nationalist modes—to place colonized lands within the 
bounds of a past, present, and future that was both “civilized” and “Japanese,” and 
at the same time, to mark colonized subjects as “out of place” in these same lands. 
In this, colonial boosters enrolled imperial travelers in the project of constructing 
a spatial imaginary of the nation that might one day overcome the core-periphery 
geography of civilization to encompass the entirety of the territory of the state.
Part 2 explores how the crisis of empire that Japan faced after World War I pro-
duced a shift from a geography of civilization to a geography of cultural pluralism. 
In the post–World War I era, the binaries of colony and metropole, colonizer and 
colonized, Japanese and non-Japanese, were re-constituted as relations between 
ethnic nations and cultural regions. In a time of growing anti-imperial activism, 
encounters between travelers and colonized subjects, and between traveling colo-
nized subjects and the state, became sites through which travelers reified a spatial 
imaginary of Japan as a nation of diverse cultural regions and yet marked the Japa-
nese ethnic nation as the nation’s political and cultural core.
Chapter 3 argues that the spatial politics of empire were centrally concerned 
with movement—as an ideal (free circulation) and as a practice (tourism). In 
the years after World War I, imperial tourism expanded from an elite practice to 
what one official called the “democratization and socialization” of travel—what 
we might think of as mass imperial tourism. At the same time, this era saw the 
establishment of new boundaries within the state that limited the movement of 
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colonized subjects, especially that of laborers and those engaged in leftist activism. 
Coming on the heels of unprecedented labor activism and social unrest and con-
comitant with a political push to universalize male suffrage, the effort to expand 
imperial tourism in the early 1920s was inseparable from the effort to create a con-
cept of imperial citizenship that could encompass the entirety of the territory of 
the state while still retaining a hierarchy of colonial difference. Through an analy-
sis of tourism’s border-crossing narratives, the chapter shows how the 1920s saw 
the rise of a new way of spatializing the relationship between metropolitan and 
colonized subjects. “Citizens” were those travelers with free mobility who were at 
home anywhere in the empire. “Subjects,” on the other hand, were those who the 
state treated as essentially “from” certain regions and who were out of place when 
they attempted to travel elsewhere.
The spatial politics of “from-ness” structured new ways of defining colonial 
difference. These politics were based on an understanding of the colonies as dis-
tinct and unchanging cultural regions, with particular natural characteristics that 
shaped the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the populations that inhabited 
them. Chapter 4 investigates the rise of a touristic discourse based on this no-
tion of a cultural region: that of “local color.” Appearing in response to several 
high-profile uprisings in Korea, China, and Taiwan against Japanese colonialism, 
local color discourse co-opted the rhetoric of cultural and linguistic difference 
upon which anti-imperial groups based their claims for self-rule and indepen-
dence. Instead, colonial boosters used local color to offer a vision of the nation and 
empire as a complementary space of diverse cultural regions, defined by history, 
cultures of labor, and landscape. At the same time, these mechanisms served as the 
foundation for new practices of dispossession and exclusion, including a spatial-
ized division of labor and the further dispossession of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples 
in the name of preserving the “national land.”
Chapter 5 returns to the affective space of the Japanese nation by examining 
how the geography of cultural pluralism encouraged travelers to experience the 
empire as a decentered, yet still hierarchical, multiethnic polity. The chapter traces 
how language became a vehicle for spatial politics as local color discourse shaped 
travelers’ expectations of colonized places and their inhabitants. Rather than re-
inforce a sense of shared nationality, imperial travelers used Japanese-language 
encounters with colonized subjects to articulate the impossibility of colonized 
subjects ever overcoming their place of origin to become authentic members of 
the nation.
Today, Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan are no longer part of the territory of the 
Japanese state. Yet spatial politics did not disappear with the end of formal empire 
in 1945. The conclusion explores the transformation of the imperial spatial imagi-
nary into an object of memory in the immediate postwar period. In the postwar 
era, the imperial tourism industry struggled to make sense of its former self. The 
U.S. Occupation required the production of a spatial imaginary of Japan in which 
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the space of the nation was symmetrical with the territory of the state. Japanese 
people struggled to re-articulate memories that had been forged under a previ-
ous geography, while the next generation of travelers created a new geography 
of spatial and social relations that addressed Japan’s imperial past and uncertain 
future in Cold War East Asia. In this context, the geography of cultural pluralism 
continued to structure the representation of Hokkaidō and Okinawa—places that 
were kept “new,” in other words, in the relationship between the nation, colonized 
land, and the motherland that Nitobe Inazō first defined as colonialism.
A NOTE ON PL ACE NAMES
Writing the history of imperial tourism and its spatial politics requires careful 
attention to the rendering of place names in roman script. Place names have a “se-
mantic depth”; they index networks of relations and shared histories.60 In the Japa-
nese Empire, place names were an essential part of the larger project of producing 
and reproducing a social imaginary of the nation that incorporated colonized land 
into the space of the Japanese nation. Japanese-language tourist guidebooks la-
beled each place or station with its name in Chinese characters (kanji) and its read-
ing in the Japanese syllabary (hiragana). Travelers encountered the cities of Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan in the language of Japanese imperialism, that is, in Japa-
nese: Pusan, Keijō, Heijō, Antō, Hōten, Chōshun, Dairen, Ryojun, Taihoku, Kagi, 
and Arisan. The colonial governments Japanified place names—the characters for 
the name of the Korean capital were read in the Japanese fashion, Keijō, rather 
than the Korean one, Kyŏngsŏng; similarly, official tourist literature described the 
reading of the characters for the capital of Taiwan as the Japanese “Taihoku” rather 
than the Chinese “Taipei”—to demonstrate that these places were now part of the 
space of the Japanese nation. In Manchuria, Japanified place names were often 
represented in parallel with Russian and Chinese names as part of a broader move 
to treat political transitions and imperial expansion as a natural part of the history 
of nations, as well as, in the specific context of Manchuria, to emphasize the local 
Japanese government’s commitment to the principles of the Open Door policy. 
The South Manchuria Railway Company’s guidebooks, for example, represented 
“Dairen” through its Chinese characters, bordered by a Japanese pronunciation, a 
Chinese pronunciation, and a Russian pronunciation. A similar practice of fore-
grounding the historical geography of place names appeared in the Government 
General of Taiwan’s guidebooks, which invariably recited the history of names for 
the island of Taiwan. In Taiwan, the chronology of place names served as a con-
venient tool for illustrating why Japanese colonialism was the most humanitar-
ian of all previous colonialisms—the Spanish and the Dutch, who had called the 
island “Ilha Formosa,” had been concerned primarily with extracting from the 
island only what was useful for them; in contrast, the Japanese, who called the 
island “Taiwan,” aimed to better the entire island. As we see in the conclusion, 
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deconstructing the shared history of place names was an essential component of 
constructing a post-imperial social imaginary of Japan that treated the empire as 
a problem of the past and constituted the present, authentic Japanese social body 
as an “island nation.”
The use of place names as mnemonic sites for imperial narratives of  Japanese 
national history was an important component of the nationalist mode of territo-
rial incorporation, the subject, along with the historical and economic modes, 
of chapter 2. But the phenomenon is perhaps equally well illustrated by margin-
alized and colonized groups’ use of place names to challenge imperial spatial 
imaginaries with their own, anti-imperial nationalist renderings of place and 
spatial order. Just prior to Japan’s colonization of Korea, for example, Korea’s 
King Kojong named Korea “The Great Han Empire” (Tae Han Cheguk) to signal 
the independence of Korea. The previous name for Korea, Chosŏn, had been 
chosen by the Ming emperor in 1394. “Han,” in contrast, was “a term traceable 
to ancient kingdoms on the southern half of the peninsula, an area, most signifi-
cantly, that had never been invaded by China.”61 When, in one of its first acts, 
the Japanese colonial government renamed the Great Han Empire “Chōsen,” it 
likewise conjured up a new political relationship, though in this case between 
Japan and Korea. The Government General stripped Korea of its nationalist 
name and bestowed upon it the Japanese reading of the name of its last tributary 
dynasty. In the current era, some Ainu activists seek to territorialize an Ainu 
identity by referring to the northern island of Japan’s archipelago as Ainu Mosir, 
or “land of the humans,” rather than the colonial state’s name of Hokkaidō. The 
territorialization of sovereignty and identity that this conceptualization of Ainu 
Mosir enacts owes more to a nationalist concept of community than an indig-
enous one.62 All the same it evidences the ongoing nature of imperial spatial 
politics in the post-colonial era.
This book uses the Japanese readings of place names within the Japanese 
Empire. I found this decision difficult. In the end, however, I decided that the use 
of the present-day names would have been an anachronistic ascription of a perma-
nent identity to places that were (and are) in flux. It would also have inadvertently 
effaced a colonizing practice that was an important part of Japanese efforts to nat-
uralize Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria as places within Japan. Instead, I wish to 
highlight the significance of renaming to the spatial politics of imperialism, which 
was part of the broader effort to culturally assimilate colonial populations, such 
as teaching the Japanese language in schools and converting Korean surnames to 
Japanese-style names. Whenever possible, I include the current Chinese (pinyin) 
or Korean (McCune-Reischauer) reading of the name the first time that I mention 
a place or site. Readers may also consult the appendix for an index of all Japanese 
place names that appear in the book with their current names in both the roman 
alphabet and their local script (i.e., Korean hangul or Chinese characters).
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Map 1. Map of Northeast Asia. The formal and informal territory of the Japanese Empire en-
compassed the islands of Japan (including Hokkaidō and the Ryūkyū Islands), Taiwan, Korea, 
parts of Manchuria, and the southern portion of Sakhalin. Map design: Lohnes+Wright.
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Transportation Map of
Taiwan
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Map 3. “Abbreviated Transportation Map of Taiwan,” 1931. The map shows how the 
 Government General of Taiwan suggested that travelers read the names of station stops in 
Taiwan. Names of stations have been rendered in Japanese pronunciation. Map is redrawn and 
simplified from Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Shōwa 6-nen ban  
(Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1931). Japanese pronunciations of place names are from Taiwan sōtokufu, 
Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1927) and Sawada Hisao, Nihon chimei 
daijiten, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Nihon shobō, 1937). Map design: Lohnes+Wright.
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In 1936, Nakanishi Inosuke articulated his frustration with what were called “ob-
servational travelers” and their not very observant travelogues: “The experts who 
write the authoritative accounts know geography, human feelings, and customs 
well of course. But they are writing nothing more than guidebooks. They do not 
have ‘eyes.’ Because of this, they do not have a worldview. And because of this, they 
are not painting a picture of today.”1
Nakanishi was a prolific proletarian writer. He had worked in Korea in the 1910s 
as a journalist. Upon his return to Japan in 1919, Nakanishi turned to writing nov-
els. His books never won awards, but they remain some of the most interesting 
Japanese-language works to wrestle with the dislocation and dispossession that 
attended Japanese colonialism and imperialism. His 1936 Shina Manshū Chōsen 
(China Manchuria Korea) and 1937 Taiwan kenbunki (A record of things seen and 
heard in Taiwan) are two of only a handful of travel accounts published during the 
imperial period that were overtly critical of imperialism.2
For Nakanishi, to have “eyes” meant to be able to see the structural effects of 
colonial rule, to see objects and peoples not as representatives of static “places” but 
as manifestations of social relations. In an essay entitled, “Okoreru Korea” ( Angry 
Korea), Nakanishi described in poignant detail what he meant: “Describing a 
group of Koreans as a wave of white robes has become a dream of the past. They 
[now] wear the khaki and gray clothes of dirty laborers.”3 The sights that seemed 
to represent “Korea” only obfuscated the reality of an imperial economy built on 
low-wage colonial labor. To write without eyes meant not only to write without a 
worldview but also to perpetuate “outrageous” distortions that fueled imperial-
ism and masked what Nakanishi saw as the true state of a world defined by class 
exploitation.
1
Seeing Like the Nation
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Nakanishi was right to critique travelers’ accounts of the colonies for their lack 
of a critical perspective on social relations within the empire. But Nakanishi was 
not quite right to say that they lacked a worldview. Japanese imperial travelers and 
colonial boosters had eyes—just not for the unequal social relations that Nakanishi 
sought to expose. To borrow James C. Scott’s phrase “seeing like a state,” imperial 
travelers “saw like the nation.”4 Modern states make terrain legible and manage-
able through procedures such as cadastral surveys and urban planning. Similarly, 
imperial travelers and colonial boosters sought to construct a place for the nation 
by observing colonized lands through the eyes of a kokumin, or national subject.
In the first decades of imperial tourism, to see with nationalist eyes meant to 
unsee the obvious differences between the experience of the individual and the 
experience of the nation as a whole, and instead, to see in the collective past and 
future tense. Gotō Shinpei, who was as much a pillar of Japanese colonialism as 
Nakanishi was a critic of it, described perfectly what this meant in an article on 
tourism to Taiwan. “If one does not recognize that it was the blood and souls of 
many pioneers commended to the mud of this land and the frantic toil and man-
agement of our predecessors that has at last called forth the sugar of today,” he 
wrote, “one’s observation stops at that of the simple naked eye—the eye of the 
mind stays shut.” To see meant to look, to refine one’s gaze and filter it through 
one’s imagination: “If we turn our eyes to the future, it is possible to see how Tai-
wan will gradually abound in splendor—complete proficiency as a land of indus-
trialized agriculture, the complete development and extraction of that which is 
now hoarded in the land—and if we don’t see this future then we are not fulfilling 
the job of seeing Taiwan.”5
Imperial travelers filtered their observations of the empire through a nationalist 
lens. They saw the present in terms of a national future and a national past. They 
abstracted from their own limited experience an observation about the nature of 
a place that they imagined would hold true for all national subjects who viewed 
the same territory—if they chose, unlike Nakanishi, to view it that way. Upon their 
return, imperial travelers presented their perspectives as the authoritative ones 
through a combination of their elite social position and the value attached to “first-
hand observation” of the colonies.
We start with the question of imperial travelers’ eyes because in order to under-
stand why the territorialization of national identity on colonized lands revolved 
so closely around imperial tourism, we must first understand the relationship be-
tween the practice of observation that imperial tourism encouraged and the social 
position of the travelers who were chosen to undertake it. Like Mary Louise Pratt’s 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European travelers, Japanese imperial travel-
ers sought to make imperial expansion “meaningful and desirable, even though the 
material benefits accrued mainly to the few.”6 If early modern European travelers 
described Africa, the Americas, and Asia in terms of a “planetary consciousness” 
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and framed their observations as the discovery of natural laws and natural  social 
orders that would be beneficial to all of humankind, early twentieth-century 
Japanese imperial travelers framed their observations in terms of an intertwined 
planetary and national consciousness. On the one hand, they sought to describe 
particular observations in terms of their broader historical meaning, to define the 
key sites of Japanese imperialism and colonialism as episodes in a larger story 
of human progress.7 On the other hand, they also denied how class shaped their 
experiences and that of others by representing their observations as those of a 
universal Japanese national subject, a traveling everyman.
The method and results of their observations tell us much about the practices 
and politics of firsthand observation that would make imperial tourism such an 
appealing vehicle for spatial politics and imperial travelers such willing partici-
pants in the process. We focus here on imperial tourism to Korea and Manchuria 
because it was in the context of fostering affective connections between national 
subjects and these “new territories of the state” that imperial tourism first emerged, 
in the years immediately following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Imperial trav-
elers’ observed Korea as a place firmly on its way to becoming Japanese. These ob-
servations differed markedly, as Helen J. S. Lee has argued, from those published 
by largely lower-class Japanese settlers, who portrayed Korea as a place “awash 
with tension, struggle, and competition” between Koreans and Japanese.8 Imperial 
travelers’ accounts of Manchuria—in particular, their observations of the site of 
203-Meter Hill, the site of the Russo-Japanese War’s most famous battle—likewise 
represented Manchuria as a site of national triumph, in contrast to soldiers’ far 
more circumspect recollections of the battle, which questioned the value of the 
sacrifices that the largely conscript army had been asked to make in the name of 
territorial acquisition. Indeed, it was precisely in this erasure of conflict and com-
petition from the present and its displacement onto the past that the worldview of 
imperial travelers emerged.
A CRISIS  OF EMPIRE
The problem was this: Japanese subjects did not seem to care about empire. They 
did not care enough, anyway. And when they did, they sometimes cared in the 
wrong way (for example, when “caring about empire” meant suggesting the ille-
gitimacy of territorial conquest). Hindsight, they say, is twenty-twenty. But in this 
case, the clarity with which history has explained Japanese imperialism—as the 
logical complement to mass nationalism in an era of geopolitics and as the logical 
outgrowth of industrialization in the metropole—obscures the extent to which 
many Japanese imperialists saw imperialism as a project constantly in crisis.9
Perhaps crisis is too strong a word. Yet if we are to use our “eyes,” in Nakanishi’s 
terms, to read the history of imperial tourism and its spatial politics, we must be 
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prepared to suspend our received notions about the symmetry of state and nation. 
Instead, we must put one foot into the shoes of those colonial boosters who saw 
imperial tourism as essential to the production and maintenance of emotional 
bonds between the nation and its imperial territory and the other foot into the 
shoes of imperial travelers, who went forth to recast colonized territory as “the 
national land” (kokudo).
Our story starts, at least provisionally, in 1905. In this year, Japan claimed vic-
tory in the war against Russia, a war that had been fought primarily in Manchuria 
and Korea. The Japanese victory came at the cost of some eighty thousand (largely 
conscripted) Japanese lives. The end of the war was for that reason, if none other, 
widely celebrated. But the central government and the media had also worked 
hard to foment mass nationalism during the war, and in this sense the victory was 
celebrated not only as an end to the killing but also as Japan’s triumph on the world 
stage. Though the promotion of mass nationalism had begun in earnest with the 
1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, it was helped immensely a decade later by the large 
number of conscripted troops fighting in Manchuria and Korea—nearly ten times 
the number that had fought in the Sino-Japanese War—and by the introduction of 
new technologies for bringing the battlefield to the home front. Newspapers ran 
photographs of battlefields and competed for the most up-to-date reports, which 
they received via telegraph. The live narration of silent newsreels of battles brought 
audiences in Tokyo and Osaka to a fever pitch of jingoism, while new infrastruc-
ture, such as Hibiya Park in Tokyo, encouraged mass sentiment as never before.10 
It was this reservoir of patriotic sentiment upon which the Tokyo Asahi shinbun 
(Tokyo Asahi Newspaper) drew when it invited applications for the first travel ex-
pedition to Japan’s newest territories a year later: “Go! I will go too—to the new 
paradise that our Japan has opened up after two years of great hardship.”11
But all was not as celebratory as the advertisement suggested. Jingoistic press 
statements about the expedition contained elements of performance and coercion. 
The Treaty of Portsmouth, which settled the conflict, transferred to Japan the Rus-
sian leasehold and railway concession in southern Manchuria and placed Korea 
under the guidance of Japan as a “protectorate.” While Korea and southern Man-
churia were under Japanese management, however, they were not placed under 
Japanese sovereignty. Nor was Japan granted an indemnity from Russia to cover 
the extraordinary costs of the war, a practice that had been a standard component 
of previous conflicts between Western and Asian states and had, in fact, even been 
part of the resolution of the previous Sino-Japanese War. At the news of the settle-
ment’s paltry terms, some thirty thousand people in Tokyo gathered in Hibiya 
Park to demand that the emperor reject the treaty. In other words, they rallied in 
opposition to, rather than in support of, the government.12 Protestors overturned 
streetcars and set fire to police boxes. Clashes with police resulted in nearly one 
thousand casualties.
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The technologies and practices that made the Russo-Japanese War such a pow-
erful vehicle for fomenting mass nationalism also made possible powerful and 
widely disseminated critiques of the war. In some areas within Japan, the construc-
tion of memorials to what the government and local elites termed the “honorable 
war deaths” and “voluntary sacrifices” of Japanese soldiers began even before the 
war had ended. But so had criticisms of the war. The increased taxes to support 
the war effort fell heavily on the urban lower classes, especially rickshaw pullers 
and craftsmen, who joined in demonstrations to protest the cost of the war. People 
in the villages of those conscripted made pilgrimages to shrines to pray for the 
safety of their hometown kids—not, as Naoko Shimazu points out, a necessar-
ily jingoistic act.13 Poets even inaugurated a new theme for the era—“war-weary 
poetry”—that lamented the human costs of the conflict. Emblematic of this group 
was Yosano Akiko, whose poem to her conscripted younger brother, “You must 
not die” (Kimi shinitamaukoto nakare), earned her the opprobrium of the pro-war 
literary establishment, one of whom called the poem “unforgiveable as a Japanese 
national (kokumin).”14
You now indeed, succeeding a loved father,
Are master of that house which in Sakai
For countless years has kept the merchants’ code.
O no, my brother; no, you must not die.
Let the damn fortress at Port Arthur fall
Or let it stand, what difference can it make
To merchant folk who are not called to cramp
Their lives in patterns cut for samurai?15
The wartime debate over the legitimacy of the war coalesced around the question 
of who the kokumin, “national people,” were and what their best interests would 
be.16 Yosano’s critique was one of many. But it spread widely because, in the words 
of Sho Konishi, it “poetically rendered” a central concern of antiwar activists—that 
the fight to claim territory in Manchuria was not, as the government would have 
it, in the interests of the nation but rather in the interests of the few.17 Were the 
kokumin a horizontal community of compatriots that existed prior to the state? 
Or, as in Yosano’s formulation, was the idea of a kokumin merely an ideological 
tool that reframed the interests of the few as the needs of the many? Fueling the 
debate was the fact that kokumin itself was an extralegal category, a type of politi-
cal identification that emerged in thought and action rather than in ethnicity or 
nationality.18 It was not the same category as that which was used to define legal 
Japanese citizenship—the category of Japanese, Nihonjin, was defined by the 1899 
Nationality Act as those born to a Japanese father. Nor was it the category used to 
describe all of the people within the territory of the state, who were instead defined 
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by the Constitution as the emperor’s subjects, shinmin. Moreover, the term was not 
linked to any static geography of inside and outside or new and old territory but 
instead moved in little relation to, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, the harden-
ing of a geographic structure of imperial citizenship. It was likewise unrelated to 
the franchise. The right to vote was extended to Hokkaidō residents (who met tax 
qualifications) in 1904, and residents of Okinawa got the right to vote in 1912, while 
in 1925 the Universal Suffrage Act excluded both Japanese and colonized residents 
of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan from voting for parliamentary representation.19 
Yet, particularly after the 1930s, even colonized subjects were expected to perform 
kokumin-ness through the use of the Japanese language and eventually, for men, 
through military service in order to demonstrate their suitability for the rights and 
responsibilities of citizenship.
Instead of a strict legal category, then, kokumin was an affective and performa-
tive one. Commentators used it to further their own political positions on how 
Japanese nationals ought to behave and how the government ought to behave to-
ward them. When the term first emerged, it was as a liberal rallying cry during 
the 1870s Freedom and Popular Rights Movement, in opposition to what these 
activists saw as the statist centralism of the ruling elite. Other activists used ko-
kuminshugi, “national people-ism,” to connote a political formation based around 
the protection of liberal individualism.20 But the powerful also used kokumin to 
coerce particular behaviors out of the less powerful—to encourage subjects to be-
have as kokumin. In the lead-up to the promulgation of the 1889 Constitution, the 
state quickly co-opted the term to denote “patriotic citizens,” especially those who 
promoted what Carol Gluck has called the “civil morality” of the state.21 During 
the Russo-Japanese War, the government continued to use the kokumin ideal to 
exhort the Japanese people to support the war effort and, more broadly, to encour-
age loyalty to a government that was, through tax qualifications on voting and the 
separation of administration from parliamentary representation, largely insulated 
from the public.
The war also brought to the fore tensions in the modern nation-state ideal 
itself. As Sho Konishi argues, the antiwar movement forwarded a powerful cri-
tique of modern international-relations theory and its vision of a peaceful world 
founded on a global order of territorial nation-states. As articulated by figures 
as wide ranging as Theodore Roosevelt, who presided over the settlement of the 
Russo-Japanese War, and Nitobe Inazō, the founder of colonial policy studies in 
Japan, conflict was not an inherent component of the Western concept of civiliza-
tion but rather external to it, the fault of barbarous societies stuck in a “state of 
nature.” In this framework, the expansion of civilization and its spatial framework 
of territorialized nation-states was a necessary and morally defensible goal of civi-
lized nations. For Yosano and her fellow antiwar activists in the leftist press, how-
ever, the idea that the placement of all the world’s territory under the  sovereignty 
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of individual nation-states would lead to world peace “was not just a jargon of 
diplomacy to mask the intent of territorial gain.”22 It was a delusional, “utopian” 
logic that countenanced colonialism and wars of imperialist expansion, such as the 
Russian and Japanese battle over the control of Manchuria and Korea, in the name 
of a future of peace and order.23
In the context of the scramble for territory and spheres of influence in early 
twentieth-century East Asia, generating affective ties to these new territories of the 
state and, through this process, producing “good” national subjects became a seri-
ous concern of both the central government and colonial boosters in Manchuria 
and Korea. Fearing that the Japanese public would quickly lose interest or even turn 
against Japan’s expansion abroad, at war’s end, the government embarked on new 
programs of indoctrination to reclaim the narrative of the Russo-Japanese War as 
a victory for the nation. The emperor appeared at celebration rallies and issued re-
scripts proclaiming his support for the peace treaty. The Ministry of Education re-
newed its commitment to teaching ethics in schools—classes that encouraged stu-
dents to see their primary responsibility as service to the state.24 And in July 1906, 
two ships departed Japan for Manchuria and Korea, territories that had been the 
site of the most recent battles and were now—with the peace settlement—within 
the internationally recognized sphere of interest of the Japanese state. One was 
the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper’s four-hundred-participant “Manchuria-Korea Travel 
Ship” (Man-Kan jun’yū sen).25 The other was a ship carrying nearly six hundred 
students and teachers sponsored by the Ministry of Education and the army.26
THE BIRTH OF OBSERVATIONAL TR AVEL
The departure of the two travel expeditions for Manchuria and Korea marked 
not only the “birth of overseas travel,” but also the birth of “observational travel” 
(shisatsu ryokō) as a core component of the government’s larger project of produc-
ing good national subjects.27 Given its nationalistic overtones, this practice has 
understandably been called “self-administered citizenship training.”28 But the pro-
duction of nation-states and national subjects did not take place in a vacuum, with 
the territorial domain and national consciousness of each individual nation-state 
expanding outward into a white space of unclaimed territory. It was embedded in 
the presumptions of the modern inter-state system, within which Japanese leaders 
imagined Japan as one of many centers around the globe from which civilization 
would emanate, and in the system’s utopian logic, which countenanced territorial 
expansion as a necessary evil for the larger good. In other words, observational 
travel was not only a way of teaching national subjects to understand Japanese 
citizenship in the context of a national land that incorporated conquered terri-
tory. It also positioned that territory within a future global order of territorial 
nation-states. The firsthand observations of travelers took place within this dual 
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order of the geography of civilization. Thus observational travel might more profit-
ably be considered a practice rooted not in the pathology of a particularly Japanese 
nationalism but as a new stage in the larger—and longer—project of naturalizing 
the imperialism of civilization around the globe.29
Travel itself was not new to Japan. Domestic travel had been a popular leisure 
activity in Japan since at least the late eighteenth century, when pilgrimage and 
“medicinal hot springs travel” were the only recognized reasons for a commoner 
to leave home. Presenting a famous shrine or a hot spring as their official destina-
tion, commoners would tour a wide area to and from that spot, visiting local sights 
along the way.30 Moreover, the Meiji government had already been sending elite 
students and officials on sponsored study travel to the United States and Europe 
for nearly fifty years.31 In the 1880s, higher schools adopted this practice by send-
ing students out on educational trips to local areas so that they might practice 
disciplined observation outside of the classroom. And since 1893, an unofficial 
organization of political and commercial elites, the Welcome Society (Kihinkai), 
had facilitated the travel of elite foreigners to Japan.32
But observational travel to the new territories differed from these previous 
practices in two senses: one, the purpose of travel was neither leisure nor the ex-
perience of particular sites but rather the observation of the national land and its 
component parts; and two, it was heavily managed by the central and colonial 
governments and by colonial enterprises to achieve a particular political end—the 
production and reproduction of Japanese national subjects who had emotional 
bonds to colonized land. It was not the act of travel, in other words, that produced 
the good national subject, but rather the act of observing—or, more precisely, the 
way in which imperial travelers translated their experiences into “observations.”33
To observe the national land meant to see the landscape within the dual or-
der of the geography of civilization—in terms of the history of the Japanese na-
tion and, at the same time, in terms of a future global order of interlinked and 
commensurable nation-states. The next chapter addresses the latter half of this 
equation. Here, we direct ourselves to the first problem—what it meant to see the 
land in terms of the history of the Japanese nation. It is here that travelers began 
the work of constructing observations of the national land that collapsed the gap 
between their personal experiences or relations to historical events and the offi-
cial history of these events. Kanō Shigorō, the principal of Tokyo Higher Normal 
School, laid out the rules as he dispatched his students to Manchuria and Korea in 
1906: “A great many kokumin know only part of the layout of the battlefields and 
the conditions of warfare from a few newspapers or magazines, and chances to 
witness the sites of victory are scarce,” he wrote. “Because of this, they are not able 
to form deep impressions of the war.”34 Kanō encouraged his charges to go beyond 
this. “Those who will become teachers must not stop at simply reading accounts 
of battles or gaining information about the war from conversations with others,” 
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he exhorted. Rather, “they must go themselves to the battle sites, reflect deeply [on 
them], and use these materials to enlighten today’s subjects and guide the next 
generation.”35
The idea that firsthand observation of objects or phenomena in isolation pro-
duced knowledge is, of course, a (if not the) foundational principle of scientific 
thought. Training in scientific observation was a core component of the educa-
tional curriculum in Japan, as elsewhere. But observation was also a “transposition 
of the real” into received categories of experience and explanation, and it was in 
this vein that the first imperial tours were envisioned.36 Such a practice was already 
at the core of new methods of education in Japanese primary schools, where edu-
cators used Swiss pedagogue Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi’s “developmental learn-
ing” method to improve students’ individual faculties through direct experience 
and sensory-based observation.37 One of the goals of the Meiji state’s educational 
system was the reorienting of local life around the abstract categories of modern 
society—developmental time, civility, and the nation. In this context, the bound-
ary between the categories of “knowledge” and “experience” necessarily blurred. 
Experience came to be determined not by “what is around the individual, but how 
that environment connects with abstract criteria—knowledge, be it objectified by 
science or a national common sense.”38
Geography education was particularly suited to active learning. Meiji-era el-
ementary school teachers often took their students on field trips in order to trans-
form the local landscape into a laboratory of geographic observation. The purpose 
of these trips, which visited local monuments, historic sites, and topographical 
landmarks, was to “increase the child’s powers of observation” by fostering “the 
students’ capacity to observe what is in front of their eyes.”39 But what students 
actually learned to observe was the metageographic relationship between their lo-
cality, their region, and the nation-state, in which “local materials” such as historic 
monuments and shrines linked the students’ home communities to the nation as 
a whole.40 For Meiji-era elementary school students, for example, part of seeing 
Nagano Prefecture’s Mt. Ontake was seeing it as “the second highest mountain in 
Japan after Mt. Fuji.”41 For older students, the destinations were farther afield, but 
the process of observation was the same. One 1902 all-Japan guide for school travel 
built upon the local-regional-national metageography by organizing the sites to be 
seen by prefecture, starting with the publisher’s locality of Osaka and combining 
to make up all the sites to be seen in Great Japan (dai Nihon).42
The “blurring of the difference between knowledge and the sensate in the logic 
of the nation” is readily apparent in the accounts of the first imperial travelers 
to Manchuria. Imperial travelers attempted to describe the knowledge that they 
gained through travel in the terms of a nationalist metageography of exclusive and 
stacking territorial relations.43 Relaying his impressions of his journey to Manchu-
ria and Korea, for example, Miyatsu Kenjirō of Kōbe, a member of the 1906 Tokyo 
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Asahi Newspaper expedition, chastised his fellow countrymen for their failure to 
nest Russian Dairen within the space of Russia itself. He had heard from many 
people who were impressed by the achievements of the Russians in Dairen and 
who worried about whether Japan had the resources to rebuild the infrastructure 
that the Russians had first installed, let alone develop Dairen further. But to truly 
observe the current situation in Manchuria, Miyatsu argued, one had to under-
stand how to organize the land under observation into the larger territorial catego-
ries of the modern world. In this sense, those who made one part of Russia stand 
in for the whole of the country had it precisely backward. This was an “error in 
observation.” Instead, one should see Russian Dairen in the context of Russia as a 
whole, where, he noted, there were many internal disturbances that were weaken-
ing the country. Dairen did not describe Russia; rather, Russia described Dairen. 
Applying his style of “correct” observation to the now Japanese city in front of him, 
Miyatsu argued that the spirit of the nation would ultimately determine the fate of 
Japanese Dairen. “Even if it is a major power, Russia lost the war. . . . If Japan goes 
forward by uniting agriculture, commerce, and industry with the Yamato spirit, 
Japan will advance to a promising future,” he concluded.44
The line between correct and incorrect observations—and the line between 
where one nation’s spirit took over as the agent of history from other nations 
occupying a given land—was not so easy for every traveler to determine. In the 
context of imperial nationalism, the nationalist metageography that worked so 
neatly in the provinces of Japan’s main islands existed in uneasy tension with the 
core-periphery metageography of the expanding empire.45 Fellow traveler Kita-
mura Kikujirō of Osaka stumbled over the indeterminate boundaries and political 
geography in his observation of the region. “Even though I had a bit of knowledge 
about Manchuria and Korea through reading books and hearing lectures, it wasn’t 
until I actually set foot there that I thought, Oh, I see, and understood,” he wrote. 
Acquiescing to the problem of perspective—“ten people will have ten different 
impressions, depending on their own positions”—he nevertheless felt confident 
that Manchuria and Korea were now in some sense part of the territory of the 
Japanese state and perhaps part of the space of the Japanese nation. “Our Japan 
is a victorious country and an advanced country,” he concluded, “and now I feel 
deeply that as individuals and as a group we have a heavy responsibility toward the 
national people (kokumin) of Manchuria and Korea.”46 The already vague meaning 
of kokumin makes this statement particularly hard to parse. It is not clear if Kita-
mura intended to indicate that the people of Manchuria and Korea were distinct 
national peoples. Manchuria remained sovereign Chinese territory, even if parts 
of its territory were under Japanese administration. If Kitamura was indeed refer-
ring to the people of Manchuria and Korea as distinct national peoples, one ex-
pected that he would speak of the national people of Korea and China. Moreover, 
Kitamura envisioned some relationship between Japan or the Japanese kokumin 
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and the national peoples of Korea and Manchuria, but he likewise left the precise 
nature of that relationship undefined. Kitamura’s confusion should not be taken 
as a sign of his own failure of observation but rather of the confused reality of 
the burgeoning system of territorial nation-states, as opposed to their theoretical 
ideal. It also reflected the more intentional obfuscation of the national status of 
Manchurian residents that Japanese imperialists undertook in order to undercut 
Qing objections to the expansion of Japanese control over the region.47
If observing these lands meant first constituting them within a nationalist 
metageography, placing them within the history of the Japanese nation also re-
quired the exertion of the self as an active agent who held affective ties to what 
Timothy Mitchell has called the “world of representations.”48 In this sense, the idea 
of national land emerged as a vehicle for bridging the gap between the idea of 
Manchuria and Korea as new territories of the state—an idea that some, like Kita-
mura, struggled to populate—and the space of the nation. If observing the new 
territories meant deploying territorial containers that were themselves subjective 
and historical frameworks for parsing the world, it also demanded the deploy-
ment of the travelers’ subjective selves far more directly in terms of its requirement 
that travelers bear witness to the national land. In this sense, national land was a 
resource for the nation and its spatial reproduction not only in terms of the use 
and exchange value of its commodities but also as a site through which travelers 
could produce a sense of themselves as having an authentic claim to a particular 
piece of land.
Part of the value of observation for travelers was the ability to claim what Dean 
MacCannell has termed the “authentic” knowledge of the tourist—the kind of 
knowledge that comes from the tourist feeling like he or she understands “the 
truth” of the site in a way that is not available to those who have not seen it first-
hand.49 Indeed, even as travelers claimed a universal perspective, the authenticity 
of the tourist’s knowledge demanded, in some sense, the acknowledgement of a 
subjective position, of a body that had traveled to see the land firsthand. This was, 
as Nicholas Entrikin has put it, the “betweenness” of place—the existence of a here 
and a there was a matter of both objective certainty and subjective perspective.50 
Observation of the national land thus transposed the real in yet another register, 
by engaging travelers in emotional reenactments of a Japanese national history as 
if their experience of a particular site could represent the experience of the nation 
writ large.51 The emotional component was particularly important in the aftermath 
of the war, when commentators worried that nationalist sentiment was fading even 
among the more well-to-do. In another of the unintended consequences of mass 
nationalism, the postwar generation took the Meiji state’s mantras of “rich coun-
try, strong army” and “to rise in the world” (risshin shusse) and transformed them 
into calls for individual success and individual wealth over state loyalty. Tokutomi 
Sohō, editor of the pro-government newspaper Kokumin shinbun (Citizens’ news), 
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complained that the younger generation had lost “all, or at least a major portion of, 
the national awareness” that had characterized the previous generation.52
Indeed, unlike other mnemonic sites relating to the extra-archipelagic his-
tory of the Japanese nation—sites that included a growing number of memo-
rial and  commemorative monuments to the Russo-Japanese War in Japan, vis-
its to the Toyokuni shrines of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (the architect of two late 
sixteenth-century invasions of Korea), and exhibits at expositions—the first 
tours of Manchuria and Korea brought travelers to the sites of historical events to 
 anchor the oftentimes fuzzy space of national history in actual (contested) terri-
tory. A visit to Genbu Gate in Heijō (K. P’yŏngyang), for example, allowed one stu-
dent on the 1915 Hiroshima Higher Normal School trip to “look back on that time 
twenty years before, when our empire first appeared from behind the curtain on 
the world stage”—a reference to the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, which was fought 
largely in Korea.53 The preservation of sites assisted in this reenactment. “Heijō’s 
old battlefields are things from twenty two years ago,” he wrote, “but [markers 
along] the pathway explain the preserved battle sites so that you are somehow able 
to put yourself back in that time.”54 The school’s other diarist noted that “the land 
we walk on now contains innumerable historical marks made by our countrymen 
(kokumin) hundreds of years ago.”55 Pusan (K. Busan) likewise sparked the second 
diarist to imagine himself in a relationship with the soldiers in Katō Kiyomasa and 
Konishi Yukinaga’s sixteenth-century armies. Pusan was the site where Hideyo-
shi’s invasion force landed; the student wrote, “[It is a place] where the blood of 
countless of my countrymen runs.”56
But it was the battlefield sites of the Russo-Japanese War that received the most 
emphasis in these early years. This was for two reasons. First, the Treaty of Ports-
mouth did not settle the conflict between Japan and China over the control of 
Manchuria; it simply shifted the terms of debate from whether Japan would have a 
stake in the territory to how much of a stake it could claim. Second, as we explore 
in the next chapter, the growing number of Japanese residents of the Kwantung 
Leased Territory, generally white-collar workers attached to the South Manchuria 
Railway Company and its growing kingdom of industries, felt their place within 
the nation to be unsteadily acknowledged by their metropolitan counterparts. For 
both issues, however, the response was the same—to bring imperial travelers to 
the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War so that they might develop affective 
ties to the contested territory. Standing under a hole in the roof of the Memorial 
Exhibition Hall at Port Arthur (J. Ryojun; C. Lushun) and hearing the story of how 
it got there, for example, prompted students to contemplate the sacrifice of Rus-
sian and Japanese soldiers. One Hiroshima Higher Normal School student noted 
that the hall had been the Russian general headquarters during the war. But, “our 
army” (waga gun) launched a shell that went right through the roof, which “made 
the meaning of the memorial all the more deep.”57
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At 203-Meter Hill, the government of the Kwantung Leased Territory provided 
tour guides, often former soldiers, to narrate the events of the battle. The battle 
of 203-Meter Hill had been the bloodiest of the entire war. For months, wave 
after wave of Japanese soldiers climbed up a barren hill toward dug-in Russian 
machine-gun positions at the top. Thousands were killed. The eventual capture of 
the hill led directly to the artillery bombing of Russian ships in the harbor of Port 
Arthur, which could be sighted from the top of the hill, and thus the battle was 
quickly commemorated as the highpoint of the war and of the patriotic sacrifice 
of the soldiers who fought in it. Tour guides’ narratives were laden with emotional 
content, and in later years, guides would compete to be known for the particular 
way in which they retold the story of the final battle.58 But the landscape itself also 
played a role, as tour guides linked the narration of the battle with the experience 
of walking up the hill.
Student travelers described how they vicariously experienced what the sol-
diers had felt. The report from one student in the Tokyo Higher Normal School’s 
English Club illustrates how the students made use of the emotional narrative 
and the physical terrain to imagine themselves in the shoes of the soldiers. The 
students gathered at the top of the hill, listening to an officer recount the story 
of the battle.
Figure 2. The remains of a cannon at 203-Meter Hill. Postcard, c. 1910s. The ruins of battle 
were left on the hill like props on a stage. Digital image courtesy of East Asia Image Collection, 
Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip0162.
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According to the officer, the last assault began at five in the morning, as planned. 
Taking advantage of the fast gathering darkness, our soldiers pressed on [toward] 
the rampart, but the sword-like hills, the irresistible machine-guns, the scattered 
bodies of the killed and the wounded were serious impediments to their progress. 
Now marching, now stopping, they came always closer to the rampart. Just then, 
strains of our national anthem arose from the left wing of our army. All cleared and 
encouraged, they overthrew the enemy, who now appeared to give way somewhat, 
and sprang over the rampart in high spirit. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and at 
daybreak our regimental flags of the Rising Sun arose high above the heap of the 
enemy’s dead.59
The student quickly transposed the guide’s narration into his own observation, 
neatly using his own firsthand experience of the hill to claim an authoritative 
memory of the event. “Well, our schoolmates,” he wrote, “I can imagine how the 
brave soldiers this time forgot the strain and exertion of the furious attack in the 
joy of victory and in shouting the deafening ‘Banzai!’ ” Indeed, for this student, 
reenacting the event on the site itself animated the land with the emotional force of 
patriotism. “Greatly moved by the officer’s lectures and standing still on the traces 
of this memorable fortress,” he concluded, “I was quite oblivious of all else and 
absorbed in deep meditation.”60
Standing at the memorial that was later erected atop 203-Meter Hill, Hiroshi-
ma’s second diarist also had a visceral experience of the terrible battle. He tran-
scribed the words of the group’s guide as he described how the Japanese battalion 
attacking the hill went from eighty soldiers to only tens in the first day. Yet that 
night, they made earthen defenses, and by the next day, after climbing over the 
bodies of those who had died before, they planted the Japanese flag on top of the 
hill. The diarist then jumped in to narrate the story relative to his own perspective: 
“They stood atop that hill. That place is right next to today’s memorial tower and 
viewing platform.”61 Indeed, the hill itself did much of the work for the tour guides 
in emphasizing the patriotic sacrifice of the soldiers. As one student from Keijō 
Public Middle School later wrote, “If it is this hard to climb the hill on this nice 
road, it must have been a nightmare to climb it during battle.”62
The reenactment of a Japanese national history in situ encouraged particular 
forgettings and unseeings that were essential to the maintenance of the fiction of a 
kokumin defined by a shared historical experience. Battlefields were preserved, as 
the Society for the Preservation of Manchuria’s Battlefield Ruins (Manshū senseki 
hozon kyōkai) explained in 1914, to “make public our everlasting loyalty to the 
national land” (kokudo) and to remind the world of the “national strength” of Ja-
pan.63 And to a certain extent, the transformation of Port Arthur into a “town 
of historic battlefields” (senseki no machi) evidenced the concern of Japanese of-
ficials and residents in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the Railway Zone over 
the tenuousness of Japan’s claim to the territory. But if the ambiguity of Japan’s 
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 informal colonial rule in Manchuria fostered an emphasis on the national land 
in this context, it also exposed the underlying territorial anxiety of Japan’s im-
perial nationalism. Indeed, as the remainder of the book suggests, the certainty 
with which the international community recognized Japan’s formal colonization 
of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910 did little to lessen colonial boosters’ sense of 
the need to constantly reanimate and reenact the nation’s claims to these colonized 
lands. Nor did it dampen the amount of forgetting and re-remembering that such 
“observations” required.
Though Yosano Akiko would make no such claim herself when she traveled 
to Manchuria and Mongolia in the late 1920s, the Yosano of 1905 might have sug-
gested that imperial travelers visiting the sites of Hideyoshi’s campaigns in Korea 
consider what the stakes were of transposing a history of samurai—the class of 
military-aristocrats who governed the archipelago’s feudal domains prior to the 
establishment of the centralized Meiji state—into a history of the kokumin.64 Of-
ficial Japanese imperial nationalism argued that for centuries the Japanese state 
and its people had been trying, unsuccessfully, to reunite Korea with the Japanese 
imperial house and thus liberate Korea from its oppressive tributary relationship 
with China. Textbooks cast Hideyoshi’s sixteenth-century campaigns as one mo-
ment in a history that stretched back sixteen hundred years to the invasion of 
Figure 3. Travelers consult a map as they climb 203-Meter Hill. Postcard, c. 1915. The stamp 
reads, “203-Meter Hill, sightseeing souvenir” (kengaku kinen). Digital image courtesy of East 
Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip1201.
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the peninsula by Empress Jingū and the establishment of Mimana, a (mythical) 
small fief in the southern peninsula, and all the way forward to the colonization, 
or “annexation” (heigō), of Korea by Japan in 1910.65 Such a narrative organized the 
past in terms of the present. It cast the kind of tributary relations that structured 
foreign relations in East Asia prior to the advent of the Westphalian system as a 
necessary prehistory to the emergence of the nation-state, the harbinger of civili-
zation and modern international relations, and thus trapped Korea behind Japan’s 
supposedly more advanced temporal location.66 In reenacting this history, how-
ever, the transposition of a samurai invasion into national history also encouraged 
imperial travelers to understand the past of the archipelago not as a fundamentally 
different social order but rather as one in which Japanese-ness—in the sense of a 
national community—was always latent within the islands’ people. Reenactment 
thus fostered in travelers the sense of themselves as products of and participants in 
the history of the nation rather than—as some who opposed the Meiji state in pre-
vious decades had argued—as products of a far more recent ideological campaign 
to reshape social life on the archipelago into the categories of an international 
order premised on competition and cooperation between nation-states.
Even within the category of “nation” and “national experience,” imperial trav-
elers’ observations were fictionalized re-enactments of a national history rather 
than representations of shared experiences. In the European context, the “myth 
of the war experience” refashioned the memory of World War I into a “sacred 
experience, which provided the nation with a new depth of religious feeling and 
put at its disposal ever-present saints and martyrs, places of worship and a heritage 
to emulate.”67 In the case of 203-Meter Hill, what the student travelers needed to 
forget in order to remember was the fact that, as elite students, they were not and 
largely would not have been asked to fight. Conscription, as Kikuchi Kunisaku has 
written, was a “poor man’s lottery.”68 As the next generation of leaders, the govern-
ment offered elite students special terms of military service, which Kikuchi calls 
“government-authorized draft evasion,” that included six-week service for nor-
mal school students and pay-your-own-way volunteer one-year service for other 
elite school graduates with access to significant financial resources (in contrast 
to the three-year terms of other conscripts).69 But in writing about their visit to 
Port Arthur, these students—even those on the 1906 Tokyo Higher Normal School 
trip, for whom the war was a recent memory—conveniently elided the uneven 
demands the state made of its subjects during the war. Instead, they argued that 
their firsthand encounter with the battlefield gave them the authority to observe 
the meaning and history of the landscape in a way that those who had only read 
it about it could not.
The students’ reenactments of the battle of 203-Meter Hill as an intentional 
and meaningful sacrifice contradicted an ever-growing body of literature in the 
metropole about the futility of war. Much of the objection to war among the 
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 intelligentsia had been animated by the writings of Leo Tolstoy, who emerged dur-
ing the war as a “symbol of antihierarchical cooperatist anarchist internationalism 
and moral resistance to the war and Japanese imperial expansion,” as Sho Konishi 
puts it.70 Critics writing for the Heimin shinbun (People’s newspaper) amplified 
his reframing of the war as a conflict not between Russian and Japanese soldiers, 
but between oppressed peoples and their oppressing states.71 Following the war, 
critiques of the management of the war and, in particular, the wanton disregard 
for the lives of the conscripted, began to appear. One reason for the high number 
of casualties was not the violence of modern warfare but the inadequacy of supply 
chains, which left Japanese soldiers dead from beriberi (a vitamin B deficiency that 
would again be a problem in the Asia-Pacific War) and infection. Tayama Katai, 
a realist novelist known for his works Futon (Futon) and Inaka kyōshi (The coun-
try teacher), highlighted the meaninglessness of such deaths—and, by extension, 
the gap between nationalist fervor and individual experience—in his short story 
“Ippei sotsu” (One soldier).72 The story recounted the fictional tale of an injured 
soldier, who tried for days to get back to his battalion at the battlefront, only to die 
of beriberi before he could get there. That Tayama had been a journalist embedded 
with the army during the war lent the tale the air of realism. One former junior 
officer confronted the notion that the soldiers’ deaths were purposeful sacrifices 
for the nation more bluntly: “Death in war is not about dying because one wants 
to die. One gets killed without really knowing what’s going on. What’s more, there 
is no guarantee of being killed. I personally don’t believe that one can die that 
easily.”73 Yet imperial travelers readily clung to the “myth of the patriotic soldier,” 
reenacting their courageous fights and honorable deaths on hills left purposefully 
devoid of such complicating factors.74
THE C OLONIAL ORIGINS OF IMPERIAL TR AVEL
What I have sought to establish is a case for treating imperial tourism and its ob-
servational methodology as a particular kind of fiction, one that sought not only 
to place the Japanese nation on colonized lands but also to construct a vision of the 
Japanese nation as a coherent social body that could possess—with homogenous 
affect—a particular land. What I will suggest in closing is that the particularities 
of imperial tourism’s fiction point to a genealogy that traces the practice’s origins 
not to Europe’s Grand Tour or to Tokugawa-era hot springs travel but rather to 
the practice of bringing elite colonized subjects on tours of the metropole. This 
genealogy reverses the standard narrative of tourism in which imperial railways 
expand outward, metropolitan subjects follow to gawk at the backwardness of 
colonized subjects, and then, many years later, colonized subjects who have ad-
opted the bourgeois mentality and practices of the empire follow the same path 
back to the metropole to subvert the “tourist gaze.” Instead, it suggests that both 
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practices were part of the larger effort to produce and reproduce a hegemonic 
social imaginary in which identity was territorial and difference spatial. While 
this discourse existed in conversation with other tropes of colonial difference that 
circulated around race, ethnicity, and culture, it also existed as its own separate 
concern—one that could not be wholly addressed by recourse to racialized con-
cepts of difference in the context of the burgeoning territorial nation-state sys-
tem. The spatial politics of this social imaginary elided what Doreen Massey calls 
“geographies of solidarity” and what Nakanishi simply called “eyes” in favor of a 
territorial-national lens.
Subsequent chapters bear out this story for our largely metropolitan body of 
imperial travelers and the colonial boosters who sought to transform the new ter-
ritories of the state into (new) national land. But it is worth pausing here to note 
that in the context of the Japanese Empire, the idea of using tourism to produce af-
fective ties to particular territories—in this case, desire—began in 1897, in Taiwan. 
Indeed, the word for “tourism,” kankō, was first applied not to imperial elites but 
rather to a group of thirteen indigenous leaders from Taiwan who were brought to 
Tokyo and other areas within Japan in 1897. As Jordan Sand points out, the char-
acters that the government used to represent tourism “suggested both a civilizing 
function and the idea of duty to a sovereign.”75 The 1897 trip was followed in 1911 
by a second trip (and then seven more before 1929).76 Over time, these “tours of 
the inner territory” (naichi kankō) were expanded to include other groups of colo-
nized elites, including Koreans and Micronesians.
These tours of the metropole brought influential colonized subjects to Tokyo 
and other sites in the hope that a firsthand encounter with inner Japan would 
“shock and awe” these groups into submission.77 The Government General of Tai-
wan’s early tours for Taiwan’s indigenous peoples heavily emphasized the military 
might of Japan, but also the abundance, knowledge, and peacefulness of Japa-
nese society.78 The itineraries suggested, not particularly subtly, that if indigenous 
peoples would put down their arms, they too would gain the benefits of Japanese 
modernity. In 1912, one group visited military garrisons in almost each town they 
stopped at, as well as a cannon factory, a bullet factory, and an armory in Tokyo.79 
But they were also taken to sites emphasizing the lineage of the emperor, the be-
neficence of the imperial government, and the knowledge of the world and its 
flora and fauna that Japanese society possessed: the Meiji Memorial Colonization 
Exhibition in Tokyo, Asakusa Park, the zoos in Kyōto and Ueno, the aquarium at 
Sakai near Osaka; the Momoyama tombs near Kyōto; and the gardens at Kyōto’s 
Myōshinji Temple.80
The Government General of Korea instituted a similar practice of tours of the 
metropole for Korean elites in 1909, just before the colonization of the peninsula. 
In the first decade of Japanese colonial rule, the Government General of Korea, 
the Japanese-owned Oriental Development Company, and the major pro-Japanese 
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newspapers sent over a dozen “inner territory observation tours” (naichi shisatsu 
dan) to Japan.81 In line with the Government General of Korea’s formulation of 
its mission in Korea, the Korean tours emphasized governance, industrialization, 
and agricultural science over the displays of military power that formed the core 
of itineraries for indigenous travelers. The Government General of Korea sought 
more than submission to Japanese rule. They aimed for a complete reformation 
(kairyō) of Korean society. For this reason, the Oriental Development Compa-
ny also took Korean travelers to sites that exemplified local government and the 
cooperative nature of Japanese capitalism at the village level. They visited village 
governments, trade associations, and cooperative societies far off the beaten path, 
such as the Kako-gun Ishimori Village Buying, Selling, and Manufacturing Coop-
erative Credit Society in Hyōgo Prefecture.82
From this perspective, the observational travel of the new territories that began 
in 1906 offered a sort of photographic negative of the many Japans of colonial 
tourism. If for colonized travelers, tours of the metropole presented a vision of the 
inner territory that suited the needs of each particular colonial formation, for im-
perial travelers, one of the goals of observational travel was to subsume the many 
different subject positions that existed within the Japanese Empire to a singular 
relationship of a national subject to a national land. These were the dual “eyes” 
of imperial travelers—on the one hand, the eyes of an elite tasked with educating 
the masses and, on the other, the eyes of a generic national subject whose experi-
ences of the colonies could believably stand in for the experience of any of his 
or her compatriots. Indeed, Kanō, the principal of Tokyo Higher Normal School, 
embedded this idea of a social imaginary in his description of the work of enlight-
enment that student travelers and future teachers would do. He did not use the 
word associated with the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment (kaika) but 
rather the word for enlightening as a pedagogical act (keihatsu), a word that was 
closer to illuminating or edifying, the enlightenment children experience through 
education.83 Kanō argued that travel to Manchuria was “witnessing” or firsthand 
observation, but really it was meant to be a kind of training in a particular ori-
entation to colonized territory as national land that leaders in education and the 
army hoped would be transmitted to the population at large. For this reason, the 
Tokyo Asahi Newspaper argued that teachers should also be sent. Sending elemen-
tary school teachers would give these influential figures the “knowledge neces-
sary to grant present and future children the qualifications for being new subjects 
(shinkokumin) of a newly powerful country (shinkōkoku).”84 An arrangement of 
partial central government support was soon announced for teachers. The travel-
ers themselves would cover the remaining costs, though in many cases, prefectural 
governments provided considerable support.85
It was precisely this act of transposition and dissemination that the framers 
of imperial travel hoped to achieve. The elite status of early travelers presented 
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a rather different group than what we might expect from a history of tourism, 
which has long been considered to be a form of mass leisure, in contrast to the 
more individualized and elite travel cultures that came before.86 But while domes-
tic travel had been a popular leisure activity in Japan—and would continue to 
be so throughout the twentieth century—travel to the colonies was prohibitively 
expensive. The initial student tour of Manchuria in 1906 cost thirty yen—roughly 
what one higher normal school student could expect to spend in a year. This was 
despite the fact that the Japanese Imperial Army provided complimentary trans-
portation to Dairen on army ships.87 Even seventeen years later, in 1923, the Japan 
Tourist Bureau estimated the cost for a two-week trip through Korea and Man-
churia at 140 yen for a third-class ticket and a whopping 287 yen for first class.88 
Given that tuition for one year at the prestigious Keiō University ran 120 yen and 
one year at Waseda University cost 110 yen, even a third-class trip would have been 
a considerable luxury.89 Travel to Taiwan was even further out of reach. The Osaka 
Mercantile Shipping Company published new sixteen-day itineraries for travel to 
Taiwan in 1924, which listed the price of first-class travel at 374 yen, second class 
at 261 yen, and third class, an option that had not been available the previous year, 
at 170 yen.90
The central government, colonial administrations, and colonial enterprises 
endeavored to lower the cost to individuals. Student discounts provided by the 
South Manchuria Railway Company and the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Com-
pany, whose steamers replaced complimentary army travel, brought the student 
itinerary down to eighty yen. Itō Takeo, who later published a memoir of his time 
as a member of the South Manchuria Railway’s Research Bureau, described a 
seventy-five-yen trip through Korea, Manchuria, and China he took in 1917 as 
“cheap,” but this determination reflected either his position as a student at the pres-
tigious Tokyo Number One Higher School or his understanding that the price was 
cheap relative to the cost of such an endeavor outside the context of student group 
travel.91 By the 1920s, when government support waned, colonial enterprises, such 
as Mitsui Heavy Industries and Bank of Chōsen, also sponsored scholarships for 
higher commercial school students.92 While the expense of each trip slowly low-
ered as transportation companies developed further discounts for travelers, a tour 
of the empire never became cheap enough to be affordable to the masses. In 1930 
the majority of Japanese households (some 65 percent) reported an income of be-
tween 200 and 800 yen a year, with some 17 percent earning less than 200 yen per 
year. While a wide range, these figures suggest that sending a single traveler on an 
80- to 110-yen journey would, at best, have cost the average family more than one 
month’s income. It was more likely, however, was that such a trip was far beyond 
the financial capacity of most.93
But the elite status of imperial travelers allowed them to amplify their observa-
tions of the new territories upon their return, and for this reason, they were the 
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target audience in imperial tourism’s early years. In contrast to Japanese settlers, 
who crowded belowdecks to travel to Korea and Manchuria and often had bring 
enough food to sustain themselves and their families for the trip, early imperial 
travelers went forth with as much pomp and circumstance as government minis-
tries and local newspapers could muster.94 When Tochigi Prefecture’s Shimotsuke 
Newspaper sponsored a group of industrialists on an observational trip to Man-
churia and Korea in 1909, for example, the Japanese Bureau of Railways spared 
no expense in taking advantage of the publicity that the newspaper sponsorship 
offered. For their trip from Tokyo’s Shinbashi Station to Shimonoseki, where 
they would board the ferry to Pusan, the Bureau of Railways attached a special 
second-class car that seated seventy-one people, so the group could stay together. 
On the outside of the car, the bureau painted “Tochigi Prefecture Industrialists’ 
Manchuria-Korea Tourist Group Sponsored by Shimotsuke Newspaper” (Shimot-
suke shinbun shusai Tochigi ken jitsugyōka Man-Kan kankōdan) on both sides.95 
For the journey between Hōten (C. Fengtian; English [E.] Mukden) and Chōshun, 
the South Manchuria Railway Company provided a special first-class car, which 
the members of the group found so luxurious they all instantly declared their in-
tention of becoming shareholders in the joint-stock company.96 Upon their arrival, 
they were guided and feted by local chambers of commerce and prefectural asso-
ciations, such as the Pusan Tochigi Prefectural Association, whose members met 
the arrival of their ferry waving large banners that read, “Welcome Shimotsuke 
Tourist Group.”97
For students, their elite social position likewise granted them the ability to 
disseminate their observations through the privileged venues they had access to. 
There was a vibrant market for their new knowledge. Student travelers spoke to 
their peers as well as to alumni and others interested in hearing what these travelers 
had learned about the empire. The Tokyo Number One Higher School Travel Club 
organized, for example, exhibitions that displayed photographs and memories of 
the trip, as well as a lecture series where students could present their findings.98 
Other schools also offered public presentations and published reports in alumni 
magazines. By far the most common evidence we have of the self-consciousness 
of these students about the social value of their travels, however, are the extensive 
travelogues that many groups published upon their return. Often running hun-
dreds of pages, these reports detailed the journey from beginning to end so that 
they might serve as a blueprint for future travelers. They also included essays on 
the current state of various industries and institutions, such as elementary edu-
cation and banking, “not only so that the students’ observations (kenbun) might 
be disseminated, but also because the results of their investigations and research 
deserve attention.”99
Like the industrialists, who one impoverished Japanese settler  complained 
spent their time “running around in all directions looking for business 
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 opportunities,” the students saw imperial travel as a chance for personal gain.100 
In this way, imperial tourism united the nationalist “to rise in the world” (risshin 
shusse) ideal of Tokutomi Sohō with the younger generation’s more  individualistic 
 version of the slogan of which he was so critical. As members of the growing 
“new middle class,” elite student travelers treated their firsthand knowledge of 
colonized lands as, in the words of one Hiroshima Higher Normal School travel-
er, “our capital for the future.”101 Like the trans-Atlantic “sociological grand tours” 
of American progressives in the early twentieth century, for rising members of 
Japan’s new middle class, firsthand experience from the front lines of empire was 
particularly coveted as a mark of distinction and knowledge.102 Some students 
would use their firsthand knowledge directly as teachers of the next generation. 
Others would serve as bureaucrats in the metropolitan and colonial administra-
tions, faculty in Japan’s universities, and white-collar labor in a growing indus-
trial and financial sector that now extended into Taiwan, Manchuria, and Korea. 
Indeed, while records of the individuals who traveled to the continent during 
this period are scarce, the roster of the 1912 Tokyo Number One Higher School 
trip to Manchuria and Korea reads like a who’s who of the next thirty years of 
Japanese intellectual, cultural, and political history. Yasui Seiichirō went on to 
head the  Tokyo Social Welfare Department before serving as private secretary to 
Governor General of Korea Ugaki Kazushige and then, in 1940, governor of the 
prefecture of Niigata. Wada Sei became a professor of Oriental history, authored 
numerous works on the history of Manchuria, Mongolia, China, and East Asia, 
and managed the Oriental Library (Tōyō bunko), prewar Japan’s most prestigious 
library and research center for the study of Asia. Capping them all was Yanai-
hara Tadao, who took over the chair of colonial studies (Shokuminchi seisaku 
gaku) at Tokyo Imperial University from his mentor, Nitobe Inazō, and went on 
to become one of the most vociferous and well-known critics of Japanese colonial 
policy in the 1920s and 1930s.103
Student travelers relished the position of responsibility that Kanō had placed 
upon his students, casting themselves as privileged guardians of the nation’s fu-
ture. Sightseeing in the Russian-controlled city of Harbin (C. Ha’erbin) in north-
ern Manchuria on July 30, 1912, students from Tokyo Number One Higher School 
received a call from the consulate with the news that the Meiji emperor had died. 
“I thought of the future and cried,” one diarist wrote. “As the generation of the 
future, our group of twenty-four had no choice but to cry.”104 Another student, 
this time from the 1915 Hiroshima Higher Normal School trip, felt his future re-
sponsibility settle over him as the group gathered on the pier in Pusan: “As we 
boarded the Shiragi-maru in preparation for leaving the continent, the position 
of our empire came to mind. Our responsibility as educators pierced our chests 
anew.”105 Local officials reinforced the message. Another student recalled a particu-
larly memorable meeting in Port Arthur with Shirani Takeshi, the civil governor of 
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the Kwantung Leased Territory. “How is it?” he asked, after the students visited the 
memorial to Japan’s war dead atop 203-Meter Hill. “Have you come to understand 
the value of Japan?”106
Both colonized and metropolitan travelers found ways to critique the repre-
sentations of spatial difference and territorialized identity that they encountered. 
Colonial and metropolitan police censored the official reports of the trips of the 
colonized subjects, in some cases even revising the original comments into more 
positive statements.107 But critical comments trickled through. Indigenous travel-
ers mocked the Japanese government’s insistence on its own peacefulness, wonder-
ing why such a peaceful country would spend such time and resources stockpiling 
weapons. Others found the stark core-periphery logic of the civilized metropole 
and savage frontier unconvincing, commenting that Japanese people (naichijin) 
“live like ants.”108 Moreover, submission to Japanese rule was no given. Mona Ru-
dao, the alleged leader of the 1930 Musha uprising in Taiwan, was a participant in 
one tour. Likewise, some Korean students reported discovering the extent of colo-
nial discrimination through tours of the metropole, when they saw the difference 
between the science laboratory facilities at metropolitan schools and those at their 
own colonial schools.109
In the case of Japanese travelers, overt critiques were likewise rare. But one 
in particular was prescient. Reversing observational travel’s practice of collapsing 
the experience of one into the shared affect of many, one diarist for Hiroshima 
Higher Normal School commented on the potential for individuals in Dairen to 
create problems for the many. “Once you’ve familiarized yourself with this place,” 
he wrote, “you can’t help but agree that, like one wave becoming ten thousand 
waves, an action by the people on the South Manchuria Railway Company route 
will come to the metropole and become a problem for the whole country.”110
C ONCLUSION
In the years after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government, colonial 
governments, and colonial institutions set about creating a nation that had af-
fective ties to Manchuria and Korea. Imperial travelers were, for the most part, 
willing participants in this process, performing their kokumin-ness through their 
emotional involvement with the national land. Indeed, despite the wide range of 
critiques that circulated during and after the war, the basic premise of a territo-
rialized national identity would largely go unchallenged by imperial travelers in 
their writings on empire. Instead, the debate turned to whether and how these 
colonized lands ought to be placed within Japan. But critiques of imperial travel-
ers’ nationalist eyes, such as Nakanishi’s, would continue to play a significant role 
in shaping the spatial politics of empire—if only, as we shall see in later chapters, 
to outline the boundary beyond which the issue could not be debated.
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The point to be gleaned from the emergence of observational travel to the new 
territories at this time is that the state’s concern with producing subjects with af-
fective ties to colonized land was as much a project of naturalizing the territorial 
nation-state as it was legitimating the scope of Japan’s empire. As we shall see in 
later chapters, the images of Korea, Manchuria, and, later, Taiwan, as places within 
the Japanese nation and the image of Japan as a nation in place on these lands 
were shaped by crises more concrete than a conceptual kerfuffle over territorial-
ity and community in a system of territorial nation-states. At the same time, we 
should not ignore the centrality of the land to the ideological project of obser-
vational travel and imperial tourism. Imperial tourism was one component of a 
spatial politics that sought to construct a social imaginary of the nation that was 
inseparable from its spatial imaginary. In the broad sense, the spatial politics that 
emerged in the early twentieth century drew on symbolic-cultural elements of na-
tionalism, such as commemorative practices, geography education, and landscape 
ideology, as well as its political and technological practices, such as establishing 
international boundaries and cadastral surveys, to make the land under Japanese 
administration manageable as territory of the state and meaningful as the space of 
the nation. In the more narrow sense, the Ministry of Education and other actors 
conceived of observational travel’s contribution to that spatial politics as mediat-
ing and, in some sense, fostering ties between state and nation through the obser-
vation of the land itself.
This suggests that the story of the social imaginary of modern Japan—what 
Marilyn Ivy calls the “national-cultural imaginary” of Japan—must necessarily be 
“re-routed” through Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan.111 In the first place, the ideo-
logical force of observational travel begins to illuminate how the boundaries be-
tween practices of “nationalization” and “imperialization” were intertwined, with 
colonial travelers brought to the metropole to develop a sense of themselves as 
part of the space of the Japanese Empire and metropolitan travelers sent to the col-
onies to develop a sense of themselves as a part of a nation that included colonized 
lands. Of course, the stakes of “becoming Japanese” differed starkly for each group. 
But for neither group was the spatial imaginary of the nation a natural phenom-
enon. Rather, it had to be taught and, the colonial boosters hoped, internalized in 
order for imperial nationalism to be reproduced. Indeed, it is for that reason that 
this book begins with the intertwined relationship of national people (kokumin) 
and national land (kokudo) that travel produced, rather than with the expansion 
and integration of the imperial transportation network, a more standard starting 
point for histories of tourism.
In the second place, specific understandings of Japan and its place in the world 
emerged from imperial travelers’ and colonial boosters’ attempts to place these 
colonized lands within the space of the nation but without, as Nakanishi argued, 
its tangled web of social and historical relations. In this chapter, we explored the 
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production of a shared history through the reenactment of a national past in Ko-
rea and Manchuria. These wars of conquest remain central elements of popular 
and official national history. They also remain powerful tourist sites, with travel-
ers returning to Port Arthur and to the remains of Hideyoshi’s invasion of the 
Korean peninsula even today. Such “nostalgia tourism,” as Mariko Tamanoi has 
argued, not only “represents the nation’s yearning for the landscapes, lifestyles, 
and spectacles of the lost empire” but also sustains the basic erasures of imperial 
observational travel by “assisting the Japanese people to forget the power of their 
own state, which once dominated ordinary Chinese people in a place where they 
now entertain themselves.”112 Indeed, as Scott Laderman has argued in the case of 
U.S. tourism to Vietnam, nostalgia tourism reproduces nationalist history’s “tak-
ing” of places by reducing them to waypoints in a narrative of national rise and 
decline while at the same time erasing other perspectives on the meaning of these 
sites and of the power relations that shape what constitutes meaningful history for 
different audiences.113 Nostalgia tourism has not erased the history of empire, in 
other words, but rather has sustained the concept of a national land that exists as a 
place distinct from the other past-places that share the same land.114
A history of imperial tourism that stretches not from 1905 to 1945 but from 
1897 to the present raises questions for our idealized imaginary of the nation-state 
as a territorialized community. What the prevalence of so many different tools, 
discursive and material, for territorializing a Japanese nation on colonized land 
suggests is that the territorialized nation is largely a myth. This is not to say that 
nations did not or do not imagine themselves to be rooted in a particular terri-
tory. It was, of course, precisely this pursuit of territorialization that motivated 
imperial tourism and other modes of addressing the gap between state and na-
tion. But to define nations as themselves territorialized implies an achievement; 
instead, we ought to be analyzing a process. Shifting our terminology from ter-
ritorialized to territorializing calls attention to the continuous work required to 
sustain the spatial imaginary of nationalism and to how this work is never com-
plete but rather must persist in order to respond to the changing conditions of 
empire and nation.
50
The irony of imperial nationalism was that it was through movement that the “sed-
entarist metaphysics” of the territorial nation-state took hold.1 The steamship and 
the railway carriage produced practices of seeing and self-knowing that encour-
aged imperial travelers and colonial boosters to observe colonized peoples as out-
side of the Japanese nation in space and behind the Japanese nation in time. But 
it was not enough to deny the coevalness of colonized peoples—imperial travel-
ers and colonial boosters also had to affirm the place of the nation on colonized 
land.2 In this, their methods of locating colonized lands illuminate an aspect of the 
spatial politics of empire that studies of the representation of colonial difference 
in the context of Western empires and previous studies of travel in the Japanese 
Empire have overlooked. Colonial boosters and imperial travelers did mark colo-
nized peoples as not-yet-civilized, as primitive, and as backward. Yet this, in and of 
itself, was not justification enough for colonialism in an era in which the project 
of empire was transitioning from one of territorial acquisition to one of territorial 
maintenance. Colonial boosters and imperial travelers also had to locate colonized 
land within the nation in space and in synchronicity with the nation in time.
In the decades following the Russo-Japanese War, colonial boosters turned to 
tourism to create a social imaginary of the nation that incorporated Korea, Man-
churia, and Taiwan as places within the space of the nation. These colonial boost-
ers were a loose confederation of colonial officials, industrialists in the colonies 
and metropole, and, increasingly, public-private booster organizations, such as the 
Japan Tourist Bureau, the Taiwan Association, the Korea-Manchuria Information 
Bureau, and the Manchuria-Mongolia Culture Association, who worked to shape 
the public image of these places for both Japanese and foreign  audiences. The 
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individuals in these organizations would not likely have recognized  themselves 
as members of a larger group called “colonial boosters.” Nor did they always 
agree—settlers, for example, were oftentimes critical of decisions by the governors 
general that limited the privileges of settlers vis-à-vis colonized subjects or their 
ability to capitalize on colonial resources to the fullest.3 But they did share a desire 
to make permanent Japan’s colonial holdings and to get their compatriots to see 
these places (if not their peoples) as necessary components of the nation. In that, 
they shared much with the boosters who inaugurated imperial tourism to other 
colonial sites, such as New Zealand, the American West, and the Caribbean.4
In the face of growing anxiety over the future of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan, the colonial governments and the South Manchuria Rail-
way Company intervened directly to shape how imperial travelers understood the 
place of the new territories within Japan. One strategy they adopted was mount-
ing industrial exhibitions in colonial capitals to draw metropolitan travelers to 
the colonies, and sending elaborate pavilions to be displayed at exhibitions in the 
metropole.5 But metropolitan attendance at colonial exhibitions was generally low, 
and the complications of shipping flora, fauna, and historic artifacts limited what 
could be sent abroad for display. Rather than rely solely on short-term, big-ticket 
exhibitions, the colonial governments and the South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany turned to tourism and its central technologies, the itinerary and the tourist 
guidebook, to transform select portions of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria into 
permanent exhibitions. By carefully curating what travelers saw and how they 
made sense of these sights, the colonial governments and the South Manchuria 
Railway Company sought to teach imperial travelers to see Korea and Taiwan as 
places within the space of the Japanese nation, and Manchuria as a place that was, 
if not within the space of the Japanese nation, then at least outside of the space of 
the Chinese nation.
Colonial boosters encouraged imperial travelers to place colonized lands with-
in Japan through two acts of transposition. One was the transposition of the land-
scape into a position within the space of civilization, in which relations within 
networks of circulation and exchange and a progressive historical time of develop-
ment determined the essence and location of a place.6 The another was into the 
space of the nation, in which the location and essence of a place was primarily 
determined by its relation to an imagined end point of History, that is, of the na-
tion’s coming into being in its present-day territory. If, in earlier eras, it had been 
enough to declare conquered lands terra nullius, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
empires began to locate their conquered lands within what we might think of as 
the “ mosaic” or “jigsaw puzzle” metageography of the international system of 
nation-states.7 The nineteenth century was, after all, an era that saw the particular-
ization of civilizing missions in terms of national futures, such as Manifest Destiny 
in the United States or “Japanification” in Japan, as well as the incorporation of the 
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United States and Japan into the European system of states with its idealization 
of the territorial nation-state.8 Intellectuals in Japan and the United States under-
stood that the history of civilization was also a history of national becoming.9
Rather than simply denying the coevalness of colonized territory, colonial 
boosters used three modes—the historical, economic, and nationalist modes—to 
place Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan within the bounds of a past, present, and 
future that was both “civilized” and “Japanese,” and at the same time, to mark colo-
nized subjects as “out of place” in these same lands. In this, colonial boosters en-
rolled imperial travelers in the project of constructing a spatial imaginary of the 
nation that might one day overcome the core-periphery geography of civilization 
to encompass the entirety of the territory of the state. Thus the boosters’ proj-
ect was, in fact, threefold. One, they sought to teach travelers to see the colonial 
landscape as already part of a global space of civilization, rather than as places 
that remained forever behind the inner territory in developmental time. Two, they 
sought to teach travelers to see the colonies in such a way that it would be possible, 
in the present and in the future, for metropolitan Japanese people to see the pro-
gressive force of Japanese history as being located in the “new territories” as much 
as it was in the “inner territory.” And three, in the service of the first two goals, 
they applied the same discursive mechanisms that they used to place the Japa-
nese nation on colonized land to dis-locate or dis-place colonized subjects from the 
colonized territory that they inhabited.
THE WORLD OF JAPAN:  AS SEEN FROM THE 
 C ORNER—OR PERHAPS THE CENTER
By the time the Government General of Korea published its first tourist guidebook 
in 1915, the territory of the Japanese state had taken the form that it would hold 
until the establishment of a puppet state in Manchuria in 1932. After an initial 
period of colonization, which claimed Hokkaidō and Okinawa, the Japanese state 
acquired Taiwan in 1895. The settlement of the Russo-Japanese War netted the 
 empire the southern portion of the island of Karafuto, the Railway Zone in south-
ern Manchuria, and the Kwantung Leased Territory at the tip of the Liaodong 
Peninsula in 1905. In 1910, the Japanese state annexed Korea, making the peninsula 
a formal part of Japanese territory. Then, in 1914, the state claimed the German 
colony of Micronesia, a conquest that the League of Nations would later ratify by 
declaring Micronesia to be a Class “C” Mandate Territory under the guardianship 
of Japan.
Representations from the imperial center described the relationship between 
the territory of the state and the space of the nation as one of a progressive out-
ward expansion, in which the space of the nation expanded along with the terri-
tory of the state. The 1919 textbook map we examined in the introduction is one 
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example. But the representation of Japan as an expanding national-historical space 
stood in stark contrast to the actual structure of imperial rule, in which Korea and 
Taiwan were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Constitution.10 Likewise, this 
representation ignored the very real differences between the government of the 
main islands, Japan’s formal colonies, and its informal possessions in the Kwan-
tung Leased Territory and the Railway Zone in Manchuria.
Colonial discourse defined Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as uncivilized 
places, for it was this lack of civility that justified the treatment of the colonies as 
spaces of exception to national norms. Cadastral surveys, for example, were one 
mechanism by which the colonial governments incorporated colonized lands into 
the territory of the state while still marking them as outside of the space of the 
nation. Undertaken by the Government General of Taiwan from 1898 to 1903 and the 
Government General of Korea from 1910 to 1918, these surveys became a means by 
which the Governments General translated the discourse of colonial incivility into 
actual practices of dispossession. In Taiwan, the Government General delineated 
the mountainous interior region of the island as a special administrative zone 
because of its “savagery,” and declared all the land within that zone to be public 
land. In the Government General’s argument, indigenous peoples who resided in 
the area did not have a concept of private property and therefore could not have 
owned the land prior to the establishment of the Japanese colonial government. 
The Government General’s own research later contradicted this assessment. Nev-
ertheless, it became the basis for the large-scale transfer of legal ownership of land 
to the Japanese colonial government.11 In Korea, it was not the cadastral survey 
itself that led to the dispossession of Korean landowners but rather its subsequent 
effects. In its determination to make Korea an agricultural appendage of Japan, the 
Government General encouraged individual landowners to shift their production 
to rice, which would be sold to consumers in the industrializing metropole, and 
sweetened the deal by subsidizing improvements necessary to increase produc-
tion. When the price of rice collapsed in the 1920s, however, so did the welfare 
of a majority of Korean farmers. In the aftermath, the Japanese-owned Oriental 
Development Company became the largest landowner in Korea.12
The colonial legal system likewise translated the discourse of colonial incivil-
ity into institutional exceptionalism. The Governments General operated under 
two laws, known as Law 63 in Taiwan and Law 30 in Korea, which granted the 
governors general the authority to issue ordinances that had the power of law—to 
bypass, in other words, the Imperial Diet and any local legislative bodies and to 
rule by decree instead. In the inner territory, such power was reserved for the 
 emperor. Enabled by Laws 63 and 30, the governors general enacted penal rules for 
the colonies, such as the use of flogging to punish colonized subjects, which were 
specifically disallowed by the inner territory’s Civil Code. These practices were 
necessary, the colonial governments argued, because colonized subjects lacked 
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a level of  development that would enable them to respond to more “civilized” 
 punishments.13
Manchuria was a slightly different case. Yet even here the discourse of incivility 
enabled special practices that marked Manchuria as a place both within and with-
out the space of civilization. For example, Japanese residents enjoyed the privilege 
of extraterritoriality in Manchuria. The practice originated in the so-called un-
equal treaties that Western powers signed with China and Japan, and later Japan 
with China, in the late nineteenth century. These treaties granted foreigners the 
right of extraterritoriality in China because, the argument went, local courts were 
uncivilized, and foreigners ought not to be subjected to their barbaric justice. In 
Manchuria, Japanese residents had the right to be tried in Japanese consular courts 
staffed by Japanese magistrates, who would determine their fate under the rules of 
Japanese, rather than Chinese, law. Moreover, extraterritoriality justified the cre-
ation of a Japanese consular police force, whose duty it was to protect the property 
rights of Japanese residents.14 From this stemmed the establishment of a Japanese 
court system whose rulings superseded those of the Chinese magistrates (at least 
the Japanese court argued as such) and would come to form the foundation of a 
large-scale transfer of Chinese land to Japanese ownership in the 1920s.15
In each case, the Governments General and the South Manchuria Railway 
Company legitimated practices of dispossession through the legal and adminis-
trative constitution of Korea and Taiwan as somehow apart from the space of the 
nation, and Japanese Manchuria as apart from both China and the space of civi-
lization. At the same time, the representation of these places and their peoples as 
somehow outside of the Japanese nation in space and behind the Japanese nation 
in time imparted to many Japanese residents of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan a 
sense of precarity. In the case of Manchuria, settlers worried that Japanese politi-
cians and officials cared little about the future of the Railway Zone and the Kwan-
tung Leased Territory. They were not wrong to worry—indeed, commentators in 
the metropole questioned the “worth of the whole enterprise.”16 Despite early im-
perial travelers’ insistence that Manchuria constituted an essential component of 
the national land, others argued that the permanent colonization of Manchuria 
was a dangerous and unnecessary endeavor. In the years immediately after the 
establishment of the South Manchuria Railway Company in 1906, powerful voices 
advocated pulling back, while others, such as Gotō Shinpei, demanded push-
ing forward toward direct colonization. Itō Hirobumi, a towering figure in Japa-
nese politics, succinctly summed up the problem. “Japan’s rights in Manchuria 
are nothing more than the leased territory  .  .  . and the railway,” Itō stated. “To-
day, officials and even businessmen speak readily of ‘managing Manchuria.’ But 
Manchuria is in no way part of Japan. It is no more and no less than one part of 
China’s territory. We have no right to speak of exercising sovereignty in a territory 
that doesn’t belong to us.”17 Japanese expansionists continued to pursue territorial 
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gains  opportunistically throughout the 1910s and 1920s—most famously through 
the presentation of the “Twenty-One Demands” to the Chinese government in 
1915, one of which resulted in the extension of Japan’s leasehold in Manchuria to 
ninety-nine years. Yet others worried that the international embrace of the ter-
ritorial nation-state as the foundation of world peace, combined with the rise of 
the Chinese nationalist movement, meant that further territorial expansion in 
Manchuria would be perceived as aggression against an extant state rather than 
expansion into the fictive white space of terra nullius.18 As it had been during the 
Russo-Japanese War, the question of whether Japanese expansion into Manchuria 
was in the best interests of the nation remained an active question.
Japanese settlers and colonial administrators in Korea likewise felt the tension 
of their not-quite-in / not-quite-out status. Japanese colonial discourse empha-
sized the long, shared history of Japan and Korea and argued that a Japanese “an-
nexation” (heigō or gappei) of Korea would be a reunion between two civilizations 
with shared ancestry yet disparate histories. Yet travelers’ representations of Korea 
in the early twentieth century gave short shrift to the common ancestry thesis and 
instead described the peninsula as a strange and dirty backwater. Okita Kinjō’s de-
scription of Korea in his 1905 Rimen no Kankoku (Korea behind the mask) is illus-
trative in this regard. Okita acquiesced to the geography of civilization’s insistence 
on defining regions in terms of what they produced for exchange. But he described 
Korea’s products as ones of questionable value to civilization’s market: according 
to Okita, the “seven major products” of Korea were “shit, tobacco, lice, courtesans, 
tigers, pigs and flies.”19 Such a discourse certainly buttressed Japanese claims for 
the legitimacy of the Government General’s civilizing mission.20 Yet it also fos-
tered the insecurity of Japanese settlers, who, by the early 1910s, were fighting to 
overcome the strictures that the idea of Korean backwardness placed on their own 
economic activities in the peninsula.21 Some commentators feared that life in Ko-
rea was  Koreanizing, or “yobo-izing” Japanese settlers (yobo was a derogatory term 
that Japanese settlers applied to Koreans) instead of Japanifying Koreans.22
Further intensifying the spatial and territorial anxieties of Japanese setters in 
Korea were metropolitan attitudes toward the project of colonialism itself. In the 
lead-up to the opening of the 1915 Korean Products Competitive Exhibition in 
Keijō, the press and the Government General of Korea expressed concern that 
residents of the metropole were disengaged from the task of assimilating Korea—
a practice that aimed to Japanify Koreans through language training and other 
external changes, such as customs and social organization.23 As one editorial in 
the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper put it, the major goals of colonial development de-
pended on the ability of the Government General to invest the Japanese nation in 
the future of Korea. It was not enough for Japanese to stand by and watch coloniza-
tion happen, the editorial argued. The project required participation.24 None was 
more conscious of this than the governor general himself, who could project no 
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near-term future in which the colonial administration would not be operating at 
a deficit.25
In the case of Taiwan, the discourse of colonial savagery and weak metropolitan 
commitment likewise flustered Japanese settlers and the colonial government. In 
the 1895–96 military campaign to wrest control of Taiwan from Chinese guerrillas 
and indigenous peoples who opposed Japanese rule, the metropolitan media in-
troduced Japanese readers to the “customs” of indigenous life—hunting, gathering, 
and headhunting—while likewise portraying Taiwanese Chinese as lawless ban-
dits, whose ragged uniforms and lack of valor contrasted with the spotless white 
uniforms and bravery of the Japanese soldiers.26 By the turn of the century, how-
ever, the equation of Taiwan with savagery struck colonial boosters in both Taiwan 
and the inner territory as both old news and the key cause of the lack of metro-
politan investment—both financial and emotional—in the future of the island. In 
the face of the steep expense of establishing a colonial government, there had been 
calls to sell back the island to China at any price.27 In response, boosters proposed 
ways of increasing metropolitan appreciation for Taiwan. In 1899, for  example, 
Nakahashi Tokugorō, the president of the Osaka Mercantile  Shipping Company, 
which enjoyed a government monopoly on regular services from the metropole 
to the island, suggested renaming the island Nan’yōdō (South Seas province), be-
cause people associated the name Taiwan with the savagery and death of Japan’s 
past encounters with the island. “Therefore,” he argued, “it’s necessary to change 
it to a splendid and beautiful name that bears no relation to anything that came 
before.”28 Likewise, members of the Taiwan Association (Taiwan kyōkai), a booster 
organization headquartered in Tokyo, attempted to elevate the civilizational status 
of Taiwanese Chinese in the metropolitan imagination by  referring to them in a 
way that did not condemn the island as a whole to an  image of savagery and law-
lessness. The Taiwan Association argued that referring to  Taiwanese Chinese as 
“Taiwan natives” (Taiwan dojin) conjured up comparisons to “Hokkaidō  natives” 
(Hokkaidō dojin), in other words, the Ainu, and therefore, of an entire island that 
was “savage” in character. Instead, the boosters suggested “people of Taiwan” 
( Taiwanjin) or “islanders” (hontōjin), two terms that lacked any overt reference to 
a linear trajectory of civilization development or pejorative characterization of the 
island’s essential nature.29
Tied in with these concerns was, for the largely Japanese population of boosters 
around the empire, the problem of how to refer to Japanese people themselves. As 
the Taiwan Association pointed out, though official and popular discourse often-
times referred to Japanese people as “inner territory people” (naichijin), this moni-
ker only made sense if one thought of Japanese identity from the perspective of a 
colonial periphery looking back on a metropolitan core. It naturalized a hierarchi-
cal division between inner territory and new territory that settlers hoped to even-
tually overcome, at least in terms of their own place within Japan. Instead, Taiwan 
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boosters suggested “people of Japanese culture” (wajin), in contrast to “people of 
Chinese culture” (kanjin)—a division that incorporated all Japanese people, re-
gardless of place of residence, into the same category and upset the spatializa-
tion of the inner territory as the center of the empire.30 In Manchuria, the leaders 
of Japanese civil society in Dairen likewise referred to themselves as “imperial 
national people” (teikoku kokumin) or “Japanese subjects” (Nihon shinmin), two 
terms that expanded the space of authentic Japanese nationality to include Man-
churia. In Korea, settlers slipped between referring to themselves as “inner terri-
tory people” (naichijin) and as “Japanese people” (Nihonjin), a term that defined 
Japanese-ness in terms of parentage rather than location.31
PL ACING THE NEW TERRITORIES
In the years between the first tours of Manchuria and Korea in 1906 and the cre-
ation of an imperial tourism industry in 1918, the number of metropolitan resi-
dents traveling to observe the new territories grew steadily.32 It was in this con-
text of colonial anxiety and a growing market for imperial travel that the colonial 
governments and the South Manchuria Railway Company embraced tourism as 
a tool for re-placing the new territories in the metropolitan imagination. In 1908, 
the Government General of Taiwan published the first Japanese-language tourist 
guidebook to Taiwan, the unimaginatively titled Tetsudō ryokō annai (Guide to 
railway travel). The South Manchuria Railway Company followed in 1909 with 
its first Japanese-language guidebook, Minami Manshū tetsudō annai (Guide to 
railways in southern Manchuria). The Government General of Korea entered the 
field in 1915 with its own official guidebook, the Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai (Guide 
to railway travel in Korea).
A few years later, the colonial Governments General and South Manchuria 
Railway Company were aided in their efforts to facilitate imperial travel by the 
Japan Tourist Bureau and the Korea-Manchuria Information Bureau. Eager to 
promote the growing trend of imperial travel further, in 1918 the empire’s major 
transportation institutions joined with the Japan Tourist Bureau (JTB) to begin 
services for domestic travelers. The new services built on those that the Bureau 
of Railways, railway and steamship companies, and hotels had begun offering to 
foreign travelers through the JTB in 1912. At that time, the JTB opened offices 
not only in Yokohama and Kōbe, two major ports of entry for travelers coming 
across the Pacific Ocean, but also in Hōten, Dairen, Keijō, Pusan, and Taihoku, 
where the JTB offered tourist information and guide services. With the turn to 
the domestic market (which, in this case, also meant the imperial market), the 
JTB updated its physical footprint as well. In 1925, the organization added offices 
in locations that catered to the circuits and pathways of Japan’s growing middle 
class—Osaka, Kyōto, and Tokyo’s Nihonbashi Mitsukoshi department store. Other 
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tourist  organizations began services as well, such as the South Manchuria Railway 
Company’s new Korea-Manchuria Information Bureau, which in 1923 set up of-
fices in Tokyo’s Marunouchi Building, Osaka’s Sakai-suji Street, and in front of the 
station at Shimonoseki, the gateway to Korea.33
Concomitant with its turn to the domestic market, the Japan Tourist Bureau 
published its first compendium of tourist itineraries in 1920. The South Manchu-
ria Railway Company’s Korea-Manchuria Information Bureau followed soon after 
with its own set of itineraries in 1923.34 These itineraries guided travelers through 
their observations of colonized lands with little emphasis on encounters with colo-
nized cultures or peoples. Instead, the itineraries directed travelers to sites that 
signified the success of the Governments General and the South Manchuria Rail-
way Company at placing colonized lands within the space of civilization and the 
space of the nation: sites of production and circulation, sites that defined the past 
of each colonized land as a linear history of transition to Japanese rule, and sites 
that located colonized lands within the affective space of the national land and a 
collectively experienced national past.
Together, tourist guidebooks and itineraries did not present a “Japanese” view 
of the colonies in contrast to a colonized one. They presented a boosters’ view 
of the nation, one directed at metropolitan Japanese who did not have the level 
of attachment to the new territories that colonial boosters’ desired. In fact, the 
guidebooks differed markedly from another “Japanese” representation of the colo-
nies. In 1913, the Japanese Bureau of Railway’s published its first English-language 
guide to the empire, An Official Guide to Eastern Asia. Modeled after the Baedeker 
guides in Germany, the Official Guide sought, in the words of its primary spon-
sor, Gotō Shinpei, to “advertise Japanese culture and the Japanese spirit to the 
entire world.” For Gotō, this meant moving from an understanding of Japan in 
the universal terms of civilization to one more particular to the Japanese nation. 
“In other words,” he wrote, “to contribute to making rapid progress in moving 
from ‘Japan in the World’ to the ‘World of Japan.’ ”35 To introduce foreign travelers 
to the world of Japan, the Official Guide included pages and pages on Japanese, 
Manchurian, and Korean geography, history, and customs (Taiwan and Okinawa 
were contained in volume 2, Southwestern Japan). The guidebook represented East 
Asia from the perspective of the Japanese Empire, which was cast as the point of 
translation, both in terms of transport geography and knowledge, between East 
and West.36
The guidebooks published by the Governments General and the South 
 Manchuria Railway Company for Japanese travelers likewise sought to translate 
the landscape into terms readily understandable by metropolitan travelers. But 
they were far more circumspect about the necessity of knowing anything about 
colonized subjects. “This book,” the Government General of Korea wrote in the 
opening pages of the 1915 Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai, “notes almost all of the 
 famous places, historical ruins, and scenic sights along the lines of the Korean 
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table 1 A suggested itinerary for Korea–Manchuria travel. This two-week itinerary was the 
shortest itinerary for Korea–Manchuria travel. Longer itineraries took travelers farther afield  
in Manchuria, to the Russian-controlled cities of Harbin and Kirin in the north and to  
the port of Eikō on the Liao River. 
Day Location Sights to Be Seen
1 Tokyo [none]
2 Kobe [none]
3 At Sea [none]
4 At Sea [none]
5 Dairen Wharf, soybean oil factory, city
6 Dairen–Port 
Arthur–Dairen
Hakugyokuzan Memorial Tower, museum, memorial exhibit 
hall, various battlefields, old and new cities
7 Dairen West Park, Electric Amusement Park, South Manchuria Railway 
(SMR) Central Laboratory, SMR Sakakō (locomotive) factory, 
SMR Ceramics Laboratory, Hoshigaura
8 Hōten–Bujun–Hōten Open-air mine, Mondo tile factory, various mines, other 
factories
9 Hōten Inner castle [Chinese city], palace, Northern Tomb, new city, 
West Tower, Golden Temple, Hōten Park, Shōkawanuma Pond, 
Southern Manchuria Medical School
10 Heijō Daidō Gate, Renkōtei Pavilion, Botandai Pavilion, Otsumitsudai 
Pavilion, Genbu Gate, Fuhekirō Pavilion, Yōmeiji Temple
11 Keijō Nanzan Park [Keijō Shrine], Government General building, 
Museum, Keifuku Palace, Pagoda Park, Commercial Products 
Exhibit Hall, Arts Manufactory
12 Keijō–Pusan [none]
13 Shimonoseki–Tokyo [none]
14 Tokyo [none]
source: Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Taishō 12-nen (Tokyo: Japan Tourist Bureau, 1923), 256–58.
Railways.” With its comprehensive guide to Korea’s sights to be seen, the guide-
book was “truly the best companion for those who wish to travel Korea.”37 It was 
possible, in this formulation, to know Korea without learning a thing about 
 contemporary Koreans, as the guidebook contained nothing related to Korean 
customs or culture in present use.
In fact, the first editions of official Japanese-language tourist guidebooks 
 contained few textual descriptions of colonized subjects or colonial cultures. They 
did occasionally include a picture of colonized subjects, but only as part of a photo 
table 2 A suggested itinerary for Taiwan travel. 
Day Location Sights to Be Seen
1 Tokyo [none]
2 Kōbe [none]
3 Moji [none]
4 At sea [none]
5 At sea [none]
6 Kiryū–Taihoku–
Maruyama
Museum, Taihoku Park, Government General, Botanical 
Garden, market; Taiwan Shrine, Kenzawa Temple, Maruyama 
Park
7 Taihoku–Taichū Taichū Shrine, Taichū Park, market, Teikoku Sugar Taichū 
factory
8 Taichū–Nichigetsutan Sun-Moon Lake, Savage Tribe
9 Nichigetsutan [none]
10 Kagi–Arisan Mt. Ari Shrine, Sacred Tree 
11 Mt. Ari–Kagi [none]
12 Kagi–Hokkō–Tainan Timber factory, Kagi Shrine, Kagi Park, Hokkō Shrine, 
Oriental Sugar Hokkō Factory
13 Tainan–Takao Kaizan Shrine, Confucian Temple, Prince Kitashirakawa 
memorial sites, market, Fort Provincia, salt fields, Anpin Port, 
Tainan Park, Kaigen Temple 
14 Takao–Heitō–Takao Heitō Park, Taiwan Sugar Heitō factory, Takao Port, 
Lighthouse, Mt Hōtai
15 Hokutō Hokutō hot spring, Fudō Falls
16 Hokutō–Taihoku–Kiryū Port under construction, Sharyō Island, Courbet’s Beach, 
Senton Cave
17 At Sea [none]
18 At Sea [none]
19 At Sea [none]
20 Kōbe [none]
21 Tokyo [none]
source: Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Taishō 12-nen (Tokyo: Japan Tourist Bureau, 1923), 287–95.
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meant to capture something else—generally a site of production or circulation. 
The one exception to this rule was the Government General of Taiwan, which 
featured images of “native customs” from at least 1916 on, as well as a recommen-
dation to visit the “tamed” indigenous village of Kappanzan (C. Jiaobanshan). On 
the broad scale, however, colonial boosters did not encourage what we have come 
to know as “ethnic tourism,” in which “the native is not simply ‘there’ to serve the 
needs of the tourist; he is himself ‘on show,’ a living spectacle to be scrutinized, 
photographed, tape recorded, and interacted with in some particular ways.”38
The omission of any discussion of colonized cultures or peoples is particularly 
curious in the context of the widely publicized and debated assimilation policy 
(dōka) in both Korea and Taiwan, which was predicated on long-running schol-
arly and popular discourses about the backwardness and savagery of Koreans, Tai-
wanese indigenous peoples, and Chinese people in both Taiwan and China—the 
same discourses that legitimated the political and legal distinctions between the 
inner territory and the new territories. Yet the Bureau of Railways argued that 
Japanese-language tourist guidebooks did not need to include information on col-
onized subjects. In the preface to its 1919 translation of the Korea, Manchuria, and 
China volumes of the Official Guide, the Bureau of Railways explained that, “For 
readers from the United States and Europe, it was particularly necessary to provide 
explanations of such things as the conditions of countries (kokujō) and customs. 
But the general Japanese traveler does not necessarily require [such explanations], 
and, as such, we have omitted them.”39 In the end, colonial boosters presumed the 
imperial traveling public to be entirely too familiar with the customs and character 
of Koreans, Chinese, Taiwanese Chinese, and Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, and 
thought that they might prefer to learn about the land and its contents instead.
Colonial boosters used tourist guidebooks and itineraries to convince Japanese 
travelers of the success of Japanese colonialism and the legitimacy of Japan’s claims 
to colonized land. Central to this argument was the idea that the place of colonized 
land could be distinguished from the place of colonized people. In other words, 
that it was possible to describe parts of Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as “like the 
inner territory” at the same time that one described the colonized peoples who 
occupied that land as “out of place in this world.” To make this argument, tourist 
guidebooks and itineraries used three modes to define the place of colonized lands: 
the economic mode, with its emphasis on sites of production and circulation; the 
historical mode, which narrated the past of colonized lands as linear histories of 
transition from primitive existence to unified states and then to incorporation into 
Japan; and the nationalist mode, which located colonized lands within the affec-
tive space of the national land and a collectively experienced national past. Each of 
these modes instructed travelers to understand the place of the land as a matter of 
location within global networks of exchange, developmental time, and the history 
of the colonizing nation. Not part of these representations of colonized land were 
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concepts of place as essence or of place as a specific cultural region. Rather, tour-
ist guidebooks and itineraries treated the place of colonized lands as malleable. 
Moreover, the modes overlapped in contradictory ways, which kept the place of 
colonized lands liminal—always both within and without the space of the nation.
PORT S,  PRODUCT S,  AND THE CIRCUL ATING  
MISSION
In teaching Japanese travelers to see the territories of Taiwan and Korea as part 
of Japan, and Manchuria as not a part of China, the colonial governments and 
the South Manchuria Railway Company directed travelers’ attention to the infra-
structure of circulation and production. They portrayed Japanese imperialism as 
a “circulating mission” as well as a “civilizing” one. By the mid 1910s, new ports, 
railway lines, and steamship services had integrated the metropole and the new 
territories into a smoothly operating transportation network. Sites of circulation, 
such as bridges, wharves, and vehicles themselves, and sites of production, such 
as coal mines and sugar factories, featured heavily in the colonial governments’ 
and South Manchuria Railway Company’s representations of their own achieve-
ments in transforming the new territories into part of a new Japan.40 Blurring the 
boundaries between metropole and colony, these guidebooks argued that not only 
had the new territories been fully integrated into metropolitan circuits of produc-
tion and exchange but also, through the intervention of Japanese colonialism, they 
were now significant places in their own right within the global market.
Tourist guidebooks and itineraries gave ports special consideration as gate-
ways: sites where colonial boosters could contrast the smooth movement of goods 
and people between territories with the imagined isolation of the pre-colonial 
landscape. Pusan, for example, was a testament to the progress of the Government 
General of Korea’s Japanification project. The 1923 Chōsen tetsudō ryokō benran 
(Quick guide to railway travel in Korea) painted a picture of the port in words, 
explaining how development under the Government General of Korea had trans-
formed Pusan into a mirror of Japan: “Like a mirror, you see the crowd of steam-
ships and sailboats, and the scene of the town with buildings lined up from the 
shore to the mountainside, and wonder if you are again looking at Shimonoseki 
or Moji [the two neighboring ports from which the connecting ferry departed].”41 
The 1921 Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai put it more succinctly: “Pusan has been so 
Japanified, it doesn’t even smell like Korea anymore.”42
In fact, few cities in Japan boasted the size and facilities of the port of Pusan. 
Rural areas, particularly in the northeast, lagged far behind major cities in any part 
of the empire in terms of electrification and urban modernization. Tōhoku, for 
example, in the northeast of the main island of Honshū, received startlingly little 
of the infrastructure development dollars that benefited the nation’s more urban 
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areas. In 1930, for example, there were fifty-seven electric light bulbs for every 
one hundred people nationally; there were only thirty-four per hundred people in 
Tōhoku. As the decade progressed, the disparity worsened. By 1935, Tokyo boasted 
more than one light bulb per person while Tōhoku actually lost light bulbs.43 In 
other words, the process that the Government General wished travelers to see as 
“Japanification” had little to do with an actually existing Japan. Rather, colonial 
boosters used geographic signifiers to place Korea within an imaginary Japan that 
they defined as a space of industrialization and circulation.
Although the term “Japanification” was rarely used outside of Korea, official 
guidebooks and itineraries for Taiwan and Manchuria followed a similar strategy 
for placing these territories firmly within an economic space of empire defined 
not by inside and outside or advanced and backward, but by production and cir-
culation. Sites of connection, such as ports and bridges, showed travelers a map of 
Japan shaped by transport rather than geographic barriers. And though there was 
little commentary on the destination of colonial products, the heavy emphasis on 
production demonstrated how colonial territory was flourishing under Japanese 
management.
As the port of arrival and departure for the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Com-
pany’s regular service to the Japanese port of Moji, the port of Kiryū (C. Jilong; 
E. Keelung) was a routine stop for imperial travelers arriving at and depart-
ing Taiwan. Eager to highlight the Government General of Taiwan’s efforts to 
bring Taiwan into the world of industrial movement, JTB itineraries explicitly la-
beled the “renovations to the port of Kiryū” as a sight to be seen.44 With railways 
that ran right to the docks, the 1921 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai (Guide to railway 
travel in Taiwan) reported the new port of Kiryū was “very convenient for con-
nections between land and sea travel.” Making clear the role of the colonies in 
the construction of a new Japan (and thus going beyond what the Japanification 
of Pusan implied), the guidebook helped travelers to see the port in comparison: 
such a convenient land-sea connection was “perhaps something rarely seen in our 
country.”45 A new Japan was being born—in colonial territory.
Although Manchuria was an informal rather than formal Japanese colony, 
the South Manchuria Railway Company’s Passenger Bureau pursued a strategy 
similar to that of the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea. Guidebooks 
for southern Manchuria began with Dairen, which the South Manchuria Rail-
way Company ensured would be the most active port in Manchuria through its 
policy of “Dairen centrism” (Dairen chūshinshugi).46 Dairen was the key port for 
the transshipment of Manchurian goods and the headquarters of the South Man-
churia Railway Company. As the 1909 Minami Manshū tetsudō annai (Guide to 
railways in southern Manchuria) described it, however, the wharf at Dairen was 
emblematic of the whole of Japanese-controlled Manchuria itself; it was “a grand 
construction project” whose “vast scale” made it a “rare sight in the Orient.”47 For 
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some travelers, the wharf marked Dairen as a place that was no longer in Asia or 
China, but rather served as a gateway between the West and the East. As one of 
the Hiroshima Higher Normal School diarists described it, Dairen was the “Mar-
seilles of the Orient,” a reference to Marseilles’ role as the gateway between France 
and North Africa.48 The wharf was so central to the railway company’s promotion 
of southern Manchuria that the first image included in the 1909 guidebook was 
a pullout panoramic photo of the wharf—showing clearly the railway that con-
nected the piers to the wharf and three steamships tied alongside. In later editions, 
the South Manchuria Railway Company used a line drawing of a steamer tied up 
to the pier at Dairen as the guidebook’s inside cover (see the cover of this book).
While ports showed the efforts of the South Manchuria Railway Company and 
the Governments General to bring the new territories into the pathways of mod-
ern circulation, sights inside the colonies showed travelers the resources that Japa-
nese industries were turning into valuable commodities. Early guidebooks and 
itineraries placed commodities front and center. Itineraries for Taiwan reflected 
the colonial government’s vision of Taiwan as an agricultural appendage of Japan. 
The JTB’s 1923 itinerary for Taiwan, which required three weeks, sent travelers on 
a journey through Taiwan’s raw materials and industrial production sites. At each 
stop, the itinerary suggested seeing sights of industrial and agricultural modern-
ization. In Taichū (C. Taichung), travelers were to see Imperial Sugar’s Taichū fac-
tory. In Hokkō (C. Beigang), the sight to see was Oriental Sugar’s Hokkō Factory. 
In Heitō (C: Pingtung), Taiwan Sugar’s Heitō factory. Other forms of industrial 
production dotted the remainder of the itinerary, from the Eirinjo Timber Factory 
in Kagi to the salt flats at Takao (see table 2). The Government General of Taiwan’s 
1916 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai underlined the significance of these sights with 
data that described the volume of production at each factory and gave a descrip-
tion of the “major products” of the area that surrounded each station stop. All told, 
administration, sugar factories, and industrial agriculture constituted nearly sixty 
percent of all the sights noted by the 1916 guidebook.49
To further promote these sights, the Government General of Taiwan’s guide-
books highlighted the high levels of productivity of sugar and timber factories. 
The description provided by the Government General was concise, defining as 
quickly as possible the power of the new productive infrastructure. In Kagi, the 
main sight to be seen was the Kagi Timber Factory, which operated the “latest ma-
chinery to process timber from Mount Ari.”50 Photos included alongside showed 
a large, Spartan factory poised on open flatland next to a railway line. Imperial 
Sugar’s factory at Taichū was “capitalized at five million yen and could run at 1,050 
horsepower.” In 1916, the guidebook reported that the factory had produced fifteen 
thousand tons of sugar in the most recent season.51 Subsequent editions did little to 
elaborate on the merits of each sugar factory, except to note a staggering increase 
in sugar production. Taiwan Sugar’s Heitō factory, which consolidated sugar from 
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all of Taiwan Sugar’s local factories, produced forty-five million tons of sugar in 
1926.52 Dai Nihon Sugar’s Hokkō factory, nearby, produced over thirty million tons 
the same year.53
If sugar and timber evidenced Taiwan’s place in a global market as well as a Jap-
anese economy, soybeans and coal defined Manchuria in similar terms. Beginning 
with the first South Manchuria Railway Company guide in 1909 and continuing 
through each subsequent edition, the soybean dominated the representation of 
Manchuria’s unique place within the world. The 1919 edition included photos of 
stacks of soybean cakes (“the collection and distribution of soybean cake”) and a 
vast warehouse full of bags of soybeans.54 In addition to seeing the soybeans ready 
for export at the wharf, travelers were also encouraged to visit one or more of 
the nearby soybean oil factories, sixteen of which were noted on the guidebook’s 
map of Dairen. The Tokyo Number One Higher School made its first stop at the 
soybean warehouse in Dairen in 1912. The size of the warehouse impressed the 
student diarist enough that he quoted how many beans per square foot it could 
hold.55
Figure 4. The loading of soybeans at Dairen wharf. The picture accompanied the South 
 Manchuria Railway Company’s 1909 description of Dairen wharf. It shows the three tracks of 
the dock railway, a ship that runs almost the length of the wharf itself, and dozens of Chinese 
laborers carrying and stacking hundreds of bags of soybeans. The sight to be seen was the 
 transport of goods, not the people.
source: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, ed., Minami Manshū tetsudō annai (Dairen: Minami Manshū 
tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, 1909).
66    chapter two
Second to soybeans in South Manchuria Railway Company guidebooks was 
coal. The production of coal centered on Bujun (C. Fushun), the central colliery 
of Manchuria and one of the South Manchuria Railway Company’s major indus-
trial enterprises in Manchuria.56 Here, the rhetoric of Japan’s leadership in the 
production and circulation of commodities continued. The sights to be seen in 
Bujun were sooty, loud, and industrial. The South Manchuria Railway Company 
included Bujun in all its itineraries, and its guidebooks included images of the 
smoking Mondo Tile Factory, coal elevators above the underground mines, and 
a “sand-gathering machine” on the banks of a nearby river. The 1919 guidebook 
devoted a number of pages to describing the investment the South Manchuria 
Railway Company had made in increasing the efficiency and productivity of the 
mines, contrasting this with the “makeshift” methods employed under the Rus-
sian China Eastern Railway. The guidebook also detailed the South Manchuria 
Railway Company’s past interventions and outlined plans for the further econo-
mization of mining operations. The mines had once produced only three to four 
hundred tons a day, but by 1919 the mines were producing seven thousand tons 
a day. “Bujun,” the guidebook concluded, “is on the verge of becoming a great 
industrial area.”57
JAPANIFICATION
In contrast to the economic mode, which described Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria 
as places within a space that was defined sometimes as “like Japan,” sometimes as 
“civilization,” and sometimes as “like the West,” guidebooks used the national and 
historical modes to place colonized lands within the space of the Japanese nation. 
From the first days of imperial travel, battlefields were sites where travelers were 
encouraged to experience colonized lands as national land through emotional nar-
ratives of patriotic sacrifice. This was true even in Manchuria, which was not part 
of the sovereign territory of Japan (see chapter 1). Early tourist guidebooks and 
itineraries expanded the nationalist mode to include Shintō shrines, which helped 
travelers to situate the new territories within a form of spirituality that Japanese 
ideologues portrayed as uniquely associated with the Japanese state. Colonial 
shrines often housed gods associated with empire. For example, the Taiwan Shrine 
in Taihoku (C. Taipei) housed the “three gods of exploitation” (kaitaku sanjin), 
who had first been deified in the establishment of a shrine in Hokkaidō, and the 
spirit of Prince Kitashirakawa as a “protector deity” of the nation.58 Prince Kitashi-
rakawa had been a celebrity of the campaign to subdue Taiwan after the transfer of 
sovereignty in 1895. The popular illustrated magazine Fūzoku gahō (Customs illus-
trated), for example, exulted in his daring exploits against the guerrilla resistance 
in its pages. After his death, the cause of his celebrity shifted from military prowess 
to martyrdom. In a practice similar to that of the reenactment of Russo-Japanese 
War battles in Port Arthur, the Government General of Taiwan’s guidebooks 
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Figure 5. Kitashirakawa’s uniform on display at Tainan 
Shrine. The uniform was one of several items related to 
Kitashirakawa that Government-General tourist guidebooks 
suggested imperial travelers see on their tours of Taiwan. 
Like this uniform, each item on the “trail of Prince Kitashi-
rakawa” was described as one that Kitashirakawa “really” 
(jissai ni) used prior to his death in Taiwan in 1896.
source: Tainan jinja shamusho, ed., Tainan jinjashi (Taihoku: Tainan jinja 
shamusho, 1928).
 encouraged travelers to follow the “trail of Prince Kitashirakawa” to see places that 
he “actually” slept, traveled, and died on Taiwan, especially Tainan Shrine.59
Just as shrines and battlefield sites encouraged travelers to use the verisimili-
tude of their locations to reenact a national past and reflect on a national spirit, 
guidebooks and itineraries likewise used historical sights to encourage travelers to 
observe the process of historical transition from non-modernity to modernity and 
from non-Japanese to Japanese rule. They adopted strategies that made the past of 
each place comprehensible in terms of a linear narrative of unification and incor-
poration into Japan. Beginning with the first tourist guidebooks and continuing to 
the end of the empire, the colonial governments and the South Manchuria Railway 
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Company gave Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan a historical character by assigning 
each an ancient and a modern capital.
More so than guidebooks for Taiwan and Manchuria, guidebooks for Korea 
emphasized historical sights. To a certain extent, this emphasis reflected the dif-
ferences between the policies of the Government General of Taiwan and the South 
Manchuria Railway Company, the former of which worked to transform Taiwan 
into a source of agricultural products to feed the growing industrial workforce in 
the metropole, and the latter of which, in lieu of sovereignty, focused on anchor-
ing Japan’s claim to Manchuria in its “management” of the region’s human and 
material resources for the benefit of the global market. But the emphasis on his-
torical sights in Korea also reflected the colonial discourses circulating at the time. 
While Taiwanese Chinese people in Taiwan and Chinese people in  Manchuria 
might have been members of an East Asian cultural sphere that  Japanese ideo-
logues  defined as “same script, same race” (dōbun dōshu), Japanese colonial dis-
course depicted Koreans as people who also shared a common ancestry with the 
 Japanese. For colonial discourse on Korea, the challenge was to explain how the 
outcomes of two nations, which were in theory composed of the same people, were 
so different—one an empire, one a colony. In contrast, Manchuria and  Taiwan 
were described as vast, untapped territories that had been colonized only recently 
by the Chinese. The emphasis in these cases was on differentiating  Japanese colo-
nialism from the Chinese and European colonialism that had come before. Thus, 
in Taiwan, the ancient capital of Tainan (C. Tainan) and the modern capital of 
 Taihoku served as the two poles of recorded insular history. In tourist materials, 
the two capitals told the story of the shift from a Dutch and Chinese imperialism 
that sought to benefit only itself to a Japanese imperialism that benefited “the 
whole island.”60 In Manchuria, the two halves of the city of Hōten—one “Chinese” 
and old, the other simply “new”—served as the ancient and the modern capitals 
of Manchuria, describing the city’s arc from capital of the Manchus to a dusty, for-
gotten city—when the Manchu rulers became the Qing emperors in Peking—and 
then to the forefront of the modernization of East Asia with the Japanese con-
struction of the new city.61
Placing the territories in developmental time naturalized imperialism by 
normalizing transition. In the case of Korea, the guidebooks identified five his-
toric capitals of Korea—Puyo (K. Buyŏ), Keishū (K. Kyŏngju), Keijō, Kaijō 
(K. Kaesŏng), and Heijō. The Government General’s guidebooks used the multiple 
capitals to underscore the argument that Koreans had failed to develop success-
fully as a people because they suffered from too many transitions. This failure was 
constituted, always, in contrast to the successful development that Japan had ex-
perienced due to its supposedly unbroken imperial line.
Overlaid on the narrative of multiple transitions was the story of how Korea 
became part of the Japanese state. The Government General of Korea’s guidebooks 
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paired Heijō and Keijō as “ancient” and “modern” capitals to reify a narrative of 
development and transition that culminated in the “annexation” of Korea and the 
reunion of the Korean and Japanese peoples. The guidebooks presented Keijō, the 
first major stop after arriving at Pusan, as a grand vista of peninsular history, from 
the early history of the Paekche kingdom to the transfer of power to the Gov-
ernment General in 1910. Layered among the city’s many sights were ruins and 
remains of three dynasties, as well as the new infrastructure that made the city 
the “capital of the peninsula,” a reference that sought to remove the city from the 
connotations of feudalism that came with the name “Chōsen.”62 But despite the 
thousands of years of peninsular political history in the city, the significance of 
all of it was exceeded by the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910)—the last dynasty prior 
to the annexation by Japan. Of nineteen sights listed by the 1921 Chōsen tetsudō 
ryokō  annai, only one traced its significance solely to the Paekche.63 Rather, the 
Figure 6. “The Wretched Ruin of the West Tower.” Postcard, c. 1910s. The South Manchuria 
Railway Company used historical sights, such as the West Tower, to tell a story of Manchuria’s 
historical abandonment by the Manchus. Together with the former Manchu palace inside 
Hōten’s city walls, colonial boosters’ used the West Tower to describe the early glory of the 
Manchu rulers and the subsequent decline of their infrastructure after they left Hōten for 
Peking, where they ruled as the emperors of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Historical narratives 
such as these served to justify colonial boosters’ claim that Manchuria was not an authentic part 
of China. Digital image courtesy of the East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, 
Easton, PA. Image ip0084.
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 guidebook’s suggestions centered on sights related to Chosŏn dynasty and  colonial 
rule: the Ch’andŏkkung and Kyŏngbokkung palaces, government buildings, In-
dependence Gate, tombs of the Chosŏn dynasty’s ruling Yi family, and sites of 
enthronement and conflict.
The tourist guidebooks rarely described Chosŏn dynasty sights as impressive 
in their own right; they valued them for the story they told of the transition to 
Japanese colonial rule. For example, although in 1921 the Government General 
headquarters was still located in the former headquarters of the Resident General, 
an ornate Victorian building in the Japanese settlers’ quarters, the 1921 guidebook 
stressed that Kyŏngbokkung, the palace of the Chosŏn dynasty, was going to be the 
new headquarters of the Government General of Korea. This practice of layering 
the new Japanese government over the previous Chosŏn dynasty included Japani-
fying the palace’s name: “Keifukukyū: Although the new Government General of-
fice is now under construction here, this place is the first palace where the founder 
of the Chosŏn dynasty undertook the great work of rule.”64
Other Chosŏn dynasty sites, such as the Ch’andŏkkung Palace, were similarly 
made to speak to the transition from Chosŏn to Japanese rule. In its description 
of Ch’andŏkkung, a residence for the Yi family, the 1921 guidebook described the 
layout of the palace and then quickly moved to the botanical gardens, zoo, and 
museum, which were located on the palace grounds. These areas, the guidebook 
pointed out, used to be part of the secret gardens of the Ch’andŏk Palace, “but are 
now opened to the public” (kōkai sareteiru).65 As Noriko Aso argues, the creation 
of public spaces connected with the imperial families was a key component of of-
ficial narratives of modernization in both Korea and Japan.66 Such notions were 
popular in urban planning, from the transformation of Tokyo into a modern capi-
tal in the late nineteenth century, to the Great Han Empire’s push to the reform the 
space of Hwangsŏng, the city that would become Keijō under Japanese rule, “to 
create a symbolic national center from and through which to integrate the previ-
ously stratified groups of Koreans into national subjects of King Kojong.”67
In the colonial context, tourist guidebooks used the conversion of private space 
into public space to construct a narrative of historical transition to a modern so-
ciety that was Japanese in terms of its language and state but was universal in its 
embrace of the free circulation of people, goods, and ideas. In this formulation, 
what distinguished Japan, and the modern nation-state more generally, from the 
politics that had come before was that modern government was a public good. 
Indeed, in the historical overview that preceded the description of what to see 
in Keijō, the guidebook portrayed the transition from the Chosŏn dynasty to the 
Government General not so much as one of political turnover but of the next 
stage in the development of government on the peninsula: “From [the establish-
ment of the first Chosŏn palace in Keijō] over five hundred years ago, the palace 
and the city have been rebuilt countless times after fires and disturbances. Yet its 
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prosperity as the capital of the peninsula has never changed. In particular, the 
last ten or so years have shown surprisingly rapid progress (chōsoku no shinpo) 
and expansion.”68 Without even mentioning the Government General, Keijō was 
made to demonstrate the long history of unified rule over the peninsula and, most 
importantly, the grand achievements that had come in the past ten years with the 
transition to colonial rule.
The path of the express railway arranged travelers’ encounters with Korea such 
that Heijō, the “ancient capital” (koto), immediately followed Keijō, the “capital of 
the peninsula.” As the former capital of multiple dynasties but present capital of 
none, the role Heijō played in the progress of peninsular history was more am-
biguous than that of Keijō, which had the presence of the Government  General 
Figure 7. The Government General Museum (above left) and “Secret Garden” (below right) 
at Ch’andŏk Palace. The caption explains that although the gardens were actually the residence 
of the Yi royal family, a part of the gardens had been opened to the public. The vertical place-
ment of the images of the garden and the museum provides a visual narrative of the transition 
from private to public resources that the Government General argued characterized Japanese 
colonial rule in Korea.
source: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, Chōsen no fūkō ([Keijō]: Minami Manshū 
tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, 1922). Courtesy of the National Diet Library.
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and the last unified peninsular dynasty to demonstrate the orderly transition of 
rule. In Heijō, the Government General used the city’s history to undercut Korean 
nationalists’ claim that Koreans were an independent ethnic nation. The sights of 
Heijō emphasized the ambiguity of the origins of the Korean nation and linked 
the ancient history of “the country of Chōsen” (Chōsenkoku) to tributary rela-
tions with China. For all the talk of Heijō’s turbulent ancient history, however, 
the sights the guidebook recommended ultimately told an overarching story 
similar to that of Keijō: the transition to Japanese rule, in this case not from in-
dependent Korean dynasties but from Chinese to Japanese influence. In this, it 
was a distinctly state-oriented narrative of origin and transition rather than an 
ethnicity-oriented narrative, in contrast to those put forth by Korean nationalists 
such as Sin Ch’ae-ho.69
As an “ancient capital,” the guidebooks made Heijō embody the heterogeneous 
origins of Korea as a unified political territory and celebrate the transition from 
Chinese to Japanese rule as a result of Japan’s victory in the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese 
War. As the 1921 entry on Heijō began, “Ages ago, the people of the country en-
throned the god Tan’gun, who had been born under a spindletree on Mount Paek-
tu, and made a capital at Heijō. Thus, from a mysterious legend begins the history 
of this place.” The first recorded history cited by the guide dated from the time 
of the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BCE), “when it is said that a branch of the Kishi 
family moved to Chōsen and made Heijō their capital.” The founding of the first 
historic Korean capital by a Chinese nobleman was confirmed, the guidebook con-
tinued, by the true history of the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE): “Ryōyō Province, 
from olden times [known as] ‘the country of Chōsen,’ is a place that was ruled by 
Kishi. Today’s Chōsen probably took the old name.”70 The historical overview con-
tinued to emphasize the turbulence of Heijō’s history as capital: Heijō ceased to be 
the capital of Kishi (K. Kija) Chōsen when the descendants died during the time of 
the Han empire (206 BCE–220 CE); the Han established the Lelang Commandery 
(108 BCE–313 CE), but were eventually thrown out by the Koguryŏ (37 BCE–668 
CE); following the fall of the Koguryŏ, Heijō became a western capital for the 
Koryŏ (918–1392 CE), under many names. To emphasize further the changing for-
tunes of Heijō, the overview concluded with a literary read on the city’s main river, 
the Daidō (K. Taedong): “[And the blue Daidō river] looks as if it holds the secrets 
of antiquity and is sneering at the glory and decline of the human world.”71
Subsequently, Heijō was the site of encounters of Japanese and Chinese 
armies during Hideyoshi’s sixteenth century invasions of Korea and the 1894–95 
Sino-Japanese War. Indeed, the majority of the city’s sights told the story of Koni-
shi Yukinaga’s defeat by the Ming army in the Bunroku campaign (1592), and the 
Japanese army’s rout of the Qing army in 1895. Renkōtei (K. Ryŏngwangjŏng), a 
pavilion dating from the Koguryŏ era, was the site “where Konishi Yukinaga fell 
into the trap of the sinister scheme of Ming Ambassador Shen Weijing” during the 
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 Bunroku Campaign, which “was the basis for his crushing defeat at Heijō.”72 The 
“sinister scheme” referred to the secret drugging of the commander of the Japanese 
army defending Heijō by a Korean courtesan. The sleepy commander was then be-
headed by the leader of the Ming army, and Japanese forces were forced to retreat. 
Similarly, Otsumitsudai (K. Eulmildae), a pavilion also dating to the Koguryŏ era, 
was where “the enemy made . . . their stronghold and hung their uniforms on the 
tree branches to make dummy troops and menace Yukinaga” during the Bunroku 
campaign. Botandai (K. Morandae), a neighboring pavilion, was where Konishi 
Yukinaga “put his main headquarters and sucked up the pain of a defensive battle” 
when “he found himself surrounded by the Ming army.”73
Neighboring these sights that staged the loss to Ming China were the sights 
that told the story of Japan’s eventual victory over Qing China. The Futsū Gate 
(K. Pot’onmun), a nine-hundred-year-old gate that dated to the Koryŏ period, was 
where the Ming army entered the castle walls of Heijō to begin the battle with 
Konishi Yukinaga’s forces. Three hundred years later, it was the site from which 
one battalion of Japanese forces attacked the Qing army during the Sino-Japanese 
War. The Shichisei Gate (K. Ch’ilsŏnmun) marked the northern entrance to the 
castle and had been the site of pitched battles in both the Bunroku campaign and 
the Sino-Japanese War. During the Sino-Japanese War, Qing troops took the high 
ground and “rained down” an attack on the Japanese army. Otsumitsudai and 
Botandai, which were famous as sites of defeat during the Bunroku campaign, 
served double-duty as sights of glorious victory during the Sino-Japanese War. At 
Otsumitsudai, “the Qing General made this his headquarters, where he was made 
to worry about the two [incoming Japanese] army branches from Gensan.” Previ-
ously well known as the site of Yukinaga’s “painful” defensive battle against the 
Ming, Botandai became the site of a “famous struggle” during the Sino-Japanese 
War and the source of a “new memory for the world.”74
IN PL ACE /  OUT OF PL ACE
In their efforts to rehabilitate Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan in the metropoli-
tan imagination, colonial boosters used similar strategies to place colonized lands 
within the space of civilization and the space of the nation. The histories told were 
explicitly not the histories of the colonies’ ethnic nations. The South Manchuria 
Railway Company guidebooks, for instance, had no interest in Han Chinese resi-
dents, other than to represent them as cogs in the machine of soybean and coal 
production and circulation. Similarly, the state-centric story of Korean origins 
disconnected Korea from Koreans and therefore from the progressive history of 
the peninsula. Despite some small-scale discussion of the “native customs” and 
“tamed villages” of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, Taiwan’s history was restricted to 
the narrative of transition from the ancient capital of Tainan to Taihoku, limiting 
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the story to the western, plains areas of the island and erasing indigenous people 
from the island’s history, which was now told as a progression of Dutch, Spanish, 
Chinese, and then Japanese colonial rule.
The economic, historical, and nationalist modes displaced and dislocated col-
onized subjects from the spatial and social imaginary of the nation by discon-
necting their pasts and futures from that of the land. But this is not to say that 
colonized subjects were tangential to the project of placing colonized lands within 
the nation and the nation on colonized lands. Their labor was essential to the op-
eration of civilization’s modern transportation infrastructure. From the Chinese 
conductors of South Manchuria Railway Company streetcars in Dairen to Korean 
and Chinese construction workers, miners, and farmers, and those who moved 
goods from the railhead to the city, the networks of exchange simply could not 
have functioned without their labor.75 Moreover, the figure of the colonized subject 
played a significant role in defining travelers’ experiences of the colonies as places 
that were becoming part of the space of the nation. Like colonial boosters, impe-
rial travelers used the historical, economic, and nationalist modes to define their 
own sense of belonging, or “in-placeness,” in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, while 
using these same modes to mark colonized subjects as out of place.
For imperial travelers, these modes structured their imagination of a norma-
tive landscape of the nation, which was reified through the contrast between the 
ideals that the modes professed and the colonized subjects they saw.76 Arakawa 
Seijirō, who traveled to Manchuria and Korea as part of a 1918 tour of businessmen 
from Utsunomiya, used a scene at the Manchurian port of Eikō (C. Yingkou) to 
illustrate the incongruity of Chinese people in spaces of circulation, embodied in 
this case by the railroads. He compared the Chinese Government Railways station 
with the South Manchuria Railway Company’s Eikō Station. The South Manchuria 
Railway Company’s station had been bustling. But the Chinese station was differ-
ent: “There didn’t seem to be even one person in charge at the station. . . . Two or 
three people came in noisily, but even so there didn’t seem to be any passengers.” 
There was only one soldier “lumbering” around with his gun.77 In Keijō, Kore-
ans appeared out of place in the modernizing peninsula. As one imperial traveler 
wrote in a 1915 report: “When I look at Koreans walking through the Japanified 
town, it seems like somehow they are a race (jinshu) that has come from another 
country.”78 The poet Kawahigashi Hekigotō described the out-of-placeness of Ko-
reans more bluntly. It was not that “Korea falls, but at least there are mountains 
and rivers,” he wrote. Rather, referring to the common colonial practice of deni-
grating Korean men for their clothing, Kawahigashi thought the process was more 
akin to “the country dies, and there remain outstanding clothes and hats.”79
If, in the historical mode, out-of-placeness was determined by a failure to 
transition, in the economic mode, it was a failure to organize one’s life or society 
around the principles of circulation, exchange, investment, or the production of 
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value. Nagasawa Sokichi, a speaker of the House of Representatives who toured 
eastern Taiwan in 1916, explained that indigenous people misunderstood the pur-
pose of money. Describing a situation closer to slavery than wage labor, Nagasawa 
noted that “recently, because of labor shortages, sugar companies and the like don’t 
even bother with offering to employ the savages (banjin), since if they request [in-
digenous labor] from the police, the savages will do whatever the police say. They 
come from each village like forced labor.” But he explained that sugar companies 
used compulsory labor not to exploit indigenous people but because indigenous 
people were unable to grasp the value of the money. “If you try to pay them with 
paper money, they won’t take it,” Nagasawa wrote, because “they fear that it will 
rot.” The solution was to try to pay them in silver coins, but even this did not work: 
“They use them to do things like dig holes, decorate their necks, or to decorate 
their swords by driving them in [to the handle]. They do this because they don’t 
understand that [money] is used as a medium of exchange.”80
The student diarist for the Hiroshima Higher Normal School dwelled similar-
ly on how the failure to understand concepts such as “investment” could lead to 
rapid changes of fate. In Hōten, he remarked, “nobody can avoid thinking of the 
last days of the Qing.”81 When the students visited the Northern Tomb in Hōten, 
however, they placed the blame for its fragile state not on the vicissitudes of his-
tory but on the failure of the Chinese nation as a whole to embrace investment. “If 
it’s not actually about to crumble, the Chinese won’t fix it,” the diarist explained.82 
Hayasaka Yoshio, another resident of Tochigi Prefecture’s Utsunomiya City, who 
published an account of his travel through Korea, Manchuria, China, and Tai-
wan in 1922, used an encounter with Korean rickshaw pullers in Keijō to like-
wise condemn the Korean people. Hayasaka recounted how he asked two different 
rickshaw pullers for a ride to the Higher Common School, only succeeding after 
walking a considerable distance and trying for a third time. “What does the above 
story tell us? If I were to put it in one word, I would say that it shows the laziness 
(taidasei) of the Korean people,” he wrote. What Hayasaka called “laziness” was 
not an unwillingness to work; it was an unwillingness to plan ahead. “Their level 
of living is extremely low, and if they earn enough to live for one day they sleep or 
drink or eat or gamble. Tomorrow’s matters are tomorrow’s, and next year’s mat-
ters can be dealt with next year.”83
Yoshino Sakuzō, Japan’s most famous prewar liberal, summed up how colo-
nized subjects’ failure to join the modern world of investment and exchange ne-
cessitated Japanese stewardship over their lands. In his 1916 report on Manchuria 
and Korea, he spelled out how important it was to recognize the gap between how 
Japanese settlers and officials understood the purpose of labor and how the “na-
tives” (dojin) did. The Koreans he spoke to on his trip objected to the massive road 
construction projects being undertaken by the Government General, because the 
labor they were compelled to contribute was both unfair and bothersome. Yoshino 
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did not agree with their claims. Nonetheless, he argued that it was important to 
take them into account when formulating colonial policy. “An ignorant people 
most certainly cannot endure losses today in the name of a long future of profit,” 
he explained. While he agreed that it was “logical,” when faced with these sorts of 
complaints, “to argue that the thoughts of the natives are mistaken,” he advocated 
that colonial officials work with local Korean leaders to find a language that both 
sides would understand. “You can’t govern the natives on logic,” he concluded.84
Like most of the concepts and categories that structured colonial boosters’ and 
imperial travelers’ efforts to place colonized lands within the nation, the notion 
that colonized subjects were out of place in modern, industrial society, particularly 
in terms of attitudes toward circulation and labor, was not only a Japanese notion. 
In the entry on railways in his Things Japanese, for example, the early Japanolo-
gist Basil Hall Chamberlain wrote, “A railway journey in this country is apt to be 
anything but a joy.”
Owing to some cause not yet explained, the Japanese who, when abiding in their 
own native ways, are the very pink of neatness, become slipshod, not to say dirty, 
when introduced to certain conditions of European life. . . . In fact, the whole thing is 
queer and unpleasant, unless of course the traveler be a philosopher to whom every 
novel experience supplies welcome material for meditation. Such a philosopher will 
perhaps enquire the reason of the stripe of white paint across the windows of the 
third-class cars on certain lines. It is a precautionary measure adopted for the safety 
of country bumpkins; for it has happened that some of these, lacking in personal 
experience of glass, have mistaken it for air and gashed themselves horribly in the 
attempt to shove their heads through what, in their innocence, they supposed to be 
a non-resisting medium.85
Chamberlain’s comments, like those of Japanese imperial travelers, were on par 
with how British travelers described railway transportation in Egypt and India. 
Nineteenth-century European imperialists argued that modern civilization and 
tradition occupied two different worlds: one, a world in which people used tools 
to dominate nature; the other, a world in which people lived according to nature’s 
whims. The difference was psychological as much as material. There, British trav-
elers treated the railway tracks as part of the space and time of the modern and 
the surrounding land as a completely separate territory in both space and time.86 
On the same page that he noted that the arrival of “a dense crowd of natives” to an 
Indian train station provided “much that is amusing to a curious observer,” G. O. 
Trevyelan observed that civilization and nature were like oil and water, never to 
share the same location. “Stroll one hundred yards from the [railway] embank-
ment,” he wrote, “and all symptoms of civilization have vanished.”87
The point is that imperial travelers did not simply deny the coevalness of col-
onized subjects. They used their out-of-placeness as the measure against which 
they calculated the Japanification of the land. The “Japan” of Japanification was 
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ambiguously territorialized—marked by generic industrial infrastructure and the 
sensibility of the observer as much as it was by cultural symbols such as Japanese 
place names or state-centered mnemonic sites. In this, colonial boosters enrolled 
imperial travelers in the project of constructing a spatial imaginary that contained 
the possibility of a floating “center” rather than one that would always be located in 
the inner territory. This practice constituted the problem of colonial difference as 
the out-of-placeness of colonized peoples and justified the incorporation of colo-
nized lands in to the present space of nation.
Over time, the outbreak of anti-imperial nationalist movements and boosters’ 
own frustrations with the uneven structure of colonial rule would force imperial 
travelers and colonial boosters to find ways to place colonized peoples within the 
space of the nation if they were to maintain the place of the nation on colonized 
lands. Yet in this early era, imperial travelers marked colonized subjects as out 
of place in both the space of civilization and the space of the nation, and they 
used that representation of out-of-placeness to define the modernity of Japan, 
the new territories, and imperial travelers themselves. Tayama Katai summed 
up this attitude best in a report on his travels through Manchuria and Korea in 
1924 (sponsored by the South Manchuria Railway Company). He juxtaposed the 
new, modern, and Japanified Korea against what he saw as the out-of-placeness of 
Koreans. Koreans watched as time passed by—Korea the place moved forward 
while Korea the people stood still. Because of this, they were a “dying nation” 
(bōkoku suru).88 Surveying the scene around him, Tayama commented to his com-
panion, “For the people of Korea, Japan being in charge must be a very difficult 
thing, don’t you think?” “Yeah,” Mr. M responded, “that must be true. After all, it 
seems like there are a lot of people thinking about the past.” Tayama described the 
people of Korea as the “ordinary people of Korea” (Chōsen no jinmin), a term that 
connoted a people who had not yet recognized their own subjectivity, in contrast 
to “national people” (kokumin), who embraced their national identity, or even im-
perial subjects (shinmin), who understood themselves to be a people in relation to 
the emperor. This designation likewise suggested a temporal difference between 
the development of Koreans and of the Japanese national people. “But surely they 
will gradually realize that they are mistaken, right? A good thing is a good thing, 
no matter what you say,” Mr. M continued. Tayama sighed and shook his head. 
“Customs have strong roots,” he explained. He looked out the window of the train. 
There, among the villages scattered about the low hills, “a Korean wearing dirty 
white clothes lazily stopped his plow and watched the train passing by.”89
C ONCLUSION
The many modes through which colonial boosters demonstrated the success-
ful incorporation of colonized land into the space of the nation and the space of 
civilization—and their concomitant displacement of colonized subjects from the 
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temporality of their own lands—illuminates how spatial politics emerged through 
the malleability of place. In this transitional moment between a world of empires 
and a world of territorial nation-states, it was not enough to simply disappear col-
onized subjects under a blanket of civilization or to deny their coevalness. Rather, 
colonial boosters recognized the significance of placing the Japanese nation on 
colonized land as well. Doing so required the deployment of multiple strategies, 
which, taken together, kept colonized lands “new” but also made a clear case for 
their legitimate place within the space of the nation.
The Governments General and the South Manchuria Railway Company de-
ployed similar strategies for representing colonized territory as already integrated 
into or in the process of becoming part of a Japanese national space. These modes 
spatialized the relationship between metropolitan and colonial territory—as a 
synchronic economic relationship of circulation and exchange; as an allochronic 
relationship of progressive transition to the metropolitan present; and as an affec-
tive relationship of national people to the places of national history. The fact that 
these spatializations overlapped in contradictory ways—Korea and Taiwan were, 
for example, both becoming Japan and already part of Japanese history and the 
nationalist land of patriotic sentiment—did not dampen their potential as ways 
that imperial travelers cum national subjects could understand their own place 
in a Japan that included the empire. Rather, these overlapping modes offered a 
shifting sand of relationships that kept the place of colonized territory perpetually 
in question and thus served as a productive site for imperial travelers’ continual 
reaffirmation of the legitimacy and desirability of colonial rule.
In parsing the place of the colonies through these modes, travelers and colonial 
boosters operated within a geography of civilization. On the one hand, they saw 
the space of the nation in terms of an expanding sphere of civilization centered on 
the inner territory. On the other hand, the territoriality of the geography of civili-
zation was ambiguous. It defined the space of Japan as a liminal location between 
the universal space of civilization in colonial modernity and the particular civiliza-
tion of the Japanese nation-state. Likewise, the economic mode and its representa-
tion of Japan’s circulating mission in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan emphasized 
the liberatory nature of new circulatory technologies, but largely in the frame of a 
universal discourse of civilization. It was through history, which we discussed in 
this chapter and will return to in chapter 4, and language, which we will discuss 
in chapter 5, that colonial boosters and imperial travelers made the case that colo-
nized lands were being incorporated into a specifically Japanese national space. 
This case rested on the notion that the culmination of the historical process of 
national expansion and integration would result in the disappearance of visible 
manifestations of cultural difference in Taiwan and Korea. In the South Manchu-
ria Railway Zone, the case was less clear, though ultimately these representations 
too emphasized the idea that China, the Chinese people, and the ruins of Manchu 
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history in Manchuria were residues of a dead past. In contrast, the neatly and 
 generically “modern” architecture of Japanese-controlled cities signified the future 
that was to come.90
In their insistence on the significance of the changes in the land that the 
 colonial governments had wrought, colonial boosters adopted the modernist no-
tion that the assimilation or modernization of the people would follow that of 
the land. In the inner territory, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
would see numerous attempts to resolve the so-called social problem of industrial 
capitalism—persistent poverty and, with the rise of the concept of public health, 
the recognition that the dangers of industrialism’s dark side could not be con-
tained within its dark places—with the redesign of the urban habitat. City officials, 
architects, and transportation companies attempted to produce modern subjects 
by transforming the urban landscape into a consciously organized space that ma-
terialized an imagination of the city as a microcosm of industrial social life: open 
spaces, pathways that emphasized the flow and circulation of commodities over 
congregation, and distinct divisions of space into places of work, leisure, and resi-
dence.91
From one perspective, then, the production of the colonies as places both with-
in and apart was a “spatial resolution” (kūkanteki ketsugi) to political economic 
contradictions born of global capitalism.92 Capital accumulation and resource ex-
traction could proceed with fewer hurdles than in the metropole. The well-being 
of colonized subjects was not of significant concern to the colonial governments 
in these early years. The Governments General were quite content to let colonized 
subjects die through flourishing sales of opium (a government monopoly in the 
Kwantung Leased Territory and Taiwan), exceedingly harsh and poorly remuner-
ated wage labor, forms of punishment declared too barbaric for the metropole, and 
squalid living conditions for the lower classes that were made worse through inept 
government management of services such as sanitation.93
From another perspective, however, the overlap between colonial boosters’ 
conceptualization of the relationship between people and land and that of urban 
planners in the metropole suggests that—despite the territorial-administrative 
differences between Korea, Taiwan, the Kwantung Leased Territory, the South 
Manchuria Railway Zone, and the inner territory—the spatial imaginary of the 
nation was for all self-consciously national subjects an act of voluntarism. In other 
words, the production of the colonies as problem places also required national 
subjects to adopt a particular spatial imaginary of the nation against which the 
colonies could be marked as different, “new,” or “not yet” Japanese. It was a sense 
of self defined by a sense of place. It was an act of choosing to connect oneself to 
a place whose location was defined by global and national networks of circulation 
and nationalist metageographies and whose essence was likewise defined in the 
commensurable spatial and temporal terms of nations in a global world. It was 
80    chapter two
this act of voluntarism that the colonial policy of assimilation sought to elicit from 
Taiwanese Chinese and Koreans. And it was likewise an act of voluntarism that 
colonial boosters and urban planners sought to elicit from metropolitan travelers.
If, in rhetoric, the ability to participate fully in the nation was a matter of 
 voluntarily constituting one’s sense of self within a new spatio-social imaginary, 
in practice, it was a far more complex matter. In the post–World War I era, the 
demand that citizens and subjects rise out of their local place would collide with 
a new regime of internal and external borders that disproportionately affected 
the mobility of colonized subjects. It was in this context of democratization and 
 bordering that the primary axis of spatial politics would shift from a geography 
of civilization to a geography of cultural pluralism and the mobility of the tourist 
would become a central ideological mechanism through which colonial boost-
ers produced an imperial spatial and social imaginary for a second generation of 
imperial subjects.
part t wo
The Geography of Cultural Pluralism
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A young Korean man waited patiently on the deck of the Kōrai-maru. Three 
 policemen stood between the third-class crowd, many of whom had emerged on 
deck two hours before, after a long and unpleasant night below, and the upper-class 
passengers, who paraded off the ship and into the waiting room of the neighboring 
train station. Finally, the third-class passengers were allowed to leave. The young 
man walked down the gangplank, searching for the detectives he suspected would 
be waiting for him. He tried to blend in with the Japanese passengers. He tried 
to not hold his breath. To no avail. Calling out “Yobo!”—a derogatory name for 
Koreans—the Pusan port police pulled him aside. The young man, a student at a 
prestigious private university in Tokyo, recognized that he could not be as brusque 
as he had been with the customs police in Kōbe. He silently handed over his lug-
gage and sat down to await permission to continue on his way.1
The previous chapters laid out a case for treating imperial travel as both a 
methodology for analyzing the spatial politics of empire and a manifestation of 
that phenomenon. In chapter 1 we explored how the ideological work of obser-
vational travel revolved around the use of historical reenactment to produce a 
homogenizing and hegemonic “national” memory of and affect toward the “na-
tional land.” In chapter 2, we looked at how colonial boosters used tourist guide-
books to represent colonized land as part of the space and time of the nation 
while dis-placing colonized subjects from that same land. In both cases, imperial 
tourism produced particular fictions that made possible travelers’ internalization 
of a sense of self and nation that incorporated colonized lands as places within 
the nation and that produced affective ties to the nation as a place that contained 
colonized land.
3
Boundary Narratives
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The story of the Korean student on the Kōrai-maru illustrates the way in 
which the representation of the empire as a space of circulation—a circulating 
mission—elided the increasingly restrictive and unevenly applied terms under 
which that circulation was allowed. In 1918, the Japan Tourist Bureau, whose mis-
sion had previously been restricted to the enticement and facilitation of European 
and American travel to Japan, began to offer services to Japanese travelers. In sub-
sequent years, the Japan Tourist Bureau was joined by a number of organizations, 
such as the South Manchuria Railway Company’s Korea-Manchuria Information 
Bureau, which likewise sought to facilitate the travel of metropolitan residents to 
the so-called new territories. An imperial tourism industry was born.
In terms of its central methodology—the observation of colonized lands 
through the particular categories of colonial modernity—the kind of travel prac-
tices that the imperial tourism industry promoted were not significantly different 
from those of the observational travel that came before. Yet in another sense, tour-
ism differed sharply. Whereas the founders of observational travel had understood 
its ideological work to be intimately connected to the elite status of the travel-
ers, the mission of Japan’s domestic tourism industry was to promote the travel 
of the masses. Financial considerations meant that this ideal was never achieved, 
but the shift in rhetoric and orientation was profoundly significant in shaping the 
meaning of imperial tourism in the context of an empire in which the distinction 
between being a “subject” and being a “citizen” was increasingly drawn in motion.
National belonging in imperial nations was a complex process that involved 
the negotiation of legal and subjective notions of nationality, subjecthood, and 
citizenship.2 As Tessa Morris-Suzuki writes, the post–World War I years saw “the 
tendency for most colonial empires to develop an increasingly sharp distinction 
between the formal status of nationality (shared by all or most inhabitants of the 
empire) and substantive citizenship (rights to participate in the political process, 
which were unequally distributed between colonizers and colonized).”3 In the 
Japanese Empire, one of the key ways in which this growing divide was experi-
enced was through mobility. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Japanese state’s 
work to deny Korean independence activists access to the Paris Peace Conference, 
where they were expected to press their case for Korean independence. In Decem-
ber 1918, Syngman Rhee, future president of the Republic of Korea, and Chŏng 
Han-gyŏng (Henry Chung), applied to the U.S. State Department for passports 
in order to travel to Paris. The State Department recognized that, under inter-
national law, the men were subjects of the Japanese state. The State Department 
then forwarded their application to the Japanese consulate, where it was promptly 
denied.4 Rhee and Chŏng were simultaneously recognized as Japanese nationals 
and denied the rights of Japanese citizenship. Indeed, activists in other contexts 
also articulated the difference between imperial subjecthood and citizenship on 
precisely this axis. Addressing his writing to the population of newly enfranchised 
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voters in the metropole following the passage of universal male suffrage in 1925, 
 Taiwanese  Chinese activist Cai Peihuo complained that Taiwanese Chinese—and 
only  Taiwanese Chinese—were not allowed to travel directly from Taiwan to 
 China but instead had to route their travel through the inner territory.5
The ideological work of tourism emerged in conversation with its denial of the 
differential mobility of colonized subjects. In this way, mobility came to serve as 
one of the axes along which travelers experienced the difference between subject-
hood and citizenship as well as an axis along which the boundaries of citizen-
ship were enforced. In its promotion of tourism as the work of all national people, 
the imperial tourism industry defined free mobility within the empire as one of 
the core or shared values of the nation.6 Yet the frustrations of immobility be-
came a common theme through which colonized subjects articulated their own 
experiences of disenfranchisement and racialization. It was in motion that they 
encountered this new understanding of colonial difference. In contrast, it was in 
motion that imperial travelers came to see themselves as “at home” anywhere in 
the empire.
FROM A GEO GR APHY OF CIVILIZ ATION TO  
A GEO GR APHY OF CULTUR AL PLUR ALISM
Practices and experiences of movement defined the contours of national identity 
in the context of an empire rapidly shifting from a project of territorial acquisition 
to one of territorial maintenance. Indeed, movement is particularly important to 
our story, because it is here—in motion—that we begin to see the transition from 
a geography of civilization, which conceptualized colonial difference primarily in 
terms of the expansion of the space of the nation over time and the concomitant 
erasure or “assimilation” of colonial cultures, to a geography of cultural pluralism, 
which envisioned Japan as a variegated nation of diverse cultural regions. If, under 
the geography of civilization, the social imagination of the imperial nation was one 
that equated the Japanese nation with Japanese culture and Japanese history, the 
dominant social imaginary of the geography of cultural pluralism was of Japan as 
a multinational state and the Japanese people as a multiethnic nation.7
Around the world, cultural pluralism was a response to competing, often oppo-
sitional positions as migrants and colonized subjects challenged nativist discours-
es of assimilation. For this reason, Mae Ngai refers to it as an “immigrant interven-
tion” in the case of the United States.8 But cultural pluralism was also an imperial 
intervention to stave off self-determination’s threat to the legitimacy of an imperial 
imaginary grounded in assimilationist models of civilization and national culture. 
The post–World War I era saw a turn to regionalism and cultural pluralism around 
the globe as empires struggled to address the intertwined crises of economic de-
pression, labor activism, and anti-imperial and anticolonial activism.9 In interwar 
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France, as in Japan, the nation was increasingly understood as a matter of “unity 
in diversity,” which, in the words of Gary Wilder, both “reflected the confidence 
of an organized empire at the height of its power” and “revealed the anxiety of a 
colonial project . . . facing an imminent crisis of colonial authority.”10 In the Soviet 
Union, planners debated how to articulate the relationship between Russia and its 
multinational peripheries, shifting between what Francine Hirsch has termed the 
“ethnographic” and “economic” principles of administrative-territorial division. 
The former argued that internal territorial divisions should follow ethnographic 
boundaries—in essence, arguing for a multinational state. The latter, by contrast, 
suggested organizing the empire in terms of economic expediency and a dismissal 
of national rights, such as self-determination.11 Uniting the two was the common 
vision of a state defined by regional diversity rather than homogenizing national 
expansion.
Within the framework of the multinational state and the culturally pluralis-
tic nation, one of the key terms for both imperialists and anticolonial activists 
was mobility.12 Under the terms of the post–World War I geography of cultural 
pluralism, national belonging increasingly revolved around intersubjective claims 
to “in-placeness” in the empire and its opposite, the official and unofficial deni-
als of the mobility of colonized subjects. Imperial tourist literature and imperial 
travelers expressed these claims through representations of the national subject 
as a traveling citizen and themselves as deracinated national people (kokumin). 
In contrast, colonized subjects, particularly those who circulated within the elite 
institutions of imperial society, pointed to the state’s denial of their own right to 
circulate freely within the empire as a defining feature of their status as colonized 
subjects. It exposed the lie at the heart of the assimilationist ideal—speak Japanese, 
orient your life around circulation and exchange, think of yourself as Japanese, 
and you will become Japanese. Instead, the contrast between the free mobility of 
ethnic Japanese subjects and the restricted mobility of colonized subjects showed 
an empire that was quickly moving from treating colonial difference as a matter of 
time and development to treating colonial difference as a matter of race and place.
A CRISIS  OF EMPIRE
The end of World War I brought political and economic challenges to empires 
around the world. In the British Empire, deflation lowered the value of the raw 
materials the empire extracted from its colonies, while, in the aftermath of the de-
struction caused by the war, the military and financial cost of maintaining colonial 
rule appeared suddenly steeper and, for some, undesirable or even unsustainable.13 
The economic crisis felt around Europe was matched by an equally powerful chal-
lenge to the rhetoric and legitimacy of imperialism’s civilizing missions. While 
Woodrow Wilson did not invent the principle of nationality, his 1918 Fourteen 
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Points speech suggested a framework—a league of nations—within which such 
an ideal might be translated into a reality. Anticolonial activists around the globe 
quickly incorporated the ideal into their movements.14
It is important to recognize, however, that the principle of nationality appealed 
to imperialists as well as to anti-imperial nationalists. As Susan Pedersen writes, 
the establishment of the League of Nations was not the end of the question of em-
pire but rather the beginning of a new era of its discussion.15 The early years of the 
league were dominated by high-stakes discussion about how to reconcile wartime 
territorial conquests with the ideal of liberal internationalism. The crisis of empire 
was not so much whether imperialism would continue but of what form it would 
take. Territorial conquest and direct rule, as in France and Italy? Or the establish-
ment of imperial commonwealths that fostered semi-independent governments 
whose economic and foreign relations were largely determined by the demands 
of the imperial metropole, as was advocated by the United States and Britain? The 
distinction was a bit facetious, as each empire maintained colonial holdings that 
were territorialized in multiple ways. The League of Nations even added a new 
category, that of “mandated territory,” to the menu of imperial options.
The World War I years and their aftermath were a time of intense social and po-
litical turmoil in Japan. Japan emerged from the war much stronger—economically, 
politically, and territorially. Japan was now a global military power and a creditor 
nation with a primarily industrial economy. At the same time, Japan’s rise to Great 
Power status did little to quell the discomfort with imperialism that had shaped 
discourses of Japanese colonialism since the colonization of Taiwan in 1895. If the 
need to differentiate the Japanese Empire from Western empires had initially kept 
the Japanese government from formally designating Taiwan, and later Korea, as 
“colonies” (shokuminchi), the economic and political crises of the post–World War 
I era brought to the fore the contradiction between the designation of  Taiwan, 
 Korea, and Manchuria as unique administrative territories in name and their 
treatment as colonies of exploitation and settlement in fact. Moreover, institutions 
such as the colonial education and legal systems, which had been established in 
the name of assimilation, were increasingly glaring markers of colonial discrimi-
nation. Ironically, colonial tours of the metropole, which were supposed to make 
colonized subjects see themselves as a part of Japan, sometimes led them to recog-
nize the degree to which they were not.16
If, in the first years of territorializing a Japanese national identity on colonized 
land, it had been possible to imagine that assimilation would simply disappear 
colonized peoples from colonized lands, in the years during and after World War I, 
anti-imperial and anticolonial activism made such a vision increasingly hard to sus-
tain. In Taiwan, Taiwanese Chinese activists pursued both violent and nonviolent 
strategies. The Government General suppressed the violent rebellions brutally.17 
Nonviolent movements were allowed more leeway. Inspired by the  contradictions 
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between the imperial rhetoric of “all subjects are equal under the emperor’s gaze” 
and the reality of colonial discrimination, Taiwanese Chinese elites began a cam-
paign for full assimilation into the institutions and opportunities of the metropole 
in the mid-1910s. When the assimilation movement was unsuccessful, they shifted 
to an even more vociferous campaign for self-rule, which became known as the 
Movement for a Taiwan Parliament (Taiwan gikai).18
In Korea, activists rejected the deferred promises of imperial assimilation and 
instead launched an anti-imperial independence movement in the name of the 
Korean nation. The 1919 uprising, known as the March First Movement, took Japa-
nese colonial authorities completely by surprise. On March 1, 1919, a day set aside 
to commemorate the recent death of the Korean king, Kojong, Korean students 
and activists submitted a declaration of independence to the Government  General. 
The language of the declaration was the language of self-determination, which 
tied the Korean nation to the Korean territory: Korea was a nation of “ twenty 
 million united people” who had a history of over “forty-three centuries.”19 As they 
read the declaration out loud in Keijō’s Pagoda Park and elsewhere in the city, 
the crowds grew into massive protests around the peninsula. The Government 
 General  responded with a violent suppression campaign that left 150 Koreans dead 
and five hundred injured in the first six weeks alone.20
In China, students challenged Japan’s economic dominance and foreign im-
pingements on China’s economic and territorial integrity. In 1919, not long after 
the March First Movement touched off battles in Korea, student leaders demanded 
an end to the Great Powers’ infringement on Chinese sovereignty through such 
practices as extraterritoriality and concessions. They made Japan a specific target 
of their activism, demanding that the League of Nations refuse Japan’s Twenty-One 
Demands—through which Japan had converted its twenty-five year leasehold in 
southern Manchuria into a ninety-nine year lease in 1915—and compel Japan to 
return the former German concession of Shandong to full Chinese sovereignty, 
which the Treaty of Versailles had transferred to Japan after Germany’s loss in 
World War I.21 When the Paris Peace Conference refused to acquiesce to Chinese 
demands, what had been a single protest on May 4 exploded into a full-fledged 
nationalist movement whose influence extended long into the twentieth century.22
In the face of anticolonial and anti-imperial activism in the colonies, the colo-
nial and imperial governments searched for ways to defuse the political conflicts 
that the structure of colonial rule created without ending colonialism itself. One 
approach was the liberalization of rule. In 1918, Hara Takashi took office as the 
first “party” prime minister, the first prime minister to be chosen by the major-
ity political party in the Diet. Hara had long critiqued the Government General 
system and its institutionalization of the colonies as territorial-administrative 
exceptions to the Constitution. As prime minister, Hara advocated a policy of 
“extending the metropole” (naichi enchō) in order to normalize the position of 
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Korea and Taiwan within the Japanese political and legal systems. By promot-
ing liberal institutions throughout the empire, Hara argued that the policy of 
extending the metropole would “[turn] Koreans from the Koreans of old into 
new Japanese citizens (kokumin), which will bring about their happiness and 
development.”23
Similarly liberal policies were applied in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, the 
 Government General pursued a policy of “cultural rule,” which replaced the 
 previous policy of military rule. Colonial officials opened the door for Korean 
participation in and advancement within the colonial system through a vernacular 
press, schools and universities for Koreans, and the admittance of Koreans to the 
colonial police force. As Michael Robinson argues, these measures were designed 
to function as an “escape valve” for anticolonial sentiment amongst the Korean 
population. It also delimited the boundaries within which Koreans could express 
a distinct cultural and political identity.24 In Taiwan, the policy of extending the 
metropole led to the appointment of Den Makoto, the first civilian governor gen-
eral, in 1919 and the revision of Law 63 by the Diet to allow for the wider applica-
tion of inner territory laws to Taiwan and a reduction in the number of ordinances 
issued by the Government General.25
The second approach to the growing political conflict within the empire was 
a kind of cultural pluralism, known as “harmony” (yūwa). In its ideal form, har-
mony suggested the peaceful coexistence of the many ethnic groups within the 
Japanese Empire. First introduced by the Governor General of Korea as naisen 
yūwa (Japan-Korea harmony) in the aftermath of the March First Movement, it 
quickly became associated with the post–World War I civil morality of the impe-
rial state. Japanese students in the metropole wrote essays on how best to achieve 
Japan-Korea harmony; Japanese settlers in Keijō established a Dōminkai (Asso-
ciation of same people) to further harmonious interactions between Koreans and 
the Japanese in the colony; and the colonial governments began promoting in-
termarriage as a way of achieving, on the level of the family, ethnic harmony and 
integration. In practice, colonized subjects saw quickly that harmony was a new 
ideological tool for compelling colonial subservience to imperial rule rather than 
a commitment to actual multiculturalism. One Korean member of the Dōminkai 
wrote in 1924, “The Japanese constantly harp on naisen yūwa and urge Koreans to 
promote harmony . . . while flaunting special privileges and a sense of superior-
ity.”26 Hamada Tsunenosuke, a former chief of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs who 
traveled around the empire in 1924, exposed a similar logic of cultural pluralism 
operating in Taiwan. Noting most shops had closed for the New Year’s holiday, 
Hamada was surprised to find a number of shops still open. They were operated 
by Taiwanese Chinese, and, while bright and well run, such a failure to observe a 
national cultural holiday was “yet another example of how inner territory–Taiwan 
harmony has yet to be achieved.”27
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BREAKING B OUNDARIES
The transition from observational travel as a self-consciously elite activity to 
imperial tourism as a practice for all national subjects took place in the  context 
of  increasing challenges to the core-periphery structure of the empire. As 
anti-imperial and anticolonial movements demanded new ways of drawing 
boundaries within and without the empire, the imperial tourism industry began 
suggesting to Japanese travelers that the empire was in fact a border-less space.
Imperial tourism trafficked in boundary narratives, that is, in stories that travel-
ers used to make sense of the social collective to which they belonged and to define 
the boundaries of that sense of self and collective identity.28 Unlike the traditional 
formulation of boundary narrative, however, tourism’s narratives did not focus 
on boundaries as borders between different peoples or customs. Rather, tourism’s 
boundary narratives told the story of how the infrastructure of tourism broke the 
social and topographical barriers that divided the Japanese nation. In this sense, 
imperial tourism offered a sense of self, social collective, and space that mapped 
neatly on to the notion of the nation as a horizontal community of national people 
who occupied a particular place on the globe.
The vision of the nation as a horizontal community undergirded the liberaliza-
tion of Japanese government in the 1910s and 1920s. It also reflected the dramatic 
change in the economic structure of the country over the course of World War 
I—from primarily agrarian to primarily industrial, which sparked its own new 
industry of leisure and consumption. This culture of play did its own boundary 
work as it drew heavily on the notion of the “masses” to transform what had been 
considered uncultured amusements into commercialized experiences of “the lei-
sure of the masses” (minshū goraku).29 Even the higher-end palaces of consump-
tion packaged their services in the architecture of boundary breaking. To encour-
age frequent visits to its Nihonbashi Mitsukoshi department store Information 
Bureau, for example, the Japan Tourist Bureau and Mitsukoshi revamped building 
policies to allow patrons to enter the store without taking off or covering their 
street shoes.30
Colonial boosters’ tourist guidebooks and itineraries emphasized the 
boundary-breaking work of infrastructure. The Government General of Korea 
heralded, for example, the Shimonoseki–Pusan Connecting Ferry, whose de-
parture times were coordinated with the arrival and departure of the Shinbashi 
(Tokyo)–Shimonoseki Special Express Train and the Pusan–Keijō Express Train. 
“More than the danger of one thousand mountains and ten thousand valleys,” the 
1923 Chōsen tetsudō ryokō benran stated, “in the distant past, the hundred-ri [240-
mile] sea route had a danger disproportionate to its distance. Between Shimono-
seki and Pusan, there was an insurmountable 121-kairi [nautical mile] border.” 
“But,” the guidebook continued, “now it is one pipeline between the same national 
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land—the progress of science has overcome the power of the natural world and 
the path hardly takes eight hours.”31 The text emphasized the parallel history of the 
removal of the topographic and geopolitical boundaries between Japan and Korea 
and the incorporation of Korea into the space of the Japanese nation. For “border,” 
the guidebook used the word kokkyō, which signified a border between states. For 
“land of the same country,” the word was kokudo, “national land.” The connecting 
ferry had consolidated Korea and Japan into the same national land.
Colonial boosters likewise made the Yalu River Rail Bridge speak to the 
 destruction of the border between Korea and Manchuria: “In addition to increasing 
the economic relationship of the two countries (ryōkoku) year by year, the trans-
portation between the two cities of Shingishū [K. Sinŭiju] and Antō [C.  Andong] 
has become remarkably convenient because of the footpath built into the bridge. 
The border has been mostly broken down and the two cities have become 
one.”32 The editors of the magazine Chōsen oyobi Manshū (Korea and Manchuria) 
looked forward to building a “new Japan” now that the bridge had “completely 
obliterated” the biggest waterway that “isolated” Korea from Manchuria.33 In 
 Taiwan, the completion of a railway line that ran the entire north-south distance of 
the island in 1908 led the new governor of Tainan, Tsuda Sōichi, to declare that the 
so-called Main Line railway had “assimilated” (dōka) Taiwan into the metropole.34 
Twenty-four years later, Tanaka Keiji, a prominent geographer and the leader of a 
group of geography and history teachers on an observational tour of Taiwan, used 
similar language to praise the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Company’s new 10,000-
ton class ships. Though they would operate on the Japan–Taiwan line, the ships 
were powerful enough to make the trip between Europe and the United States. 
From his perspective, “it is clear that the contribution of these ships to bringing 
the inner territory and Taiwan closer together is not small.”35
The discourse of technological and infrastructural boundary breaking was mir-
rored by the discourse of tourism itself, which advocated for a new travel culture 
that broke down the barriers between elites and the masses. As Miriam Silverberg 
argues, the mass culture that dominated the era “presumed and produced” indi-
viduals as “consumer subjects” who engaged in subjective formation through the 
consumption of mass media. This act of consumption contributed to the produc-
tion of subjects because media content was shaped, in more and less subtle ways, 
by state ideology.36 Tourism likewise presumed and produced the individual as a 
citizen-traveler, who enacted his or her participation in and belonging to the na-
tion through the practice (that is, the consumption) of travel.
Colonial boosters emphatically rejected earlier representations of imperial 
travel as the purview of elites. Instead, they insisted that imperial travel was the 
duty of all national subjects. Hayashi Takahisa, principal of Miyakonojō Higher 
Commercial School, articulated this sentiment in his 1931 preface to the school’s 
report on their journeys to Korea and Manchuria. “The need to know about the 
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colonies is not a problem that is confined to a few special people. Rather, in these 
days of enlightenment, it must be part of the common sense we have as national 
people.”37 In this phrasing, “common sense” had two meanings: one, a shared basis 
for making good judgments; and two, a shared sensibility of what it meant to be a 
national subject of Japan. Both would be facilitated through travel to the colonies. 
Yet Hayashi’s use of kaika for “enlightenment,” in contrast to Kanō Shigorō’s use 
of keihatsu in 1906, also illustrated the shifting meaning of “national subject.” In 
contrast to Kanō’s keihatsu, which was associated with education, kaika was more 
closely associated with the concept of (Western) Enlightenment, and the opening 
of Japanese society to that Enlightenment in the late nineteenth century (known 
as bunmei kaika or “civilization and enlightenment”). In Hayashi’s formulation, 
the “common sense we have as national people” was not a common sense that 
would be communicated from elite travelers to the masses, but rather a kind 
of knowledge that every national subject should gain for himself or herself. In 
this formulation, the community of national subjects was horizontal rather than 
hierarchical.
Indeed, one of the interventions that the Japan Tourist Bureau and its asso-
ciated agencies sought to achieve with the opening of services to Japanese trav-
elers was the democratization of travel knowledge and culture. Contributing to 
the fledgling industry were a host of organizations devoted to disseminating what 
became known as “travel culture” (ryokō bunka), such as the JTB’s Japan Traveling 
Club (Nihon ryokō kurabu) and the Ministry of Railways’ Japan Travel Culture 
Association (Nihon ryokō bunka kyōkai) and its flagship magazine, Tabi (Trav-
el).38 In the first issue of Tabi in 1924, Arai Gyōji, the head of the services depart-
ment at the Ministry of Railways and future head of the Japan Tourist Bureau, 
defined the travel culture of the era as the idea that all national subjects should 
and could travel. He referred to the mission of the tourism industry as one of 
disseminating an elite travel practice to the masses. Making reference to two of 
the country’s most famous literary travelers—Matsuo Bashō, author of the late 
seventeenth-century haiku collection Oku no hoso michi (The narrow road to the 
deep north), and Saigyō Hōshi, a twelfth-century poet whose poetic journeys to 
the north inspired Bashō’s—Arai contrasted the travel cultures of earlier eras with 
the current moment, in which the combination of the liberalization, industrializa-
tion, and mechanization of Japanese society placed new constraints on travel at the 
same time that it made possible a new form of mass travel. “In a world in which 
the struggle for existence is so clamorous as to be blinding,” Arai wrote, “traveling 
like Saigyō or Bashō is not something that most people are allowed. It is a plea-
sure that only one part of the people can enjoy.” It was time, he argued, to use the 
power of science and civilization to make the pleasure of travel available to a great 
number of people, rather than the elite few. It was time not only to “democratize” 
(minshūka) travel but also to “socialize” it (shakaika).39
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TOURIST MOBILIT Y,  C OLONIZED MOBILIT Y
The rise of the imperial tourism industry coincided with practices that placed un-
even restrictions on mobility within the empire, and it is here that we must interro-
gate how tourism contributed to the maintenance of empire and the reproduction 
of an imperial social imaginary under the new conditions that internationalism, 
anticolonial activism, and anti-imperial nationalism presented.
Much of the actual work of containing the threat of anti-imperial and leftist ac-
tivism took place through restrictions on the circulation of people and information 
within the empire. The Government General of Korea imposed travel restrictions 
on Koreans in the immediate aftermath of the March First Movement. The restric-
tions, which included language-proficiency  examinations, cash-on-hand require-
ments, and the requirement that Korean travelers present letters of  certification 
from both their local authorities and the port police in  Pusan, were sustained 
in official and unofficial forms until 1939.40 The  Government General of Taiwan 
restricted information about the Korean uprising, leading Taiwanese  Chinese ac-
tivist Cai Peihuo to complain: “Since March 1, 1919, you can’t even say the word 
‘Korea’ in Taiwanese media.”41 The Government General of Taiwan sustained the 
Taiwanese Chinese passport system, originally established in 1897 by the Qing 
provincial government, and imposed further measures, such as police surveil-
lance, to track the activities of Taiwanese Chinese people in southern  China.42 
Police crackdowns on the circulation of communists and communist-related 
materials even led to the establishment of what Annika Culver has termed an 
“underground railroad” between Korea and Moscow. Wary of being stopped and 
searched on the railway, Korean communists traveled on foot along the route of 
the South Manchuria Railway to bring the annual report of the Korean Commu-
nist Party to the Comintern in Moscow. Nakano Shigeharu described the route 
in a short story, called “To Moscow” (Mosukowa sashite), which was published 
in the Musan shinbun (Proletarian times) in 1928. Though the story was critiqued 
for romanticizing Korean resistance, it illustrated the way in which the represen-
tation of the empire as a space of circulation—a circulating mission—elided the 
increasingly restrictive and unevenly applied terms under which that circulation 
was allowed.43
The routes and itineraries that the tourism industry offered, however, hid these 
distinctions and instead represented the internal borders of the nation as gateways 
to be passed through on the way to one’s destination. The Japan Tourist Bureau’s 
1923 itinerary for a two-week trip through Manchuria and Korea, for example, 
noted that travelers would undergo a customs examination at three places: at Dai-
ren Station, when departing on northbound trains (which, although part of the 
Railway Zone, were covered under different tariff agreements with the Chinese 
government); at Antō Station, when crossing into Korea; and on the connecting 
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ferry from Pusan to Shimonoseki.44 The latter was to enforce internal tariffs on 
items such as tobacco, which were cheap in China and Korea but taxed as luxury 
items in the metropole.
A subsequent edition of the Japan Tourist Bureau’s itinerary compendium 
emphasized that these examinations were necessary and were “not an inconve-
nient, complicated process.”45 The accuracy of this statement depended, how-
ever, on the experience of the traveler. One of the diarists on the Hiroshima 
Higher Normal School trip in 1915 grumbled when he could not get his tobacco 
through customs on the connecting ferry from Pusan. He had carefully count-
ed his cigarette and cigar purchases and had bought less than the maximum 
amount in Shanghai. Yet when he presented his bag to the customs official on 
the ferry, the official pulled out the cigars and threw them in the garbage bin. 
The student was furious. “What are you doing?” he asked, his voice, according 
to his own report, “full of both utter amazement and anger.” The customs official 
replied, “It is fine to bring up to one hundred cigarettes. It is also fine to bring 
up to fifty cigars. I am throwing one of them away.” The student noted that the 
official delivered this news “with a cold smile.” Feeling defeated, the student 
went back downstairs to his cabin. “When I came back up to the deck a second 
time,” he wrote in conclusion, he saw the garbage bin, “full to the top with vari-
ous kinds of tobacco.”46
Hayasaka Yoshio, who traveled through Korea, Manchuria, and China in 1922, 
had a rather different experience, one much more in line with the statement about 
customs examinations in the Japan Tourist Bureau’s suggested itinerary. In a sec-
tion of his travelogue entitled, “Kind Customs” (Yasashii zeikan), Hayasaka de-
scribed his encounter with customs officials at Antō as he entered Manchuria from 
Korea. “I worried, because there were five or six boxes of Korean tobacco in my 
bag,” but the customs official waved him through.47 He had a similar encounter 
at Shimonoseki at the beginning of his trip as he waited to board the connecting 
ferry to Pusan. It was a completely mundane experience: “As the customs official 
opened my bag, he asked, ‘Have any tobacco?’ ‘No.’ ‘Do you drink?’ ‘Sometimes.’ 
And that was that.” For Hayasaka, the bigger story was his own seasickness—he 
was relieved to be through with the examination so that he could lie down.48
For both the Hiroshima student and Hayasaka, the examinations were uncom-
fortable experiences (at the very least). At the same time, neither of them imagined 
that their experience was shaped in any way by ethnicity. The Hiroshima diarist’s 
status as an student in an elite school afforded him a certain amount of leeway 
when interacting with officials, and it was this sense of entitlement that allowed 
him to question the customs official with an angry tone of voice—he even used a 
grammatical construction that was somewhere in between polite and impertinent 
(nani suru desu). For Hayasaka, the customs experience was simply something to 
be suffered through along the way to something else.
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In contrast, Korean novelist Yŏm Sangsŏp painted a picture of Kōbe–Pusan 
travel shaped entirely by his status as a Korean. In his short story “On the Eve of 
the Uprising” (Mansejŏn), which formed the basis for the vignette that opened 
this chapter, the protagonist, Yi Inhwa, attempts to board a ship bound for Pusan 
at Kōbe only to be hassled by a plainclothes customs officer on the docks. The of-
ficer peppers him with questions: “Your age? School? On what business? Destina-
tion?” “Helpless and irritated,” the protagonist writes, “I wanted to ask out loud 
why on earth he needed to know.”49
Retiring to the third-class bathing area on board the ship, Yi finds himself sur-
rounded by Japanese people, who, after an initial period of attempting to deter-
mine whether the poorest-looking member of the group is Korean, strike up a 
conversation about the laziness and gullibility of Koreans, using the derogatory 
term yobo. Soon a Korean working for the port customs office arrives to order 
him off the boat with all of his belongings, so that he might be inspected and 
interrogated by the port police.50 Throughout this, Yi negotiates constantly with 
the customs officials, who describe their own constraints—they can only open the 
bags in his presence, for example—alluding to the way in which the singling out 
of Korean travelers for special scrutiny was enacted within the confines of profes-
sional identity and respect for the rule of law. Ultimately, the officials allow him 
to re-board the steamer two minutes before it departs. After a journey marked by 
contention and conflict, Yi arrives in Pusan a day and a half later. As told at the 
beginning of this chapter, he attempts to disembark without drawing the notice 
of the port police in Pusan, but the police find him anyway and harass him one 
more time. In contrast to the Hiroshima student’s comfort in expressing anger and 
disbelief at the arbitrary nature of customs enforcement on his return from Pusan 
to Shimonoseki, Yŏm’s protagonist felt the need to adopt a strategy of conciliation 
at Pusan, where he felt more vulnerable than he had in the metropole.
The story of Yi Inhwa was fictional. But Yŏm’s underlining of the differential 
mobility of travelers within the empire contained important kernels of truth.51 
On the one hand, Yŏm Sangsŏp was a Korean nationalist and socialist, who spent 
four months in prison for organizing protests of Korean students and laborers 
in Osaka in support of the March First Movement. “On the Eve of the Uprising” 
was a work that presented an anti-imperialist nationalist challenge to  Japanese 
colonial rule. Yŏm also portrayed the colonial government’s exploitation of class 
differences; Yi expresses his rage at the thought of Japanese labor recruiters de-
ceiving Korean laborers about the wages and conditions they could expect if they 
contracted to work in the metropole. In this sense, the story might be read more 
as a manifesto than a documentary account of cross-straits travel. On the other 
hand, Yŏm’s turn to mobility in this moment to expose the fundamental contra-
dictions of the colonial assimilation policy and its geography of civilization illu-
minates how the ability to move freely throughout the empire was seen by at least 
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some colonized subjects, particularly those who moved within the elite institu-
tions of imperial society, as the sine qua non of full membership in the imperial 
nation. He attended Keiō University in Tokyo, one of the most prestigious private 
universities in the empire. This pathway was facilitated by his brother, who was 
a lieutenant in the Japanese imperial army.52 For Yŏˇm, then, it was apparent that 
no matter how well they spoke Japanese or what prestigious institutions they 
belonged to, colonized subjects would be treated differently by colonial and met-
ropolitan institutions.
Yŏm was not alone in this assessment. Writing under the name Priest Go, a 
Taiwanese Chinese author protested the discrimination that Taiwanese Chinese 
students experienced at the borders of the inner territory. Seeking to demonstrate 
his willing participation in the colonial regime of Japanification, one Taiwan-
ese Chinese student—whose surname was 林, which was “Lin” in Chinese and 
“Hayashi” in Japanese—identified himself to customs officials at Kōbe as Hayashi. 
In response, Priest Go reported, the customs official rejected the student’s claim to 
Japanese identity with the retort, “Don’t try to fool me. Aren’t you really a Rin?” 
By offering a Japanified pronunciation of the Chinese reading of the student’s last 
name—changing “Hayashi” to “Rin”—the official insisted that the student’s au-
thentic identity was Chinese. It was incidents like these, Priest Go argued, that il-
luminated the contradiction in Japanese imperial society. Why should the student 
bother to demonstrate Japanification when people like the customs official at Kōbe 
would never recognize him as Japanese?53
At the heart of imperial tourism’s ideological function was its representation 
of the traveling-citizen as a free subject and of space as absolute—the nation and 
empire as a space that one passed though regardless of body or perspective, space 
that existed rather than was produced. Although border officials harassed colo-
nized subjects or sometimes even denied them passage, imperial tourist promo-
tions described the routes of travel within the empire in universal terms, erasing 
the empire’s internal and embodied borders. When the Osaka Mercantile Ship-
ping Company inaugurated its new travel magazine, Umi (The sea), in 1924, it 
included a number of articles designed to teach travelers the how-tos of Taiwan 
travel. Articles such as “To China! To the South Seas!” advertised the company’s 
routes between Taiwan and southern China—precisely the route that was forbid-
den to Taiwanese Chinese travelers without prior government permission. The 
article made no mention of how travel requirements differed for different popu-
lations. One might object that these were materials directed toward a particular 
touring audience, one from the inner territory. Yet tourist guidebooks and route 
advertisements were multipurpose items. The Government General of Taiwan’s 
1927 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai, for example, contained information on how to 
travel with a corpse (tip: it costs 50 percent more to travel with a corpse if you opt 
for an express train service).54
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Other how-tos and travelogues for Taiwan emphasized the ease with which 
travelers could pass through the island’s internal border between the plains areas 
and the Government General’s special administrative zone in the central moun-
tainous region, the so-called Savage Territory. For the indigenous peoples residing 
inside the special administrative zone, the border marked a line they could not 
cross without police permission. Colonial authorities worked hard to communi-
cate this fact to indigenous leaders. As part of a “savage tour” (banjin kankō) of 
the island, colonial police screened a film that showed an indigenous man being 
electrocuted by the electrified border fence.55 The representation of the guard line 
as a strict and impassable boundary elided the way in which, as Paul D. Barclay has 
argued, the line also worked as a “contact periphery” between Japanese officials 
and indigenous residents of the highlands.56 At the same time, passage through the 
boundary was at the whim of and in the service of Japanese colonial rule. As Kirsten 
Ziomek relates in her accounting of the life of Yayutz Bleyh, even indigenous peo-
ple who participated in the colonial regime found themselves stymied at times by 
the vagaries of the police. Bleyh—an Atayal woman who had served in the Ab-
original Affairs division of the Government General and as a translator for a group 
of indigenous leaders touring the metropole—applied to the Government General 
of Taiwan for permission to travel to the inner territory, where her common-law 
husband, a Japanese man, lay on his deathbed. The Government General dragged 
its feet and demanded more documents, delaying her travel by three months. Her 
husband died shortly after her arrival.57
Quite in contrast, Japanese travelers experienced the “savage border” as a line 
to be crossed. One of the most popular tourist sites in Taiwan was the village of 
Kappanzan, which was relatively close to the main railway and offered the chance 
to “survey the state of life of the savages (banjin).”58 Ogi Zenzō described his ex-
perience of the border as one of frictionless passage: “Those of us who were going 
up [to Kappanzan] stopped at the Taikei ward office to request permission to enter 
the Savage Territory. As we applied, the officer called up to Kappanzan to let the of-
fice there know we were coming, and instructed us where our lodging was for the 
night.”59 The Japan Tourist Bureau’s compendium of tourist itineraries described 
such an experience as the norm. Under the heading, “Observing the Savage Ter-
ritory,” the compendium explained that “the process is very simple—just report 
orally and permission will be given immediately.”60
If touristic representations differentiated the nation of traveling-citizens at all, 
it was by class—first class, second class, and third class. Yet such representations 
also elided the common practice of ethnic differentiation that structured the rail-
way car and steamship cabin. The third-class cabins located under the stairs on 
the Shimonoseki–Pusan Connecting Ferry were designated for Korean travelers. 
Though the ship was technically divided into three classes, Japanese travelers re-
ferred to these cabins as “fourth class.”61 As Kō Sonbon points out, even if unofficial 
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policy did not differentiate cabins by ethnicity, income did the same work.62 First- 
and second-class cabins were extraordinarily expensive, and as Akimori Tsunetarō 
noted in his 1935 account of travel in Korea, the Government General’s policy of 
encouraging lower wages for Korean workers and granting “colonial bonuses” to 
Japanese workers meant that even third-class fares were largely unaffordable to 
Korean travelers.63 Such a system was enforced in Taiwan and Manchuria as well, 
where railway conductors and railway guards expected Taiwanese Chinese and 
Chinese passengers to ride in second or third class.64
Imperial travelers were cognizant of this expectation, even if tourist guide-
books did not make it plain. Indeed, in one incident, it was precisely because 
they were riding in second or third class that a railway guard mistook a group of 
Tokyo Number One Higher School students for Chinese exchange students. On 
board a second- or third-class carriage at Eikō Station, a Japanese soldier board-
ed to check the cabin. “Are you all Chinese?” he asked. “We’re Tokyo Number 
One Higher School students!” they responded, “in a high-handed manner.” The 
soldier, determined to find out if there were in fact any Chinese people aboard 
the car, kept up his questioning: “Well, are you foreign students then?” The ques-
tion suggested that the students were Chinese students studying at Tokyo Num-
ber One Higher School on exchange. The students just burst out laughing, for, 
they said, “What else could we do?”65 For other imperial travelers, riding the 
third-class cars represented an off-the-beaten-path experience of imperial travel. 
Matsuda Kiichi, a middle-school student from Osaka, congratulated himself for 
riding “with the islanders” in third class as he traveled south from Kagi in 1937. 
The sleeping cars were full, and, he declared, he had little interest in “ordinary 
travel” anyway.66
It is possible to suggest that all of these travelers were different types of 
travelers—that a Taiwanese Chinese person would not consult a Government 
General tourist guidebook or an Osaka Mercantile Shipping Company advertise-
ment to find out how to travel to southern China, nor would a Korean traveler 
consult the Japan Tourist Bureau’s itinerary compendium to look for which cabins 
they were eligible to reserve on the connecting ferry. But the colonial governments 
themselves engaged in ideological work to teach colonized subjects to imagine the 
space of the nation as one of free movement and themselves as national subjects 
with the right to move freely. In that sense, imperial tourism’s boundary narra-
tives were directed at the national people as a whole even if, in practice, they ap-
plied only to a subset of national subjects. Elementary school Japanese-language 
textbooks produced for the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea, for ex-
ample, included travelogue and letter-from-abroad readings, such as “Letter from 
Keijō” (Keijō dayori), “From Kiryū to Kobe” (Kiryū kara Kōbe), and “I Rode the 
Connecting Ferry” (Renrakusen ni notta).67 The texts represented the territory 
of the state as a space within which social and topographical borders had been 
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 eliminated. “I Rode the Connecting Ferry,” for example, described the journey of a 
Korean student and his father between Pusan and Shimonoseki. Even though the 
text was published in 1924, one year after the end of the official travel certification 
system and the beginning of unofficial restrictions on Korean movement to Japan, 
it did not address the common conflicts that Korean travelers and migrants faced 
on the connecting ferry. Instead, “I Rode the Connecting Ferry” represented the 
journey between Korea and the inner territory in the way that imperial travel-
ers experienced it. The story reported none of the restrictions and interrogations 
that Yŏm’s Yi Inhwa endured. Rather, the student’s narrative described their arrival 
at Pusan Wharf at ten o’clock in the evening and how they quickly boarded the 
Tokuju-maru, one of the three sister ships that formed the third generation of con-
necting ferries. The story ends with their arrival in Shimonoseki at seven the next 
morning and their quick transfer to the local inn.68 Like the first colonial tourist 
guidebooks, the elementary-school primer situated this moment of Japan-Korea 
travel within a progressive history of imperial transition and ever-increasing 
speed. They meet a friend of his father’s aboard the ship who says, “When this 
connection was done on ships such as the Iki-maru and the Tsushima-maru [the 
first generation of connecting ferries], it took twelve whole hours. Now, though, 
they got the three ships—the Keifuku-, Shōkei-, and Tokuju-maru—and it only 
takes eight hours. The trip is convenient.”69
THE B OUNDARIES OF B OUNDARY BREAKING
For the fictional Yi Inhwa, as for real colonized travelers, the experience of in-
ternal borders within the empire was one of the rejection of shared nationality 
through the denial of recognition; it was one of reinforcing, or perhaps even 
constituting, a sense of their own place within the imperial nation. This sense 
of place was based not on eventual cultural assimilation but of ethnic differ-
ence. Nor was it limited to colonized subjects. Rather, when faced with bound-
ary breaking by colonized subjects, imperial travelers reinforced the distinction 
between the Japanese ethnos as the empire’s traveling citizens and colonized sub-
jects as those who still required constraints. To put it bluntly, they put colonized 
subjects in their place.
When combined with the rhetoric of expanding the metropole and impe-
rial harmony, ethnic discrimination in border crossing and travel fostered both 
a sense of collective identity among colonized subjects and a sense of the need 
to maintain institutional policies of ethnic differentiation among imperial travel-
ers. One observational travel group’s story illustrates how this process unfolded. 
The spread of travel culture to Taiwanese Chinese children impressed Tsukahara 
Zenki, a teacher traveling with the 1932 All-Japan Geography and History Teach-
ers’ Association trip to Taiwan. He noted, “Taiwan’s islander children also enjoy 
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 playing deck billiards [shuffleboard] back and forth.”70 His fellow travelers Uraka-
mi Shūe and Yamaguchi Shunsaku recorded a rather different experience of Tai-
wanese Chinese travel culture with the Japanese Empire, however. Upon boarding 
the Yoshino-maru in Kōbe, Urakami’s group noticed that the cabin that had been 
reserved for their party had, in fact, been “occupied” (senryō) by Taiwanese stu-
dents (Taiwan gakusei). The word that Urakami used for “occupied” was the same 
word associated with a military occupation, though he did not register the irony. 
More interesting was the students’ reaction to the ship’s secretary’s insistence that 
they vacate the cabin. “When the ship’s secretary tried hard to get them to change 
rooms, I saw the attitude of the students get very threatening. They all stood up 
and roared things like, ‘We are also Japanese (Nihonjin)! We paid the same fare so 
what are you doing differentiating us?’ while they held their canes in their hands 
and beat the columns and stomped their feet. Their manner was ghastly.”71 Dis-
cussing the incident afterward, the travelers searched for explanations. One, based 
on a discussion with a Japanese official in Taiwan, was that “educating Taiwanese 
requires extremely careful consideration” because of the rise of anticolonial think-
ing among Taiwanese Chinese scholars.72 For others, however, the reason for the 
outburst was not that difficult to locate. “It wasn’t a mystery at all why they did 
something like this,” Yamaguchi Shunsaku wrote. “Afterward, I heard that island-
ers are prejudiced against inner territory people.”73
C ONCLUSION
In the midst of a crisis of empire and nation, the Japan Tourist Bureau and other 
imperial transportation enterprises set about representing the empire as a space 
of free movement and the empire’s subjects as traveling citizens within that space. 
Their representations elided, however, the internal and embodied borders that 
shaped the travel of colonized subjects within the empire. Despite imperial travel-
ers’ own embrace of boundary breaking as the foundation of observational travel, 
they found ways to turn a blind eye—or, in some cases, exploit—the boundar-
ies that travel within the empire imposed on colonized subjects. Movement, in 
other words, should not be considered an afterthought in the history of tourism 
but rather a central site in which its politics, both of practice and representation, 
emerged.74
In telling the history of imperial tourism from the perspective of the kind of 
spatial experiences it presumed and produced, I have sought to avoid what Saskia 
Sassen has called the “endogeneity trap” of trying to explain the significance of 
a phenomenon solely by the studying the phenomenon itself.75 Indeed, a central 
aspect of the ideology of imperial tourism was its representation of the national 
people as traveling citizens. Writing, then, of a history of tourism that focused 
solely on the experiences and movements of the empire’s most powerful subjects 
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would re-create rather than challenge the spatial politics of empire. Instead, this 
chapter has shown how the ideological work of tourism emerged in conversation 
with its erasure of the differential mobility of subjects. In this way, mobility came 
to serve as one of the axes along which travelers understood their own status 
as “citizens” as well as an axis along which the boundaries of citizenship were 
enforced.
Though imperial tourism represented mobility as a project of increasingly con-
venient point-to-point travel, the uneven experiences of intra-imperial borders 
illuminate the fact that “contact zones” do not occur solely at a traveler’s destina-
tion. The differentiation of space into discrete and internally homogenous “famil-
iar” and “alien” places is its own kind of fiction. Yet it was one that would become 
increasingly central to the work of territorializing a Japanese national identity on 
colonized land—and to the conceptualization and enactment of colonial differ-
ence. Imperial tourism’s erasures expose how everyday practices of distinction in-
creasingly marked Korean, indigenous, Taiwanese Chinese, and Chinese bodies as 
subject to special scrutiny. While in their journeys to battlefields and other sites 
in the nationalist mode, imperial travelers treated national membership as a per-
formative and affective category, through their own encounters with the growing 
internal borders of the empire, colonized subjects demonstrated that membership 
in the nation was a matter of recognition as well.
The differentiation of travelers based on ethnicity and place was the underside 
of the liberalization policies and “harmony” rhetoric that Japanese officials de-
ployed in the face of growing anti-imperial and anticolonial activism. As harmony 
activists envisioned it, ethnic difference was a value if it could be contained within 
the nation. What was required was the recognition of the different strengths that 
each ethnic group brought to the nation and the embrace by all groups of certain 
shared values. Those promoting liberalization policies likewise recognized the ex-
istence of distinct ethnicities within the nation, arguing that the extension of the 
legal and political institutions of the metropole would create a homogenous space 
of the nation within which local ethnic populations could achieve “happiness” as 
Japanese nationals while retaining their ethnic identities.
As colonized travelers experienced it, however, the rhetoric of the nation as a 
homogenous space encompassing the entire empire did not live up to the real-
ity. Ethnicity and place were linked—it was not only their identity as Taiwanese 
Chinese that made Taiwanese Chinese travelers subject to special scrutiny. It was 
also their attempt to travel from Taiwan to the inner territory—to move from the 
place that official policy insisted they belonged, to a place where official policy and 
unofficial practice constituted them as alien. Likewise, it was not just in movement 
that Korean travelers found themselves relegated to a lower class of service. It was 
in movement along the empire’s rail and steamship lines, which the “circulating 
mission” discourse of Japanese colonialism constituted as the space of a civilized 
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Japanese nation in contrast to that of colonized subjects, who were out of place in 
the space of civilization.
The geography of cultural pluralism was thus both a weapon and a tool. For 
anticolonial and anti-imperial activists, the idea that Taiwan and Korea were dis-
tinct cultural regions with distinct ethnic populations served as the basis for pow-
erful challenges to the structure of Japanese imperial rule. For colonial boosters 
and imperialists, however, the same concept became a way of envisioning a future 
Japanese imperial nation that fully integrated the new territories and their peoples 
at the same time that it used notions of place to reinforce an ethnic and cultural 
hierarchy within the nation.
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In 1935, an article entitled “Going to the Korea of White Robes” (Hakui no Chōsen 
o iku) appeared in the popular Japanese magazine Tabi. The article’s byline credited 
the account to Kobayashi Chiyoko, and while the article provided no biographical 
information, it is likely that the author in question was, in fact, the famous singer 
of the same name. She had recently recorded the first Japanese version of the Ko-
rean folk song “Arirang” for the label Nippon Victor. Its lyrics and melody evoked 
a Korea curated for the Japanese colonial imagination—a land of “simplicity, mel-
ancholy, and wit” that was also a “reflective mirror” of Japan’s modernity through 
which Japanese people could connect to the “primeval emotions and lifeways” of 
an imagined premodern Japan.1
The Japan Tourist Bureau sent Kobayashi to the peninsula as its special cor-
respondent. Like her version of “Arirang,” Kobayashi’s description of Korea rep-
resented the colony as both exotic and familiar. “You’ll be surprised to find that 
just by crossing one sea, there are scenery and customs that are so different,” she 
wrote.2 The Korea of white robes was a leisurely place, a preindustrial paradise. 
The white-robed men were not just Koreans, they were emblematic of Korea 
itself—slow and unchanging, a land that was both close to and far away from what 
a subsequent correspondent referred to as “the rapidly changing inner territory” 
of the Japanese Empire.3
In the late 1920s the geography of civilization gave way to a geography of cultur-
al pluralism. From Taiwan to the inner territory to Manchuria, imperial tourism 
shifted away from representing the place of the colonies in terms of their progress 
toward Japanification and industrialization and instead offered the experience of 
“local color” as its primary product. No longer was the value of the first-hand 
4
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Figure 8. “Hakui no Chōsen e yuku” (Going to the Korea of white robes). The cover to 
Kobayashi Chiyoko’s special report on travel to Korea linked culture and territory by plac-
ing a typical colonial image of a Korean man above a map of the Korean peninsula. 
source: Tabi 1935, no. 7. Courtesy of the Japan Travel Bureau Library of Tourism Culture.
Local Color    105
experience of the colonies solely the observation of their incorporation into the 
circulatory pathways of civilization or their place in the national land. Rather, co-
lonial boosters and imperial travelers increasingly portrayed the importance of 
imperial travel as the sensory experience of regional difference that it offered.
In emphasizing the value of regional difference to the national people, local 
color representations like Kobayashi’s suggested a spatial and social imaginary 
of Japan that integrated colonized lands and peoples into a Japanese nation that 
was now understood to be a variegated space of diverse and commensurable cul-
tural regions and a national body composed of multiple ethnic nations. This new 
spatio-social imaginary posited an elevated status for those citizens who could 
make use of regional difference, for it was those who circulated throughout the 
empire who could contribute their experience of Japan’s diversity to the wealth, 
knowledge, and well-being of the nation. The emphasis on circulation changed 
the meaning of observation as well, which now was not only observing the sight at 
hand but also appreciating the differences between regions and peoples.4
Local color tourism invoked new modes of territorial incorporation and modi-
fied the old. Tourist materials no longer erased colonized subjects from the pre-
scriptive lists of sights that defined each territory. Rather, local color introduced 
an ethnographic mode of territorial incorporation, advertising the observation 
of colonized subjects as a fundamental component of the experience of regional 
difference.5 The historical mode adopted “indigenous peoples” (genjūminzoku) as 
the subject of the regional histories of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria, while the 
nationalist mode emphasized the necessity of preserving diverse regional land-
scapes for the well-being of the national people. Most significant, however, were 
the modifications to the economic mode, which now treated commodities as natu-
ral resources endemic to particular regions rather than products made marketable 
through Japanese industrial know-how. Local color likewise represented physical 
labor as a product of the natural aptitudes of particular peoples rather than as an 
unfortunate holdover from a previous nonindustrialized era. In this, local color 
suggested a spatial and social imaginary of the Japanese nation that defined it as 
an economic body whose relations were constituted through a “mutual exchange 
of advantages” between ethnic groups and cultural regions.6
Local color’s treatment of culture as something that one could consume re-
flected a broader shift to an everyday life defined by commodities and con-
sumption, what has been called the rise of the kokumin as “consumer-subject” 
as well as citizen-subject in the late 1920s.7 Mass culture even—or, perhaps, 
especially—commodified sentiment through the production of consumers’ desire 
for “the new,” which, in the case of local color tourism, manifested as a desire for 
“the exotic old.”8 What distinguished local color tourism from other examples of 
the “erotic grotesque nonsense” culture of the mass consumption era, and what 
makes it central to the analysis of the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism, 
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 however, is that local color was about the consumption of place. Local color rep-
resented particular identities as endemic to particular territories in a manner that 
took both the territories and the identities outside of History.
The exhortation to imperial travelers to consume the nation’s local colors nec-
essarily involved them in the broader struggles of imperial and anti-imperial na-
tionalism that shaped the 1920s and 1930s as the empire transitioned from an era 
of territorial acquisition to one of territorial maintenance. With the notable excep-
tions of anarchists such as Sin Ch’ae-ho in Korea and proletarian internationalists 
like Nakanishi Inosuke, who imagined politics to be an unstable conflict between 
classes and individuals imbricated in multiple subject positions, the conflict over 
the future of the imperial nation-state could not but invoke territorialized identi-
ties as the basis for political legitimacy.9 Native ethnographers used local color to 
foment ethnic nationalism in Japan, and Korean anti-imperial nationalists used 
it to lay claim to an independent Korean nation in Korea. Representatives from 
Japan’s “second cities” used it to challenge the dominance of Tokyo in the determi-
nation of Japanese culture at the same time that Taiwanese Chinese activists used it 
to demand self-rule.10 The Japan Tourist Bureau used local color to emphasize the 
need for continued colonial rule in Taiwan, while the Japanese Kwantung Army 
used it to justify the formal separation of Manchuria from China and the estab-
lishment of the putatively independent state of Manchukuo. If the geography of 
civilization had emphasized the transformational power of History over custom, 
local color flipped this relationship on its head to argue that Culture and Ethnos 
were ontological properties of territory that must be protected from History.
The use of local color to fight so many different political battles suggests the fur-
ther naturalization of the territorialized nation as the global archetype of political 
community. At the same time, it illuminates how such a concept could also be used 
to naturalize a multinational state that legitimated past colonialism in the name 
of future protection and prosperity. Indeed, it was precisely local color’s utility to 
several movements—the imperial national, the anti-imperial nationalist, and the 
anticolonial liberal—that made local color tourism such an important political 
tool. In an era when anti-imperial and anticolonial activists took to newspapers, 
magazines, and even children’s literature to challenge the legitimacy of Japanese 
imperialism and, in some cases, of nationalism and the territorial nation-state, 
local color suggested a way of seeing the nation not as a project of future homog-
enization but as a constructed cultural body. Culture, in this context, was under-
stood as both the ontological local culture of the state’s diverse regions as well as 
the voluntarist culture of the nation as a whole. Such a project naturalized the 
territoriality of the nation as a composite of its territorialized subcultures, which 
were represented as inseparable from the environment that had forged them. In 
its claim to protect and curate the empire’s diverse regional cultures, local color 
provided a raison d’être for a liberal, imperial state that superseded the logic of 
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national self-determination.11 Local color tourism naturalized this new imaginary 
by emphasizing the sensory experience of difference between places—now under-
stood to be static and fixed—and encouraged travelers to reproduce this imagi-
nary through the act of appreciating the complementary capacities and commodi-
ties that each region and ethnic nation had to offer.
This chapter shows how colonial boosters used the idea of local color to ar-
ticulate a vision of Japan as a nation and empire of diverse yet complementary re-
gions in Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan. It focuses on two of local color’s common 
terms, labor and landscape. It was through these interlinked terms that colonial 
boosters transformed the threat that colonized subjects posed to the legitimacy of 
the Japanese Empire into an argument for the authenticity of a multiethnic nation 
of Japanese kokumin that nevertheless incorporated colonized lands and peoples 
on uneven terms. Though histories of the sublime—a sensory experience of beauty 
or grandeur that inspires awe—suggest that the production of a romantic land-
scape relied on the erasure of visible labor, central to local color’s spatial politics 
was the territorialization of a hierarchical social imaginary through the figure of 
the indigenous laborer.12 Colonial boosters used local color to define the empire’s 
ethnic nations as essentially “from” a particular territory while at the same time 
representing the imperial nation as the complementary union of an imperial divi-
sion of labor and natural resources. Such representations constituted the colonies 
as places within and yet somehow apart from the nation by positing an impe-
rial social imaginary in which relations between ethnic nations were defined as 
a  mutual exchange of advantages between the empire’s regions and peoples. They 
also fostered new forms of dispossession in the name of “appreciating” the differ-
ences between the natural aptitudes and diverse histories of each region. The chap-
ter traces the contours of local color in Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria to illumi-
nate how the representation of land and labor used specific political conflicts over 
the future of each territory as a resource for reproducing place-images that fueled, 
rather than undercut, imperial travelers’ sense of the “newness” of the colonies.
THE SEC OND GENER ATION PROBLEM
Behind colonial boosters’ enthusiasm for local color was a hint of exasperation. 
The second generation of imperial tourists had grown up on the accounts of the 
first—accounts that described Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as places that felt, 
looked, and smelled different from Japan—and it was this experience of differ-
ence that they sought to acquire through travel. Yet the geography of civilization 
framed these experiences of difference as uniformly negative. While travelers were 
perfectly willing to recognize the modernization of colonial infrastructure, indus-
try, and governance, they experienced colonial differences as negatives—aspects 
of colonial life that needed to be ameliorated before the colonies could truly 
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 become part of the Japanese nation. It was this negative valuation of difference that 
 Matsukawa Jirō pointed to in his 1925 guidebook, Shi go nichi no tabi (Four- and 
five-day trips). While Western-style buildings and street cars made the city center 
of Keijō “far more splendid than the city of Kyōto,” the city’s native differences lin-
gered: “in the places where in between [the street cars and autobuses] white-robed 
Koreans (Senjin) lumber around, carrying tobacco pipes that might as well be three 
feet long, there is the unmistakable color (karā) of Korea,” he wrote. “If you take 
one step from the flourishing [central] district toward the poorer quarters, you are 
led to a squalid Korean town where the streets are narrow, and low houses made 
of dirt are jumbled together.”13 It was likewise this negative sense that sparked pro-
test from one alumnus of Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School, who resided in 
Keijō. Major changes had taken place in the colony in the last ten years, including 
the construction of a new Government General Building, the widening of roads, 
and the introduction of asphalt. But, he complained, the country had not yet taken 
notice. “It is my strong desire,” he asserted, “to see this travelogue used throughout 
the country and to see it introduce the true conditions of Korea-Manchuria widely 
throughout the realm.”14 Itō Ken, a prolific literary critic, voiced a similar com-
plaint in his 1935 Taiwan annai (Guide to Taiwan): “[The Japanese] (Nihonjin) lack 
clear and correct knowledge of this complete picture. If you immediately think of 
‘savages,’ ‘venomous snakes,’ ‘bad illness,’ or ‘terrible heat’ when someone says ‘Tai-
wan,’ it must be said that you are very ignorant. If you are Japanese, then it really is 
an embarrassment not to truly know Taiwan.”15
Japanese settlers in the colonies found themselves fighting against a metropoli-
tan imaginary that turned the terms of the geography of civilization against them. 
In the early 1920s, movements against Law 63 and Law 30—the laws that empow-
ered the governors general of Korea and Taiwan to issue ordinances without the 
involvement of a parliament—gained strength as organizations of Japanese settlers 
joined with elite colonized subjects to advocate for the full incorporation of the 
colonies into the metropolitan political and legal systems. Yet in 1925, colonial resi-
dents found themselves further excluded from the imperial polity when a univer-
sal male suffrage bill was passed that formally denied residents of Korea, Taiwan, 
and Manchuria the right to vote in national parliamentary elections. Whereas, 
previously, suffrage had been based on tax qualifications, thus limiting the elector-
ate to some five percent of the population, the 1925 act defined eligibility by age, 
sex, and place of residence. Only males twenty-five years and older whose official 
place of residence was in the inner territory could vote. The act thus enfranchised 
many colonized subjects residing in the metropole but excluded Japanese residents 
of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. The act also, however, mandated a full year of 
residency at the voter’s current place of residence, a rule that disproportionately 
disenfranchised the heavily Korean community of migrant laborers in the metro-
pole.16 The exclusion frustrated many settler and colonized elites, who continued 
Local Color    109
to debate whether the best route toward achieving a political voice would be by 
demanding complete assimilation (the policy known as naichi enchō) or by seek-
ing autonomy from the metropole in the form of local parliaments and self-rule, 
the strategy taken by the largely Taiwanese Chinese activists who participated in 
the movement for a Taiwan parliament.17
In both Korea and Taiwan, colonial elites chaffed against the continuation of 
the Government General system, which had been justified, in part, by the argu-
ment that colonized peoples were not civilized enough to participate in liberal 
government.18 In Korea, the Government General was challenged by a nascent 
coalition of Japanese and Korean commercial elites, who opposed the govern-
ment’s proposal to maintain Korea as an agricultural appendage of Japan. Seeking 
a stronger voice in governing the colony, they rejected the notion that the political 
status of the entire territory should reflect the popular—and, they claimed, often 
inaccurate—notions of the developmental status of colonized subjects. In Taiwan, 
the lines of conflict were drawn differently. Taiwanese Chinese elites opposed the 
continuation of the Government General system, while Japanese settlers largely 
supported it as an important source of their special privileges on the island.19 Yet as 
Itō Ken’s complaint shows, even as settlers argued that Taiwanese Chinese people 
should remain second-class citizens, they too argued that the geography of civi-
lization ought to be replaced with a new spatio-social imaginary that treated the 
territory of Taiwan as fully part of the Japanese nation. In Manchuria, Japanese 
settlers in Dairen feared both the rise of Chinese nationalist claims to Manchuria 
and the Japanese government’s apparent lack of commitment to Japan’s “special 
interests” in Manchuria. A number of settlers campaigned vigorously for election 
to parliamentary office in order to protect these special interests and won five seats 
in the 1928 election. (The suffrage law prevented Japanese residents of Manchuria 
from voting, but these settlers were able to bypass that restriction on their voices by 
running for office—the residency requirement for holding office was determined 
by the location of one’s household registry rather than actual place of residence.) 
As Emer O’Dwyer points out, the significance of the election was to be found not 
so much in the election of Japanese residents of Manchuria to the Diet, but in the 
political parties’ adoption of the concerns of Japanese settlers in Manchuria and 
elsewhere as a core component of their own platforms.20
If colonial elites found themselves frustrated that the uneven geography of 
empire was likely to continue for a second generation, metropolitan officials and 
colonial administrators likewise found themselves confronting the prospect of a 
second generation of colonized subjects who had little patience for the empire’s 
empty promises. Though they were not threatened by the renewal of Laws 63 
and 30 or disenfranchised by the Universal Suffrage Act, government officials 
were tasked with maintaining the viability of imperialism in an increasingly hos-
tile domestic and international environment. Hamada  Tsunenosuke, the former 
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chief of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs, noted this in his 1928 report on travel to 
Taiwan:
Among today’s young students  .  .  . there are those who have embraced treachery, 
using big exaggerations like so-called ethnic self-determination (minzoku jiketsu), 
Taiwan self-rule, or Taiwan independence. And there’s also a group of inner terri-
tory people like members of the Diet who fan [their anger]. These guys think it’s a 
good thing and run around making noise. The hot-blooded youth go along with 
the crowd. The problem gets bigger. Won’t it be the case then that before too long 
phrases like ‘establish a Taiwan parliament,’ just like phrases like ‘independence 
for Korea,’ [will] penetrate the minds of elementary school children? That’s what I 
worry about.
I’m convinced that probably nothing will happen with the current generation of 
islanders. But what about the second generation? It seems as if they’re heading in 
the direction of absolutely opposing the Government General’s policy of assimila-
tion, and inviting the result of that opposition. This is the thing that I can’t stop 
being afraid of.21
Within the borders of the Japanese imperial state, the moral renewal of impe-
rialism revolved around the concept of “harmony” (yūwa). Officials hoped that 
the pursuit of harmony would mitigate anti-imperial activism among colonized 
subjects by encouraging Japanese citizens to appreciate more actively the virtues of 
colonized subjects. Harmony associations in Osaka and Yokohama, two cities with 
large populations of Korean workers, for example, encouraged students to write 
essays about their feelings toward Koreans and Chinese people and, in particular, 
to emphasize the contributions that each ethnic group made to the imperial whole. 
The associations saw composition as a particularly powerful vehicle for achieving 
the internalization of a multiethnic national identity because, like reports on im-
perial travel, the essays required students to write in the first person.22 Reforming 
the attitudes of the second generation of imperial subjects would also, officials 
hoped, help with the growing second-generation problem among colonized sub-
jects by decreasing the instances of overt interethnic antagonism.23
But the challenges could not all be fixed with adjustments to the public image 
of empire or to its prescribed method of interethnic relations. Colonized subjects 
also challenged the empire to live up to its own rhetoric. Writing a few years after 
Hamada, Taiwanese self-rule activist Cai Peihuo argued that assimilation’s prom-
ise of eventual inclusion had brought the empire to an inevitable turning point. 
“Is this what the imperial command of ‘all subjects are equal under the emperor’s 
gaze’ is supposed to mean?” he asked. He described in detail how the Government 
General of Taiwan’s sugar monopoly artificially lowered the prices that Taiwanese 
Chinese farmers could get for their crops. “In this era of popular rights, in one 
corner of a Japanese Empire that absolutely protects the right to private property,” 
he exclaimed, “there is this place called Taiwan, where we do not have the freedom 
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to sell the sugar cane that we ourselves have produced.”24 For Cai, the passage of 
universal suffrage fundamentally transformed the character of Japanese imperial-
ism. If before it had been possible to see imperialism as the work of a small group 
of vested interests making decisions on behalf of a largely disenfranchised popula-
tion in the colonies and the inner territory, after 1925, imperialism was now truly 
a matter of a metropole ruling over colonies. Cai argued that universal suffrage 
represented a turning point in the history of Japanese imperialism.
Those of you who were in the position of being without prestige and being ruled 
are now suddenly in the position of controlling us. . . . While we celebrate your new 
life, we also eagerly hope that you will not forget the bitter and terrible taste that you 
experienced in the past as those who were controlled, who were underestimated and 
put down.  .  .  . So as not to harm the rights that we have as human beings, we are 
asking of you that we be allowed to follow a different course. Why? If not, . . . Japan, 
whose imperialism has been dominated by a small number of vested interests, will 
really become in name and fact an imperialist country.25
The second-generation problem called into question one of the fundamental 
premises of Japanese imperialism—that assimilation would transform colonized 
peoples into new Japanese subjects and colonized territory into Japanese national 
land. It seemed possible that the results were not as promised. Not only was eth-
nic nationalism on the rise, but metropolitan residents were also stuck in their 
erroneous views of the colonies. As Cai argued, the extension of universal suf-
frage created a moment of opportunity, but one that was fraught with moral stakes. 
No longer could empire’s contradictions be written off as a matter of time or as a 
project of elite vested interests—“rulers”—making decisions for the “ruled,” the 
unpropertied and disenfranchised. From his perspective, Japanese citizens of the 
metropole had to either affirm Japan as a culturally pluralistic nation or accept that 
they were embarking on a new era of outright imperialism.
Ultimately, those who sought in this moment of democratization an end to 
empire were sorely disappointed. The Diet voted to renew Laws 63 and 30, the 
two laws that granted the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea the power 
to govern through ordinances rather than representative democracy. In 1929, one 
year after Cai’s manifesto, the metropolitan government decided to bring the colo-
nial governments under its formal control by placing the Governments General of 
Taiwan, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory, Karafuto, and Micronesia under a 
new ministry, the Ministry of Colonial Affairs. The decision to go forward with the 
Ministry of Colonial Affairs was, in some sense, a victory for imperial democracy, 
in that it was largely motivated by the desire of the metropolitan political parties 
to take control of the Governments General, especially that of Korea, by formally 
incorporating them into a cabinet ministry and, therefore, into the system of po-
litical spoils.26 Yet with the establishment of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and 
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the official introduction of the term “outer territory” (gaichi) for Korea, Taiwan, 
 Micronesia, Karafuto, and the Kwangtung Leased Territory, the metropolitan gov-
ernment imposed a seemingly permanent geographic hierarchy on metropolitan 
and colonial territory that previous policy had insisted would be temporary.27 
Three years later, in 1932, the imperial government affirmed the establishment of 
the state of Manchukuo, and the state’s officials began constructing a history and 
ideology that would justify the permanent independence of Manchukuo from 
China and a relationship of complementary dependence with Japan.
SEEING WITH CULTUR ALLY PLUR ALISTIC EYES
It is in this context of myriad challenges to the spatial order of empire and questions 
about the future of the Japanese imperial nation that we must interpret the signifi-
cance of imperial tourism’s turn to local color. The establishment of the Ministry 
of Colonial Affairs in 1929, combined with the exclusion of colonial residents from 
the franchise in 1925, marked the sedimentation of a territorial-administrative 
structure that divided metropole from colony. Yet it did so without admitting to 
Cai’s proposition—that Japan really was “becoming  .  .  . an imperialist country.” 
Instead, imperial discourse increasingly emphasized that colonized subjects were 
also kokumin and that Korea and Taiwan were “regions” (chihō) of Japan. A simi-
lar denial of imperialism shaped the official discourse of the new state of Man-
chukuo, in which the government prioritized its claim to sovereignty over mem-
bers of the state’s “five races”—Manchurian, Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean—with an official history that stated that Manchuria had been colonized 
by multiple ethnic groups and therefore no one group could claim an authentic 
link to the territory.28 In this sense, the politics of local color went far beyond le-
gitimating colonization to the construction of a new “metaethics of national life” 
that revolved around the triple categorization of difference as ethnic rather than 
temporal or socioeconomic, of ethnic identities as territorial ones, and of a new 
ideology of the state that located its legitimacy in its management of relations be-
tween ethnic groups and their regional “homelands.”29
Beginning in 1927, the Japanese Ministry of Railways, the Governments Gen-
eral of Korea and Taiwan, and the South Manchuria Railway Company each re-
vised their guidebooks to include numerous essays on local customs, languages, 
geography, and history. Previous guidebooks had not included this introductory 
information, considering it unnecessary. But the second generation placed it front 
and center. The 1927 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai included, for example, “Exotic 
Taiwan and the Manners and Customs of Taiwanese: A Quick Guide to Taiwan.”30 
The Government General of Korea and the South Manchuria Railway quickly fol-
lowed with their own local color guidebooks emphasizing the unique history, ge-
ography, and culture of the regions. The turn to regionalism extended even into 
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the inner territory, where the Ministry of Railways produced its own local color 
guidebook series for Japan, which divided the inner territory into seven distinct 
cultural regions.31
Colonial boosters portrayed the change as a response to metropolitan desires. 
“Today’s tourists don’t want to only see famous sights and historic remains,” wrote 
Mōri Motoyoshi, the director of the Keijō Tourism Association, in the magazine 
Kokusai kankō (International tourism). “They also want to have their fill of that 
land’s local color (rōkaru karā) and local attractions (rōkaru atorakushon).”32
Rather than describe metropolitan desires, however, local color guidebooks 
and magazines took the lead in prescribing new ways of seeing the space of the na-
tion. Consider the Keijō Tourism Association’s own description of the local color 
of Korea: “Since the Japan-Korea annexation of 1910, all of Keijō has been com-
pletely changed. Yet although the appearances of modern culture, such as the con-
struction of tall buildings and modern houses, the supplementing of roads, and 
the [modernization of] clothing, are being furnished, Korea’s particular customs 
will add an exotic spice everywhere that will please the cameraman, starting with 
the ancient architecture of the Kinsei Palace at Keifukukyū, . . . the white-robed 
people walking on the street, the clothes-washing of the omoni (wives), and the 
suljip (sake shops) along the roadside.”33
On the one hand, the Keijō Tourism Association used the Japanese readings of 
the names of local cities and sights to locate Korea within Japan, continuing the 
practice of Japanifying place names that had begun with the geography of civiliza-
tion. On the other hand, the tourism association altered the framework for mak-
ing meaning out of difference by treating it not as an element to be eventually 
eliminated but as a value to be appreciated. The tourism association represented 
Korea within Japan by spelling out the Korean words for “wife” and “sake shop” in 
katakana, the Japanese syllabary reserved for foreign words. Next to these words, 
in parentheses, the association included the Japanese characters. The tourism as-
sociation also suggested that the appreciation of the value of local color was a 
universal characteristic of cosmopolitan—that is, modern—people. The “exotic 
spice” of Korea’s customs would “please the cameraman,” a figure who is described 
in terms of affect—his appreciation for cultural difference—but not ethnicity or 
nation. But since, as we saw in chapter 3, the ability to travel without ethnicity or 
nation was limited, the association’s cameraman signified those who enjoyed the 
privileges of imperial citizenship, those who experienced travel as the act of pass-
ing through borders that defined distinct places rather than those for whom their 
place traveled with them. Most significant, the tourism association did not suggest 
that the presence of a visible Korean culture was in any way antithetical to the le-
gitimacy of Japanese rule. The tourism association defined the culture of Korea as 
a commodity. It was to be consumed and transformed into value for the traveler. It 
was not a political or historical statement.
114    chapter four
Colonial boosters marketed the colonies as a welcome break from the rush of 
life in the metropole, drawing on a notion of the sublime that was not distinct from 
industrialization and labor but whose value to the nation was, in fact, constituted 
within the temporality of industrial life. The product, in this case, was less the site 
itself than the affective response that the experience of difference produced. In her 
special report, for example, Kobayashi Chiyoko marveled at how “white-robed 
Koreans” epitomized not working and that “she could not help but smile.” “Slowly, 
slowly the old white-robed Korean men put on their black hats and walk around, 
neither sweating nor making noise,” she wrote.34 Hamada Tsunenosuke mobilized 
wonder and awe in his description of laborers in Dairen’s soybean oil factories. 
Responding to the idea that coolies wore little while they worked because they 
were uncivilized, Hamada argued that the nakedness was a sign of their special-
ized knowledge—it was not because it was too hot but because they knew that 
the oil would spit and get on their clothes. A neutral observer might suggest that 
having one’s skin burnt by oil several times a day would likely motivate a more 
well-remunerated workforce to purchase protective attire (or, better yet, demand 
that it be provided by the employer). But in Hamada’s retelling, the coolies were 
“strong” and “patient” workers. “Us inner territory people have a lot we must learn 
from them,” he concluded.35
Colonial boosters and imperial travelers transposed their experiences into an 
imagination of the nation as a space of unique regions whose value emerged from 
their natural complementarity and the sensory experience of difference they of-
fered. In 1929, the Japan Tourist Bureau advertised travel to Korea and Manchuria 
with the tagline “Can you see this in Japan?” “This” meant, “some thousands of 
coolies” laboring under the “white sun” at Bujun and the grand historical ruins of 
Hōten. But “this” also meant the “feeling of a life of freedom” that one got from 
looking down the Yalu River. These were all things that could “only be seen on the 
continent.” These sensations were unavailable in the inner territory: “One cannot 
get such a deep emotion from the scenery of an island country.”36 Students on the 
Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School trip to Manchuria and Korea agreed. One 
student marveled at the scenery—all “I saw and heard through the railway carriage 
window was strange.”37 Doi Ichirō, a student from Tokyo Prefectural Number One 
Commercial School, even went so far as to enumerate the differences between 
rail travel in the metropole and the continent in his reflections on their 1932 trip 
to Manchuria and Korea. Invoking the authority of the traveler as first-hand ob-
server, he listed the differences “just as I saw them, just as I felt them, and just as 
they were”:
 1. The trains carry more power and go faster because of the wide gauge;
 2. The rail beds are rocks rather than sand;
 3.  The outside of the passenger cars is green rather than brown, as it is in 
the inner territory. Additionally, first class is yellow, second class is grass 
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 colored, and third is red-brown (just a little bit darker than the red of 
 Japanese third-class cars);
 4.  There are fewer windows than in the inner territory, and they are smaller. 
The window glass is double weight because of the harsh continental winter;
 5.  The third-class seats are fancier than inner territory seats—they are about 
the level of second-class seats in the inner territory;
 6.  The Korea-Manchuria trains run lower to the ground;
 7.  The trains ring their bells in the “American style,” that is, with the sound 
“garan garan!”
 8.  They sell food on the train (because there are not as many options for buy-
ing lunch boxes at the station as there are in the inner territory);
 9.  On the South Manchuria Railway Company lines there are pistol-carrying 
guards aboard the trains, and the uniform of the conductors is very high 
quality;
 10.  In terms of general impressions, the stations and people of Korea are re-
ally calm, not like the inner territory. It is a grand feeling to board a South 
Manchuria Railway Company train rushing across the vast plains of the 
continent.38
Matsuda Kiichi, a middle-school student who traveled by himself through Tai-
wan in 1937, could not contain his excitement at the thrill of difference. Look-
ing through the window of a train car heading south, Matsuda exclaimed, “The 
mountains of Taiwan! The rivers! The houses! Even if there is a bit of the feeling of 
the southern country, nothing at all resembles the inner territory’s suburbs or the 
nostalgic landscape of my homeland.”39
These expressions of awe and wonder at the strangeness of the landscape were 
a far cry from the Government General of Korea’s 1921 exclamation that the port 
of Pusan had “been so Japanified, it doesn’t even smell like Korea anymore.”40 As 
these accounts suggest, by the late 1920s, to see with nationalist eyes meant some-
thing more than it had in the first years of imperial travel. In this era of economic 
and political turbulence, to observe colonized lands meant not only to territorial-
ize a space for the nation but also to treat observation as a practice of appreciating 
the differences between places within the space of the nation. When the students 
of Hiroshima Higher Normal School toured Korea and Manchuria in 1915, both 
diarists commented that the colonial government’s policy of Japanification had 
gone so far as to even change the weather. Thunder was not often heard before the 
Japanese arrived, wrote the first diarist, “so even the atmosphere is being Japani-
fied.” For him, this meant that human power—the power of an industrial society to 
reengineer social life through changes to the landscape—“had even taken control 
of nature.”41 When students from Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School trav-
eled to Korea in 1930, however, their diarists read the landscape in an entirely 
 different fashion. Watching the countryside pass by outside the train’s window, one 
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student said, “it was as if the ‘white-robed peasants’ emanated the atmosphere of 
Korea.”42 The atmosphere in this case was not the weather, but the sweatiness and 
“lazy movements” of the farmers in the fields. It was a welcome break, a valuable 
strangeness. In the words of another student, they enjoyed the “strange scenery” 
outside the window: women doing the washing, farmers in white robes, children 
playing strange hand games.43
Some struggled with the mandate to see with culturally pluralistic eyes.  Kamata 
Yoshio discovered as much when he toured Korea and Manchuria with his class-
mates from Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School in 1926. Reporting on the 
events of the day’s tour of Keijō, Kamata related a discussion that he had with 
his guide, a member of the Miyazaki Prefecture Residents’ Association (Miyazaki 
kenjinkai). “Koreans do a lot of goofing off and wandering around, huh?” Kamata 
asked, noting a number of Koreans relaxing in the Botanical Gardens at Ch’andŏk 
Palace. “Well,” the guide responded, “it looks like that, right? But, even in the inner 
territory, think about Asakusa Park in Tokyo. People with nothing to do are just ly-
ing about. Now, when foreigners see that, they think that there isn’t a people in the 
world that plays around as much as Japanese people. In other words, it’s the same 
as what you’re thinking about Koreans.” Not having achieved the confirmation of 
his observation that he desired, Kamata tried a different tack. “Well,” he said to the 
guide, “Koreans are smelly.” Again, the guide offered a broader perspective. “Yeah, 
they are,” he acquiesced, “but that has to do with what they eat. Foreigners think 
that Japanese smell like daikon radish, and Japanese say that foreigners stink of 
foreignness (ketōkusai). If you go to China, Chinese people stink. No matter where 
you go, you smell what you call the stink of that country. So, really it’s not right 
to say that Koreans stink.”44 Kamata described his conversation with the guide as 
a moment of almost enlightenment. “I heard this and thought, Oh! Now I see. It 
was a mistake to think of Koreans as a stinky people or a lazy people.” But then he 
reconsidered: “I thought that [it was a mistake]. But then again, I actually could 
not think [of Koreans] otherwise.”45
For others, the mandate to see with culturally pluralistic eyes also served to de-
marcate the boundaries of acceptable behavior and national expectations. In this 
sense, appreciating cultural differences encouraged imperial travelers to reproduce 
the norms and expectations of the nation. For example, one Miyakonojō student 
incorporated a central tenet of Japanese colonial discourse on Manchuria when 
he described the thrill of riding on the Ajia Super Express, the South Manchuria 
Railway Company’s most famous and technologically advanced high-speed train, 
as the thrill of traveling through “an unpeopled region at super high speed.”46 The 
land was not unpeopled. But Japanese colonial discourse often represented it as 
such, for this justified the larger discourse of Manchukuo as a blank canvas where 
the state could build a new “paradise” by combining technological modernity with 
a commitment, however chimeric, to multiethnic harmony.
Local Color    117
In his discussion of “Chinese leisure” (Shinajin no kyōraku), Takahashi Gentarō 
likewise reproduced a point that imperial travelers had made constantly to legiti-
mate de facto Japanese control over Manchuria under the geography of civiliza-
tion: that the problem with China was that Chinese people did not understand 
the need to invest in the future. But now, under the geography of cultural plural-
ism, the argument was cloaked as appreciating the essential differences between 
Chinese people and other nations. He started with a comparison that drew on the 
common description of coolie leisure as “drinking, betting, and buying.” “In Japan 
we also say, ‘drink, bet, buy,’ ” Takahashi’s interlocutor, Mr. Kuchino, began. “But 
for Chinese people, it’s not a factor of three but five,” he continued. He explained 
that Chinese people also add mahjong and joking to the three standard amuse-
ments. Moreover, Chinese people revel in China’s extraordinary cuisine: “They 
say that the dogs in China are all skinny,” Mr. Kuchino reported. “Why?” asked 
Takahashi. “Because [Chinese people] eat the part that they are supposed to give 
to the dogs.”47
In this manner, Takahashi’s fictional conversational partner appreciated “Chi-
nese customs,” while presupposing the opprobrium or moral judgment of the 
Japanese reader/traveler. Appreciation became a vehicle for defining the limits of 
acceptability. Takahashi continued by explaining the differences between the two 
nations in a way that contrasted the presumed stability of the Japanese and Man-
chukuoan state’s protection of private property with what he portrayed as the law-
lessness of Chinese life: “Based on what you describe, Mr. Kuchino, it seems that 
for Chinese people, the guarantees of life and property are not adequate, and so for 
that reason, they think that they had better enjoy themselves while they can.” “Yes, 
exactly,” Mr. Kuchino concurred.48
THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF “FROMNESS”
The act of appreciating the differences between regional cultures necessarily in-
volved the definition of what the authentic culture of each region was. Local color 
tourist materials placed great emphasis on indigeneity. The Government General 
of Taiwan’s 1927 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai described the population of Taiwan 
as divided into three groups: inner territory people, Han people who migrated 
from China, and “the so-called savages, who are the native residents of Taiwan.”49 
The Government General of Korea’s 1929 Chōsen ryokō annai ki (Notes for Travel 
in Korea) emphasized that the history of Korea was a story of both “indigenous 
peoples in the Korean peninsula” and migrant peoples from Manchuria, Japan, 
and the Shandong region of China.50 A later edition distinguished between an “in-
digenous Korean people” in the southern peninsula and an “indigenous people” 
in the north, who intermixed with various peoples of Manchuria and China.51 In 
contrast, the 1929 Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai (Guide to railway travel 
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in Manchuria) steadfastly refused to use the term “indigenous” to describe any 
of the region’s peoples. Instead, it noted that, “until the middle of the Qing pe-
riod, Manchuria was managed by a race considered to be of the endemic Tungus 
family.”52
A variety of terms were used to indicate indigeneity, each of which carried 
specific connotations. The Government General of Taiwan described the indig-
enous peoples of Taiwan as dochaku no jūmin, literally “the people who live on the 
land.” This term connoted “natives” rather than the self-conscious identification 
that the term “ethnic nation,” or minzoku, implied. In Korea, the use of genjūmin 
for “indigenous” co-opted the language of national self-determination by differ-
entiating between an ethnic Korean people (genjūmin taru kanzoku) in the south 
and a migrant and mixed population in the north. The description went on to link 
the history and security of the southern Korean people with the Japanese state by 
explaining that it was the southern, “indigenous” ancestors of the Korean people 
whom the Japanese state had historically supported against the dominance of the 
Chinese dynasties and with whom the Japanese people shared common ancestors. 
In the case of Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway Company used the word 
“manage,” keiei, to cast the relationship between the Tungustic people and the 
land not as one of indigeneity but of supervision—precisely the same word that 
the railway used to describe its own relationship with Manchuria between 1906 
and 1931.53
In the aggregate, local color tourism engaged in what we might think of as 
a politics of “fromness”—marking certain bodies as essentially “from” certain 
places and using this to justify particular inequalities and restrictions. The poli-
tics of fromness “incarcerated” colonized subjects in place on the terms of the 
post–World War I era.54 One aspect of this was guidebooks’ new emphasis on the 
idea that certain peoples were indigenous to certain places. Despite the variety 
of terms and connotations thereof that guidebooks used to define indigeneity, 
each took pains to address the issue, even if, as in the case of the South Manchu-
ria Railway Company, the intention was to deny the possibility of its existence 
entirely.
The way that local color tourism defined the authentic culture of each region 
and the significance of that culture to the imperial whole spoke to specific political 
conflicts in each territory. In the case of Manchuria, colonial boosters argued that 
the region’s lack of an indigenous people defined its local color and delegitimated 
Chinese claims to sovereignty over the region. In its description of Manchuria’s 
history as one of an “endemic” (koyū) Tungusic people who “managed” (keiei) 
Manchuria, for example, the South Manchuria Railway sidestepped the thorny 
issue of authenticity by implying that the early Tungusic peoples held an inauthen-
tic, non-sovereign relationship with the Manchurian region that was similar to 
the railway’s own non-sovereign relationship with Manchuria. After 1932, when, 
as guidebook author Ōtsu Toshiya pointed out, “the era of ‘the management of 
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Manchuria’ ” came to an end, the 1935 Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai offered 
more specifics on the ancient history of Manchuria but continued to refrain from 
describing any group as indigenous to the region.55 Manchuria’s history now began 
with the Sushen (J. Mishihase or Ashihase) and Yilou peoples, who “gathered in 
completely uncivilized villages without any regulation” and who, over time, “in-
vaded” the cultural area to the south—that is, China—and were themselves settled 
by migrant groups from the northern part of China.56 In this, the railway’s history 
preserved its emphasis on the inauthenticity of any one people’s relation to the ter-
ritory claimed by the puppet state of Manchukuo.
Indeed, the guidebook described the unique local color of Manchuria as the 
result of this particular aspect of its history. It emphasized the history of Man-
churia as one uniquely marked by conflicts of an ethnic character. For example, 
“The Yuan, who were a Mongolian race (Mōko shuzoku), were destroyed by the 
Han race (kan jinshu).” But later, the Aisin Gioro family emerged (from the Tun-
gusic Jurchen people) and destroyed the Ming.57 According to the guidebook, the 
landscape of Manchuria reflected this history. “Because Manchuria is a land in 
which races (minzoku) have risen and fallen since ancient times, there are not a 
few buildings that have been left behind by the various races. The stone castles 
atop Mount Daikoku (C. Dahei Mountain) and Tokuri Temple (C. Tei-li-ssu), the 
earthen castles in Kishū (C. Guizhou), and the stone-tiled castles in the flatlands of 
Kinshū (C. Jinzhou), Ryōyō (C. Liaoyang), and Hōten are examples of this.”58 And, 
of course, seeing such sites in their proper historical context was an important 
aspect of seeing the “true” Manchuria: “Passengers can glimpse [these sites] from 
the train window or can visit the sites themselves at their leisure.”59
Guidebooks and local color materials for Taiwan took a different approach. 
They recognized the island’s indigenous peoples as the source of the island’s au-
thentic local color. In contrast, guidebooks described the island’s Taiwanese Chi-
nese population as representatives of the Chinese ethnic nation (Shina minozku) 
who had “migrated” to Taiwan.
While guidebooks and travel magazines represented Taiwanese Chinese cul-
ture as an important component of the experience of Taiwan, it also took care to 
represent the true nature of the island’s land and landscape as indigenous.60 For 
example, Matsuzawa Akira, who authored a guidebook for travel to Taiwan in 
1929, described Taiwan’s difference from the metropole as primarily environmen-
tal rather than developmental.
The Island of Takasago—Hōrai Island. . . . The many flowering grasses that color the 
ever-green ground, or the dark red of the hibiscus flower in which we forget that 
winter comes, or the breeze that softly shakes the coconut palms, the rich fruits that 
coax out the sense of taste of the travelers who come in all seasons, the dusky forests, 
the stately figure of that sacred mountain Niitaka, the endless sugarcane fields, the 
herds of water buffalo, bamboo rafts, or the fascinating life of the savage tribes . . . for 
travelers, there is not one thing [about Taiwan] that is not exotic.61
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Matsuzawa used indigenous people as the central image in the ethnographic 
representation of Taiwan. He did not erase Taiwanese Chinese people, or “island-
ers” (hontōjin), from the picture. Rather, he simply pointed out that they, too, 
were migrants, in contrast to the indigenous people. “There are approximately 
4,000,000 people living in Taiwan,” he wrote, “but of this number, 3,700,000 are 
members of the Chinese ethnic nation (kanminzoku) who have migrated [to the 
island] and 200,000 are inner territory people. The rest are what we call ‘savages’ 
(banjin). Savages are the indigenous residents of Taiwan (Taiwan no dochaku no 
jūmin).”62 Matsuzawa was not alone in this position; other official tourist publica-
tions made the same arguments. Writing in favor of a gradual policy of assimila-
tion into the political system of the metropole, Morishige Shūzō argued in Tabi 
that the true nature of Taiwan was defined by its “primitive savages” rather than its 
Taiwanese Chinese. Using a nationalist keyword from Japanese geography educa-
tion, Morishige argued that Taiwan was the “native place” (kyōdo) of the indig-
enous people, while the “culture of southern China” had only been “transplanted” 
to the island.63
Those writing from the perspective of the Movement for a Taiwan Parliament 
argued that it was precisely this transplantation that made Taiwan a unique place. 
As Cai Peihuo wrote in his manifesto, Nihon honkokumin ni atau (To the met-
ropolitan citizens of Japan), “Just like you are not the same as us because of the 
effects of a thousand years of history and a special landscape, we also have spe-
cial qualities that differ from you.”64 In contrast, Morishige and later Japan Tourist 
 Bureau publications argued that the government of Taiwan should be determined 
by the needs of its indigenous population. In Morishige’s words, the fact that “our 
Taiwan . . . jumped directly from the Stone Age to the Iron Age without hitting the 
Bronze Age” suggested the need for a “developmental” approach to political incor-
poration.65 In this formulation, Taiwan was not ready for self-rule because its true 
nature was that of its indigenous population rather than its Chinese population. 
While Taiwanese Chinese assimilation activists such as Cai saw at least part of 
the solution to the “Taiwan problem” as one of differentiating the island’s Chinese 
population from the indigenous population (as they saw this lumping together of 
the two as one of the sources of Japanese discrimination against Taiwanese Chi-
nese and against Taiwan in general), colonial boosters saw this differentiation as 
a solution to a different conceptualization of the Taiwan problem—that of Tai-
wanese Chinese challenges to the structure of empire.66 To that end, Matsuzawa 
did not follow Cai in linking the exotic nature of Taiwan to the need for self-rule. 
Instead, he followed the practice of the Government General, which in the early 
1920s heeded calls from local Taiwanese Chinese to engage in “effective propa-
ganda” to correct metropolitan misunderstandings about Taiwan but left off their 
demands for equal treatment.67 He simply touted the island’s exotic nature and 
modern infrastructure and erased its recent history.
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Like the guidebooks’ use of indigeneity to define the authentic character of each 
region, colonial boosters used indigeneity to define the place—quite literally—of 
colonized subjects within the territory of the state and the social imaginary of 
the nation. If, in its historical mode, local color tourism waded into the issue of 
national self-determination by differentiating regions on the basis of their indig-
enous occupants, in its economic mode, local color tourism integrated those re-
gions into a labor hierarchy determined by ethnic aptitudes rather than exploit-
ative structures. In the nationalist mode, it likewise drew on the spatial imaginary 
of local regions to constitute the figure of the colonized subject as one element of 
an exotic landscape to be appreciated and consumed by the national people.
In local color representations, the colonized subject did not appear as a politi-
cal figure but rather as a laborer and a defining element of the landscape. Local 
color literature went to great lengths to insist on the locality of this labor. Colo-
nized subjects were no longer referred to as deterritorialized “savages” or placeless 
“coolies.” Instead, colonial boosters argued that the figure of the laborer symbol-
ized the unique landscape of the place itself. In Korea, for example, Government 
General publications emphasized the figure of the burden bearer, or chige-kun, as 
a must-see for travelers.68 Arakawa Seijirō’s 1918 report on Korea had included a 
description of chige that marked them as a sign of Korea’s general disarray: the rea-
son why chige were necessary in Korea was because “the roads are bad, thus horses 
and carts can’t be used. Most of the hauling is done instead on human shoulders 
by these chige.”69 By 1934, however, the Government General completely altered 
the significance of the chige—making them no longer a sign of lack of develop-
ment. The 1934 Chōsen ryokō annai ki included a special inset on chige and insisted 
that they were an essential element of Korea’s local color: “In places such as the 
crossroads of flourishing cities, the wharves of ports, and the entrances of sta-
tions,  Koreans in ragged clothes carrying long wooden frames on their backs are 
 wandering around. When they see people returning from shopping or passengers 
carrying luggage, they gather around from front and behind, right and left. In 
 Korean, these are called chige-kun, and they are people whose trade is hauling. 
It can’t be fixed labor, but rather what we might call work without art or place 
(ikichi).”70 While the guidebook argued that burden-bearing was “place-less” 
work, it made an attempt to localize the specific figure of the chige as an element 
of Korean culture and history: “When we say chige-kun, we hear the kun as kun 
[n.b.: kun is a Japanese term of respect added to the end of a name and is also the 
first character in the word for ‘monarch’ and ‘sovereign’]. For this reason, we think, 
‘Wow, [chige-kun] are important.’ But actually, chige is a name for a carrying device 
and kun is the word for ‘person’ in old Korean.”71
Each representation of colonial labor as local color emphasized the mutual con-
stitution of labor and landscape. In the case of Taiwan, it was the sight of labor-
ing indigenous people that produced the sense that Taiwan was both exotic and 
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integrated into the Japanese social body. The caption to the cover photo of a 1939 
Tabi special issue on Taiwan described the labor of Taiwan’s indigenous people as 
part of Taiwan’s landscape. “Known to the world according to its name ‘Formosa’ 
(beautiful island), this island truly does not contradict that name but is a paradise 
of evergreens and a land of scenery.” The caption concluded by linking indigenous 
people to the island’s major industries as both a labor force and a consumable ex-
perience in their own right: “The cities are cleanly bright, and in the countryside, 
the figures of the Takasago-zoku working tirelessly, along with the rice, sugar, and 
fruit industries, gives you a deep understanding of Taiwan.”72 In 1935, the Govern-
ment General prohibited the use of seiban, “raw savages,” in official documents in 
favor of “Takasago-zoku,” or the “tribal peoples of Taiwan.”73 Takasago-zoku, the 
name by which the 1939 Tabi special issue referred to the Amis people that it fea-
tured, naturalized the figure of the indigenous person as part of Taiwan’s natural 
landscape by collapsing the distinction between the Amis people featured (only 
one of the nine indigenous ethnic groups that the Government General recog-
nized) into a single “tribe.” Through this renaming, the Government General also 
placed Taiwan into the larger history of Japan. “Takasago” was an archaic Japanese 
name for the island, which came from the name of a Japanese settlement in south-
ern Taiwan that was abandoned in 1628.74 With its reference to the early Japanese 
settlements, “Takasago” territorialized indigenous peoples as the local color of all 
of Taiwan at the same time as it incorporated the island into the historical and 
linguistic space of Japan.
In case of Manchuria, colonial boosters took a slightly different approach to 
the practice of localizing labor as landscape. The South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany emphasized the “coolie” as one of the most significant elements of Man-
chukuo’s local color, along with other aspects of social life in the region that they 
categorized as representative of “Chinese” culture, such as the “Little Thieves 
Market” in Hōten.75 Indeed, despite a dominant Japanese political discourse that 
overwhelmingly rejected the idea that Manchuria was in any way an authentically 
Chinese territory, even imperial travelers saw the passage across the Yalu River 
from Korea to Manchuria as an act of crossing a cultural border between the 
“white robes” of Korea and the “black robes”—those worn by Chinese people—in 
Manchuria.76
Colonial boosters went to great lengths to describe these low-wage laborers as 
essentially Chinese. In his Shin Manshūkoku kenbutsu (Sightseeing in new Man-
chukuo), Takahashi Gentarō used an imaginary dialogue to explain the place of 
Chinese labor within Manchukuo and within the East Asian labor hierarchy as a 
whole. Looking at laborers carrying towers of soybean cake, Takahashi’s imaginary 
partner asked, “These laborers are what we call ‘coolies,’ I suppose?” Takahashi 
contradicted him: “Yes, but, instead of calling them ‘coolies,’ if possible, I would 
like to get into the habit of calling them ‘Chinese laborers’ (kakō), or what the 
Figure 9. “ ‘Utsukushii shima’ Taiwan o nozoku” (Peering into Taiwan, the “beautiful 
island”). The cover of a 1939 Tabi special issue placed an image of men of the Amis people 
over a map of the entire island of Taiwan. The image effectively erased the island’s major-
ity Taiwanese Chinese population from the representation of Taiwan’s authentic culture. It 
likewise represented the dancing men as the authentic people of all Taiwan by describing 
them as “the Takasago people” rather than as Amis people.
source: Tabi 1939, no. 5. Courtesy of the Japan Travel Bureau Library of Tourism Culture.
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Chinese themselves call them, ‘laboring people.’ ”77 A 1936 guide to Manchukuo in 
Tabi magazine even referred to the Dairen housing facility for Chinese laborers, 
which had been known in tourist itineraries and guidebooks as Coolie Camp (kūrī 
shūyōjo), by its new name: Camp for Chinese Laborers (kakō shūyōjo).78
Yet even though the “Chineseness” of these laborers was an important part of 
Manchukuo’s multiethnic local color, it also served to emphasize the state’s ar-
gument that Chinese people were essentially foreign to Manchukuo. Indeed, in 
May 1935, such a perspective became part of Manchukuoan labor law, when new 
restrictions on foreign labor required Chinese laborers to secure permission be-
fore entering Manchukuo, without which they were considered “illegal aliens.”79 
Yet even as colonial boosters encouraged an understanding of Chinese laborers 
as inherently from elsewhere, they also taught travelers to appreciate the natural 
aptitude of Chinese people for hard labor—and to understand that the low wages 
they received for this labor were a reflection of Chinese history rather than South 
Manchuria Railway Company policy. Takahashi argued, for example, that the new 
terminology of “Chinese laborer” was to call attention to the skill required to per-
form the work of a laborer in Manchuria, which sometimes involved carrying as 
many as forty-five layers of soybean cake. “Japanese laborers can’t even compare” 
to the skill and price of Chinese laborers, Takahashi argued.80 A South Manchuria 
Railway Company publication elaborated on the origin of the wage differential: 
“During the past four hundred years, the powerless inhabitants of China Proper 
were continuously under the yoke of either vacillating regimes or selfish warlords. 
The privations and sufferings of their forefathers have inured these indomitable 
laborers to meager life and sustenance. The majority of coolies in Dairen are im-
migrants from Shantung and other parts of China Proper. Endowed with abilities 
to endure hardships, these energetic coolies are rapidly paving the foundation for 
stable and elevated life.”81
In his own account of travel in Manchuria, Nakanishi Inosuke raged at the 
idea that the origin of the laborers explained their condition. In fact, it was quite 
the opposite—the fact that they were free migrants from China was the source 
of their extreme exploitation, because as supposedly “free labor,” the South Man-
churia Railway Company had an incentive to get as much work out of them for as 
little renumeration as possible. He concluded: “Those industrial laborers (coolies) 
are receiving the world’s maximum screwing from XX!!”82 The censors blocked the 
name of the “screwer,” but from the context it was clear that Nakanishi referred to 
the South Manchuria Railway Company.
Nakanishi was not wrong. What the railway portrayed as an inherent feature of 
coolie labor was better understood as a product of its own recruiting and employ-
ment system. The South Manchuria Railway and other Japanese enterprises pri-
marily hired laborers through the laoxiang batou, “hometown boss” system. The 
batou, “head,” recruited laborers from his hometown and then traveled with them 
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and served as their foreman when they arrived in Manchuria. The enterprise paid 
wages directly to the batou, who passed them to his accountant, who passed them 
to the batou’s assistant, who distributed the wages to the workers themselves. As 
the South Manchuria Railway Company’s own research suggested in 1944, this sys-
tem created three different opportunities for wage skimming and left the workers 
destitute. The railway was perfectly happy to use this system, however, and even to 
celebrate the low wages it could pay Chinese labor.83 The South Manchuria Railway 
departed from metropolitan practice, in fact, when it opted to continue work-
ing through the indirect laoxiang batou system rather than imposing “scientific” 
direct management. This choice contributed to the relative lack of white-collar, 
middle-management jobs—for either Japanese or Chinese residents—in Manchu-
ria by outsourcing management to migrant Chinese laborers.84 Explaining the dif-
ference between the metropolitan and Manchurian labor systems, however, the 
railway’s tourist materials argued that it was simply following local custom. The 
coolies worked in a “feudal” (tōkenteki), indirect labor system that reflected the 
underdevelopment of China itself, and the railway was simply acquiescing to the 
social organization that they preferred.85
In the case of Manchukuo, the “fromness” of Chinese labor buttressed a dis-
course of the natural complementarity of an exploitative division of imperial  labor 
and the legitimacy of the imperial state. In the case of Taiwan and Korea, a simi-
lar rhetoric of complementarity justified the ongoing exploitation of local labor 
and new forms of dispossession. As did Kobayashi Chiyoko at the opening of this 
 chapter, tourist literature for Korea used the notion of complementarity to repre-
sent Korea as a slow place that complemented the fast pace of the metropole—in 
other words, a framework of comparison set by the temporality of industrial soci-
ety. In her special report on travel to the “Korea of white robes,” Kobayashi Chiyoko 
described Korea as part of Japan’s primordial past. Another account lamented the 
“half-Japanification” of the colonial capital at Keijō, preferring instead the exotic 
scenery of the nonindustrialized landscape. Describing her arrival to Korea in the 
page of Tabi, Aoi Ikko depicted a landscape coming into focus, with white-robed 
Koreans as its defining, localizing feature: “First I saw the mountains far across the 
blue sea, and as we got closer, I could see that the green trees were growing thick. 
Then, here and there, in high places and in low places, faint glimpses of the figure 
of white-robed Koreans came to me.” For Aoi, the landscape represented an alter-
native to the clamorous modern: “Ah, this quietness and beauty—maybe this is a 
dream land? It is too far from the present.”86
Quite in contrast to earlier touristic representations, which had dispensed with 
Koreans entirely, local color representations argued that Koreans were a defining 
feature of Korea itself. And indeed, imperial travelers expressed such expectations. 
One student from Kyūshū Imperial University’s 1933 trip to Korea and Manchukuo 
argued that if it were not for the white robes of Koreans, he would not have had the 
Figure 10. “Pose of Powerful Coolies.” Postcard, c. 1935. The postcard shows the 
ambiguity that defined colonial boosters’ representation of the place of coolie la-
bor in Manchukuo. On the one hand, the postcard described coolies as an element 
of the “the customs of Manchuria.” On the other hand, by 1935, tourist materials 
increasingly emphasized the “Chinese-ness” of Chinese laborers to delegitimize 
Chinese claims to Manchuria by emphasizing the foreignness of the region’s 
Chinese population. Digital image courtesy of the East Asia Image Collection, 
Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip0099.
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sense of being in a different place at all: “The many Koreans wearing white robes 
is strange, but otherwise [Pusan] gives off entirely a feeling of the inner territory.” 
It was, in fact, somewhat of a disappointment to this student. Pusan “did not live 
up to [his] expectations.”87
Local color tourism fostered the ongoing reproduction of an increasingly 
sedimented metropolitan social imaginary that equated Koreans with Korea 
and vice versa, and which had already marked Koreans for different treatment 
based on the dual facts of their foreignness to the inner territory and the sup-
posedly undeveloped, “slow” nature of Korea itself. It was the idea that Korea 
had a lower standard of living that had initially authorized the creation of an 
artificially cheap market for Korean migrant labor in the metropole. But by 
the late 1920s, Korean labor had become synonymous with cheap, precarious 
labor—particularly construction day labor. Governmental officials in the in-
ner territory began to comment on the necessity not of cheap day labor but of 
Korean labor. Koreans were, in the words of one Kyōto city official, “an abso-
lute necessity.” This was especially true “in the areas of unskilled labor in public 
works construction.”88 Deploying language eerily similar to that of the touristic 
representation of Korea’s local color, Sakai Toshio, an official in the Osaka city 
labor bureau, described Korean workers as perpetual migrants: “Like nomads 
roving about in search of greener pastures, Korean workers wander the heavens 
and the earth in search of labor, appearing in Manchuria or in the wilderness 
of Siberia. Or, crossing the straits to Japan, they come as a white-robed army, a 
veritable Asian multitude.”89
The idea that lower-paying, less-secure employment was appropriate for Kore-
an workers relied on the dual notions of Koreans as always essentially from Korea 
and of an undeveloped “Korean Korea” that existed apart from the industrialized 
Korea of Japanese colonial rule. Traveler Akimori Tsunetarō articulated and chal-
lenged these notions when he critiqued the Government General’s policy of pay-
ing Korean and Japanese workers different wages. Though the Government Gen-
eral argued that the prevailing wage for labor in Korea was 60 percent what it was 
in the metropole because it only took 60 percent of what it took in the metropole 
to live, Japanese (naichijin) working in Korea were generally given a 60 percent 
boost. In his 1935 self-published travel report, Akimori pointed out that regardless 
of one’s ethnicity, the cost of riding the trains was the same. The disparate wage 
policy was akin, in his mind, to gradually refusing to allow Koreans to ride the 
trains, which, for Akimori, was “not good government.”90 Indeed, as Nakanishi 
Inosuke complained in his 1936 essay “Angry Korea,” the image of “the Korea of 
white robes” encouraged travelers to view social relations as a matter of relations 
between places rather than between peoples—and that masked the increasing in-
corporation of Korean laborers into the most precarious positions in the imperial 
economy.
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THE NATIONAL L AND
Perhaps the best example of the imbrication of local color tourism with the pro-
duction of a new ethics of postimperial empire is the establishment of national 
parks in Taiwan in 1937. The 1930s saw a boom in national parks around the world 
and, though it has largely gone unremarked, nearly half of these parks were estab-
lished on colonized or semi-colonized land.91 The designation of three  national 
parks in Taiwan—Daiton, Tsugitaka Taroko, and Niitaka Arisan—took place soon 
after the designation of twelve national parks in the metropole between 1934 and 
1936. Though colonial officials celebrated Taiwan’s national parks as the first in the 
outer territories, they were not the only parks to be established on colonized land.92 
Two national parks—Akan and Daisetsuzan—were also established in Hokkaidō 
in 1934, Japan’s first colonial acquisition.
National parks displayed and preserved scenery that represented the nation 
through the diversity of its regions—yet it was a diversity defined on imperial 
terms. The founders of the first part of the national parks movement, which fo-
cused on establishing parks in the inner territory, framed much of the appeal of 
the parks as their ability to encapsulate a particularly Japanese view of nature—in 
contrast to a Western one—a view that imperial subjects could be taught to ap-
preciate. The areas selected to become national parks not only were rich in re-
sources for “the study of topography, botany, and zoology” but also “held a deep 
significance as a training ground for the improvement of the nation’s knowledge 
and cultivation of the nation’s spirit,” because they were rich with historical sites 
that would attest to the glorious history of the national land.93 The twelve parks 
established in the inner territory included scenic landscapes like Mount Fuji; sites 
of national history, such as the Tokugawa shrine at Nikkō; historical sites relating 
to the Southern Court, which ruled during an imperial schism in the fourteenth 
century (and to which the current imperial house linked its line); and sites of im-
perial mythology, such as Mount Kirishima, the site of the descent of Amaterasu’s 
grandson, Ninigi-no-mikoto, from heaven to the islands of Japan (known as the 
tenson kōrin).
In Taiwan, the Taiwan National Parks Association chose the mountainous re-
gions of Daiton, Tsugitaka Taroko, and Niitaka Arisan to be national parks—areas 
with scenery that reflected the particularity of Taiwan within the framework set by 
the metropole. For some, the choice of mountain scenery to represent the unique-
ness of Taiwan was strange. In debates over which areas to select, the Govern-
ment General overruled the suggestion that at least one park represent the tropical 
plains of the island, which was not only a major component of tourist advertising 
and the place where the majority of the island’s residents lived but also, the author 
argued, a kind of scenery that was unique relative to the metropole (though in this 
the  author of the proposal ignored Okinawa, perhaps because he imagined it to 
be outside of the metropole as well). Countering that proposal, the Government 
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General of Taiwan’s Interior Department argued that any area selected for a na-
tional park in Taiwan must include mountains, because mountains had been part 
of the selection criteria—the theme of “big nature” (dai fūkei)—for metropolitan 
national parks (all twelve national parks contained famous mountains). Taiwan’s 
national parks were intended, the Interior Department argued, to remind visitors 
and local Japanese residents of Japan.94
The landscape and natural monuments that Taiwan’s national parks repre-
sented were thus set by the frame of the metropolitan national parks. Though 
all three parks were on the island of Taiwan, national parks literature described 
their uniqueness in the context of Japan. Niitaka Arisan contained the “tallest 
mountain in Japan, Mt. Ari,” while Tsugitaka Taroko was the biggest park in Japan 
and included the spectacular mountains of the Tsugitaka (C. Xueshan) mountain 
range. In contrast, Daiton National Park was the smallest national park in Japan, 
but that made it quite similar to Mount Unzen National Park in Kyūshū, and, 
given its proximity to the island’s capital, Taihoku, it was in the most advantageous 
location.95
Taiwan’s national parks further underscored the idea that the authentic identity 
of Taiwan was indigenous rather than Taiwanese Chinese and, like the representa-
tion of Korea and Manchuria, demonstrated the simultaneous incorporation of 
Taiwan into the nation and its differentiation through the figure of the laboring 
“native.” The framers of Taiwan’s national parks incorporated the labor of indig-
enous peoples into the foundation of the national parks while, at the same time, 
representing the park as quintessentially primitive, right down to the “savages” 
themselves, who could be seen in the park and were part of the unique charac-
teristics of the scenery.96 In an attempt to raise awareness of Mount Niitaka (C. 
Yushan) and Mount Ari (C. Alishan) in light of their candidacy for national park 
status, Tabi ran a lengthy article that included maps and itineraries for mountain 
climbers and emphasized the unique features that Taiwan’s mountains had to offer. 
Following two paragraphs on the distinct flora and fauna of the Mount Ari area, 
the  article pointed out that travelers could also see the Tsuo people, the local popu-
lation, from the window of the Mount Ari Electric Railway. The scenery, in other 
words, was not limited to peaks, plants, and animals: “The savages who live in the 
high mountains, in particular the savage girls of Mount Ari, are extremely beauti-
ful in appearance.”97 The national parks enabled the incorporation of indigenous 
people into the tourist economy as labor and as scenery.
Indeed, a central component of the movement for national parks in Taiwan was 
to represent Taiwan and Taiwan’s indigenous peoples as “in place” in the Japanese 
nation but, at the same time, to deny indigenous peoples a claim to any particu-
lar territory within the nation. Two of the parks—Niitaka Arisan and Tsugitaka 
Taroko—were firmly within the so-called Savage Territory, and this fact played a 
central role in their constitution as part of the national land. In order to facilitate 
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tourism, the Taiwan National Parks Law stipulated that the restrictions on entry 
to the Savage Territory were to be removed as soon as possible. For those in the 
Bureau of Savage Management (Ribankyoku), this dictate presented worrisome 
challenges to their dual mandate to undertake the “guided enlightenment” of in-
digenous peoples while protecting the safety of what would surely be an increased 
number of visitors to the special administrative zone.98 But the Taiwan National 
Parks Association insisted that it was precisely the primitive nature of these sites 
that made them such a valuable resource for the national people. Like Taiwan’s lo-
cal color more generally, the Government General of Taiwan represented Taiwan’s 
national parks as pure nature.99 The Government General declared emphatically 
that the national park sites had no history—or, more precisely, that they stood out-
side of history. It was that fact that had preserved their scenery, the Government 
General argued, leaving for future generations a kind of nature to which Japanese 
in the metropole and Korea would otherwise have no access, because of the long 
history of civilizational and commercial development in these areas. Because the 
Atayal residents of the area “engaged in only primitive cultivation,” the mountains 
were “virgin soil.”100 As Yokō Kōsuke, an employee of the Bureau of Savage Man-
agement, wrote, “Precisely because the parks are within the Savage Territory, they 
are natural areas that have been protected by the savages, who we now call the 
Takasago tribes. They are sacred lands that the gods (kami) have left especially for 
today’s cultured people.”101
The location of the parks offered a special opportunity. Enumerating the spe-
cial features shared by all of Taiwan’s national parks, the vice chairman of the 
Taiwan National Parks Association pointed out that in addition to the relatively 
little damage from industrial development that the areas exhibited and the fact 
that they showed four distinct seasons (another trope of the Japanese national 
landscape), they were all on state-owned land (kōyūchi) and would be very easy 
to regulate.102 The distinction of being state-owned land was significant, because 
it meant that the Government General would not have to negotiate with the pres-
ent occupants of the land; it could simply assert its rights to use the land as it saw 
fit. The primary residents of the special administrative zone were, in addition to 
Japanese colonial police, indigenous peoples. In 1902, the Government General 
of Taiwan had declared that indigenous peoples possessed no rights to property 
within the special administrative zone. Arguing that the indigenous residents of 
the territory recognized no “unified institution” that could guarantee property, the 
colonial state determined that they could therefore make no claims to ownership. 
This rule, in fact, contradicted the Government General’s own ethnographic sur-
veys, which demonstrated that indigenous communities had a variety of concepts 
and practices of ownership. Yet it served as a convenient tool for the Government 
General as it sought to access camphor and timber in the special administrative 
zone.103
Figure 11. “Tsugitaka sanchō o mezashite” (Heading for the summit of Mt. Tsugi-
taka). Okada Kōyō’s image of Tsugitaka Taroko National Park shows the centrality of in-
digenous labor to the representation of Taiwan’s national parks as well as to their actual 
operation. Image courtesy of Okada Kōyō Photo Art Museum. Digital image courtesy of 
East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip1035.
132    chapter four
The Government General’s Committee on Taiwan National Parks addressed 
the question of land rights directly, asking, “Won’t savages think that their land has 
been taken?” The response from the director of the Government General of Tai-
wan’s Interior Department was clear: “The Takasago tribes will be relocated.”104 The 
Government General of Taiwan was not the only participant in the national parks 
process to suggest such a practice. In his own report to the Government Gen-
eral on the potential of the Mount Ari area as a national park, Tamura Tsuyoshi, 
one of the founders of the national parks movement in the inner territory, argued 
that the Government General ought to move indigenous villages out of the park 
boundaries and incorporate their residents into the promised tourist economy. 
“Construct a small village,” Tamura advised the Government General’s Forestry 
Management Office, “say, of two or three savage houses, above a waterfall near 
Suganohira, where savages can farm fruits and vegetables, make souvenirs, or, if 
necessary, serve as guides for Mount Ari and Mount Niitaka.”105
The suggestion that indigenous villages be relocated was not new. A few years 
earlier, the Government General had begun a policy of both forced and volun-
tary removal of indigenous villages from mountain highlands to the lowlands.106 
Tamura himself had encouraged the deployment of a similar “move and work” 
policy at Hokkaidō’s Akan National Park, where Ainu residents were made to 
move or participate in the tourist economy—either as scenery themselves or as 
guides or small-time entrepreneurs.107 Okada Kōyō, who would become famous 
in the postwar era for his photographs of Mt. Fuji, captured this constitution of 
indigenous peoples as both landscape and labor in an image that appeared as part 
of a 1939 collection of photographs celebrating the opening of Taiwan’s national 
parks.
FROM C OLONIAL FRONTIER TO NATIONAL EXOTIC
Between the mid-1920s and the late 1930s, colonial boosters set about attempting 
to create a spatial and social imaginary of the Japanese nation that decentered the 
inner territory and its people. In its place, they proposed a cultural and ethnic 
 hierarchy of “harmony” that marked colonized peoples as “in place” in particular 
regions of the nation but on terms that maintained colonial hierarchies in the name 
of natural complementarity. The twin ideas of harmony and local color encour-
aged a second generation of imperial travelers to see themselves as the pinnacle 
of an imperial division of labor through the productivity of their leisure practices, 
which constituted the work of observation as a matter of appreciating the empire’s 
complementary diversity of human and material resources.108 The normative land-
scape that local color proposed undercut anti-imperial and anticolonial demands 
for self-rule and self-determination, while positing a place (albeit a subordinate 
one) for ethnic nations and their historical territories within the Japanese  imperial 
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nation. Under the geography of civilization, Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan consti-
tuted the colonial frontier. Under the geography of cultural pluralism, they came 
to be coded as the national exotic.
Writing on the politics of multiculturalism in Australia, Elizabeth A. Povinelli 
argues that multiculturalism represents a “new metaethics of national life.” If the 
study of ethics focuses on what is or is not moral in a given society, metaethics ex-
amines morality itself. For Povinelli, multiculturalism became the determinant of 
morality in postwar Australia—to put it simply, laws and practices that promoted 
the state and social recognition of multiple cultures, particularly of indigenous 
culture, were moral; those that denied the place of minority and indigenous cul-
ture in Australia were immoral. But, as Povinelli points out, recognition is itself 
a political act, the drawing of lines that bounded not only a “national common 
sense” but also the realm of possibility for recognizable “cultural” expression.109
There are many significant differences between Povinelli’s analysis of the poli-
tics of multiculturalism in Australia and this book’s analysis of the spatial politics 
of the Japanese Empire, not least of which are the differences that emerge from 
an ethics of multiculturalism rooted in what Povinelli defines as the apologetic 
historical consciousness of postcolonial settler modernity and those rooted in the 
triumphalist historical consciousness of what here is colonial settler modernity. 
But in many ways, the comparison is illuminating, because it draws our attention 
to the ways in which the cultural pluralism of imperial tourism’s local color dis-
course was not merely designed to legitimate the possession of colonized land by 
perpetuating acts of dispossession. It also produced a national subject who under-
stood these practices to be moral under the post–World War I era’s new symbolic 
regime of authenticity.110
Tourism’s affective productions contributed to the reproduction of an ethics 
of harmony in ways that incorporated the recognition of indigenous land and la-
bor but denied political emancipation in favor of protecting an imperial cultural 
pluralism. If colonial boosters located the work of imperial citizenship in the ap-
preciation of place-based difference, they also anchored the morality of cultural 
pluralism in the duty and power of the state to manage relations between ethnic 
groups and cultural regions to create a productive complementarity. The challenge 
of anti-imperial nationalism and anticolonial liberalism made it no longer pos-
sible to argue that the temporal and spatial form of imperialism was a project of 
making the space of the nation symmetrical with the territory of the state. Instead, 
local color deployed a notion of indigenous land and labor that territorialized a 
permanent hierarchy of ethnic peoples. This hierarchy emerged, so the argument 
went, not from the whims of the imperial state but rather from the state’s recogni-
tion of ethnicity as natural product of environment. While not discounting history 
entirely, local color downplayed its transformative potential and instead proposed 
a notion of culture that was indexed by place and largely outside of history.
134    chapter four
The rise of romanticized representations of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria was 
as much about producing an ethical or “good” subject of a culturally pluralistic 
nation as it was about legitimating the continued colonization of any one terri-
tory. As we saw in chapter 1, the production of good subjects through the forma-
tion of ties to the national land motivated imperial travel and tourism from its 
inception, immediately following the Russo-Japanese War. What we see here is 
that the spatial politics of the 1920s and 1930s adapted this practice of observation 
to incorporate the demands of the post–World War I era’s new symbolic regime of 
authenticity, which argued that nationalism and imperialism were two opposing 
forces and located morality firmly on the side of nationalism. In practice, the dis-
tinction between empire and nation remained fuzzy. No place was this more true 
than in the case of Manchuria and Manchukuo, which travelers treated as part of 
the complementary hierarchy of the Japanese Empire, even if it was still not part of 
the territory of the Japanese state.
The rise of local color tourism illuminates how tourism facilitated the transi-
tion from imperial state to multicultural nation by making the appreciation of 
local difference part of the work of national subjects, that is, part of the culture of 
imperial nationalism. The 1930s saw the rise of local color tourism in colonized 
lands around the globe—from Hawai’i to California to Algeria.111 In Japanese co-
lonial boosters’ representation of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchukuo, local tourism 
industries represented colonized lands as the ancient past of the colonizing na-
tion and as the home of indigenous cultures to be both consumed and protected. 
Through local color, cultural pluralism became the basis for what we might think 
of as “post-imperial imperialism,” in which the metaethics of cultural pluralism 
domesticated challenges to the legitimacy of the imperial state by incorporating 
the recognition (but not emancipation) of multiple ethnic nations into the histori-
cal consciousness and practices of “good” national subjects.
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The spatial politics of local color provided new tools for representing the social 
divisions of the imperial nation as both complementary and naturally hierarchi-
cal. Colonial boosters, particularly those who resided in the colonies, used the 
language of cultural complementarity to argue for the inclusion of colonized ter-
ritory into the space of the Japanese nation. For their part, imperial travelers ac-
cepted that the bottom rungs of the labor hierarchy would be filled with colonized 
subjects, whose “natural” aptitude for such work made the project of empire both 
rational and justified. At the same time, imperial travelers sought grounds upon 
which they could be said to share a political community with colonized subjects 
despite the geographic, historical, and cultural differences that separated them.
As imperial travelers went forth investigating colonized lands—the so-called 
new territories—and the future of their relationship with Japan, they also probed 
colonized subjects for their willingness and ability to become imperial subjects. 
The mechanism of this probe was the Japanese language, the one tool that imperial 
travelers wielded that could cut through volume after volume, article after article, 
travelogue after travelogue of “truths” about the Japanification of the new territo-
ries: Do you understand Japanese? Getting right to the heart of the question, impe-
rial travelers questioned colonized subjects in Japanese and about Japanese, and 
they recorded these conversations as evidence of either the success of assimilation 
or the need to continue training and evaluating colonized subjects for member-
ship in the nation.
That they chose language for this task is not surprising, given the pervasiveness 
of the ideology known as “linguistic nationalism” during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. In the late nineteenth century, Ueda Kazutoshi argued 
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that language was the lifeblood of the nation. The leader of the campaign to stan-
dardized spoken Japanese, Ueda famously articulated the link between the  Japanese 
language and the “Japanese spirit” in 1894, when he argued that “the  Japanese 
 language is the spiritual blood of the Japanese people.”1 During this time, the Gov-
ernments General in Taiwan and Korea inaugurated intense Japanese-language 
education campaigns, intending to transform colonized subjects into Japanese 
people through linguistic conversion. In the metropole, the Ministry of Education 
waged a similar campaign against what it called “dialect” (hōgen). Schools around 
the country worked to transform the highly variegated everyday speech of the 
nation into a “national language” (kokugo). Despite national language advocates’ 
insistence on the essential unity of the Japanese-language speech community, the 
new “standard” primers for language education in the metropole, which appeared 
in 1903, proposed to teach the nation what was, in fact, a highly localized version 
of Japanese: Tokyo dialect.
In this moment of shifting expectations, no individual’s definition of “ proper 
Japanese” was self-evident. Rather, speech itself was undergoing a process of 
 definition and redefinition as powerful institutions, such as the Governments 
General, the Ministry of Education, associations of language teachers, and public 
intellectuals, linked speech to nation and therefore to one’s place in society. In the 
hands of imperial travelers, linguistic nationalism became the basis for a shifting 
landscape of inclusion and exclusion that operated in loose parallel with the vision 
of the empire as a division of labor and cultural regions. Imperial travelers agreed 
that certain peoples—like classes of laborers—were naturally suited to certain lan-
guages and registers (the degree of formality and kind of vocabulary that one uses 
depending on the social context), and only some could use language to transcend 
their place of origin. Yet unlike labor, imperial travelers did not treat language as 
an example of the logic of mutual benefit. A Taiwanese Chinese street peddler’s 
broken Japanese did not fulfill a particular function that allowed other speech 
communities to attend to complementary tasks. Rather, in their reactions to the 
Japanese-language speech of colonized subjects, imperial travelers produced a 
sense of the imperial nation as a community divided by intractable linguistic vari-
ation, which they read as a sign of the continued unfitness of colonized subjects for 
full inclusion into the nation.
THE PL ACE OF L ANGUAGE
The idea that language and nation are coterminous, that nation comes from lan-
guage and that nations are definable through language, is a form of language ide-
ology rather than a historical truth. It would be hard to find a nation that meets 
the standards of national-language ideologues. Language is notoriously variable, 
with even the most codified of tongues open to internal debate over the “correct” 
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way to conjugate a verb, how to gender speech, and which registers are appropri-
ate for different classes of people. For this reason, Michael Silverstein has argued 
that language is a metalinguistic category—a subjective matter of where bound-
aries between languages, dialects, creoles, and so on should be—rather than an 
objective description of what they are.2 Indeed, despite the self-evidence with 
which they drew the linkage between language and nation, more often than not, 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century linguistic nationalists found themselves con-
fronting language as a problem to be solved rather than a reality to be embraced.3 
During this era, as Hiraku Shimoda argues, speech diversity “was not a problem of 
function . . . rather, it was a problem of political psychology.”4 As national-language 
activist Ueda Kazutoshi saw it, the problem was not that people could not under-
stand each other, but rather that they would not feel like a unified nation if they 
did not speak the same language. “Dialectism” threated the unity of the nation, 
because “even though we are all Japanese, it is like meeting foreigners.”5
Like the landscapes of labor and scenery that constituted the touristic “local 
color” of Japan’s diverse cultural regions, imperial travelers and colonial boosters 
used language to place colonized lands and colonized peoples within the Japa-
nese nation. Yet unlike those landscapes, the linguistic encounters that travelers 
recorded offered the possibility of immediate and transparent relations between 
themselves and colonized subjects, as well as the potential for provocation. Like 
visible landscapes, travelers constructed linguistic landscapes in ways that created 
a sense of place in accordance with their own ideological lenses.6 Early Japanese 
imperial travelers used Japanese-language encounters to place colonized subjects 
under the rubric of the geography of civilization. They imagined that the new ter-
ritories were both already part of the national (linguistic) land and, at the same 
time, imagined that the recognizable differences of colonized subjects would soon 
disappear (if they hadn’t already) as they too became Japanese. Readily embracing 
the equation of language and nation, imperial travelers regularly recorded conver-
sations with local residents as part of their travelogues. In Korea, where travelers 
encountered Korean students on the city trains, conversations provoked astonish-
ment and optimism about the prospects of assimilation. Arakawa Seijirō, for ex-
ample, believed that “the most difficult and important task” of colonial policy was 
“to harmonize the feelings of the natives and assimilate them as citizens.”7 On his 
1918 trip, the speech of Korean common school students impressed him enough 
that he wrote about the encounter. After twenty or so Korean students boarded 
the train, the captain of Arakawa’s group brought one student over to share his 
opinion of Japan. Though Arakawa did not include the content of the student’s 
answers, he appeared pleased that he had answered “promptly and clearly,” pre-
sumably in Japanese (since no one in the group spoke Korean).8 The Hiroshima 
group expressed similarly positive feelings after an encounter with Korean stu-
dents from Heijō Higher Common School. The Heijō students “spoke national 
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language just like a person from the inner territory,” one student reported.9 In fact, 
it appeared that the Korean students spoke it somewhat better than people from 
the metropole. As the other diarist noted, the Koreans’ “textbook Japanese was so 
good that when I was told, ‘Your Japanese is a little different,’ I broke into a bit of 
a cold sweat.”10
In Manchuria, Japanese language signified not assimilation, but an expansion 
of Japanese territory.11 As the Hiroshima students reported, when they arrived in 
Dairen from Nanking, “after ten days of travel for us who had been in contact with 
the language and scenery of a foreign country, we were extremely happy and nos-
talgic to finally discover a city that centered on the Japanese language.”12 Yet even 
in Manchuria, where Japanese-language education was not couched in terms of 
assimilation into national subjects, the use of Japanese by Chinese medical school 
students and service workers signified their integration into a Manchurian soci-
ety dominated by Japanese institutions and aims. The Tokyo Number One Higher 
School students were impressed with the South Manchuria Railway Company’s 
hiring of Chinese streetcar conductors, for example. “They really thought this out,” 
one student wrote. The policy of having Chinese conductors in the first car would 
encourage both Chinese ridership and the spread of Japanese language, since the 
conductors were required to use Japanese.13 At a common school (kōgakudō), the 
students met Chinese students who, after only three years of training, could speak 
“surprising” Japanese. When the Tokyo students approached the school to ask per-
mission to look around, a Chinese student responded politely in Japanese, inviting 
them in to speak with his teacher. The fluency of his speech prompted the diarist to 
note, “When he said that, he was basically Japanese.”14 Later, the Chinese students 
stood up and sang “Kimi ga yo,” the Japanese imperial anthem. “When I heard 
these spectacular little Chinese citizens (Shina no chiisai kokumin) rise up together 
and sing [Kimi ga yo],” he gushed, “I felt an indescribable feeling that was like 
breaking out in a cold sweat.”15
Encounters with Japanese-speaking colonized subjects produced a sense of the 
uncanny. Travelers’ responses were part celebration and part concern over what 
the linguistic aptitude of colonized subjects meant for their own place within the 
nation and the empire. Imperial travelers were particularly unnerved by the  ability 
of indigenous people in Taiwan to speak Japanese. Travelers were clear in their 
expectation that indigenous people would not speak Japanese. Or, if they did, that 
they would clearly distinguish themselves from metropolitan Japanese (by speak-
ing impolitely, inappropriately, or with an accent). In 1918, the painter Ishikawa 
Toraji captured these unarticulated expectations in “Taiwan ryokō” (Taiwan 
travel), his contribution to a volume entitled Shin Nihon kenbutsu (Sightseeing 
new Japan). Ishikawa reported speaking with several people, but the only people 
whose speech he commented on were the indigenous people he met in the Sav-
age Territory. “I grabbed my sketchbook and walked here and there,” he wrote. 
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“Along the way,  every male savage I met gripped his sword and greeted me with 
‘hello’ (konnichiwa).” The encounter “was somehow uncanny.”16 The appearance 
of Japanese-speaking indigenous people and, moreover, polite Japanese-speaking 
indigenous people struck Ishikawa as strange and unsettling.
In many ways, the surprise that Ishikawa, Arakawa, and the Tokyo and Hiro-
shima students expressed is counterintuitive. From the historian’s vantage point, 
it is not at all surprising that many colonized subjects spoke excellent Japanese. 
Japanese-language education was the centerpiece of assimilation policy in Tai-
wan and Korea. In the words of E. Patricia Tsurumi, “Education, it was hoped, 
would secure the cooperation of the natives and perhaps eventually would even 
assimilate them. . . . Education was seen as an instrument of fundamental social, 
political, economic and cultural change; it was to transform a segment of tradi-
tional China [Taiwan] into an integral part of modern Japan.”17 Language theorists 
“firmly believed that the mastery of a language would lead to the construction of 
the personality associated with that language.”18 As one leading scholar of colonial 
language pedagogy claimed in 1904, “the knowledge, emotion, and quality of the 
nation, as well as the people’s activities and growth, all reside in the language.”19
To accomplish this goal of transforming colonized subjects into willing subjects 
of the Japanese nation, the Governments General in Taiwan and Korea invested an 
enormous sum into education, particularly the study of Japanese. Language edu-
cation began in the first year of Japanese rule over Taiwan when Isawa Shūji, the 
acting chief of the Government General’s Bureau of Education, started a program 
of Japanese classes at Shisangyan, near Taihoku. A year later, there were fourteen 
“Japanese language institutes” in the new colony.20 The near isomorphic relation-
ship between “education” and “language education” continued throughout the 
early colonial period. In 1898, the Government General’s new Common School 
Regulations stipulated that the purpose of such an education was, first, to “give 
Taiwanese Chinese children a good command of Japanese language” and, second, 
to “teach them ethics and practical knowledge, in order to cultivate in them the 
qualities of Japanese national subjecthood (kokumin taru no seikaku).”21
Like their Taiwanese Chinese counterparts, indigenous people within and 
without the Savage Territory were encouraged to attend school to learn  Japanese. 
In the plains areas, the Government General opened what were known as 
“ Savage Common Schools” (banjin kōgakkō) in 1905.22 Inside the Savage Ter-
ritory, the Government General established education centers for indigenous 
children in 1908 as part of a broader plan to claim the territory for the Japanese 
camphor industry.23 These education centers differed from common schools in 
two important ways. One, they were operated by the Government General Police 
instead of the Bureau of Education. Two, their curricular offerings were far more 
basic than even the Savage Common Schools, which already used separate text-
books that emphasized “simple” skills, such as reading in katakana (rather than 
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 Chinese characters, the language of literature and government) and learning to 
read only in colloquial, rather than literary, Japanese (kōgotai, not bungotai).24 
As late as 1927, students in education centers spent two-thirds of their instruc-
tional time on Japanese and “practical studies” (jikka), which meant farming 
(nōgyō), handicrafts (shukō), or sewing (saihō).25 By 1934, there were over eight 
thousand indigenous children attending eighty-eight education centers, with at 
least one in every indigenous district.26 Though linguistic discrimination and 
social inequality prevented these children from matriculating into the primary 
school system in high numbers (a point to which we will return to later in this 
chapter), many learned to speak Japanese fluently. A 1936 report by the Govern-
ment General documented that the average rate of “national language diffusion” 
among indigenous people was around 30 percent, with the highest being the 
Tsuo people, of whom over 40 percent of males and nearly 22 percent of females 
spoke Japanese.27
When Japan colonized Korea in 1910, the new Government General of Korea 
imported the common school system from Taiwan with the similar intention of 
transforming Koreans into Japanese subjects via language education. Though 
Tsurumi argues that the Korean and Taiwanese systems produced quite differ-
ent results, for our purposes, the point lies in the similarity of intentions, which 
stemmed from the basic presumption that, to borrow again from the Government 
General of Taiwan, “the Japanese spirit rests in the Japanese language.” For this 
reason, from the perspective of assimilation policy, it was imperative that colo-
nized subjects “put all effort into using as much Japanese as possible” and that 
the colonial governments provide the educational foundation for such a spiritual 
linguistic transformation.28 By closing many private academies and coercing and 
otherwise incentivizing attendance at Government General schools, the colonial 
government in Korea enrolled nearly eighty-eight thousand pupils in over 450 
common schools by 1918.29
With this history in mind, one might expect Japanese fluency among colonized 
subjects to be so banal as to be not worthy of mention. And yet quite the oppo-
site was the case. Ōyama Takeshi, an official in the Bureau of Colonization who 
traveled to Taiwan in 1924, was taken aback by the ability of indigenous people 
to speak perfect, polite Japanese. In his travelogue, Ōyama reported arriving at a 
station in southern Taiwan to find dozens of indigenous people, whom he called 
seiban, “raw savages,” standing outside the police building. He noted the other-
worldliness of their appearance: colorful long cloths on the women, strange jew-
elry, and arms that were covered from wrist to shoulder in “savage tattoos.” Yet, 
to his surprise, “everyone understood Japanese.” “Isn’t your belt tight?” he asked. 
“No, it’s not a problem,” a smiling man answered. Ōyama noted their barefooted-
ness. “Aren’t your feet hot?” he inquired. “No, they are not hot,” another answered. 
Ōyama thought of the men running through the jungle barefoot and asked, “Well, 
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don’t you ever get cut and injured by thorns?” “Not very often,” the man replied. 
“And anyway, if we do get injured, we get better within three days.” Ōyama consid-
ered this last statement to be a thinly disguised sneer at the weakness of Japanese 
people (naichijin).30 The man’s fluent Japanese, which Ōyama reproduced in polite 
forms, illustrated for Ōyama the surprising success of colonial education. And 
yet the encounter also revealed the potential for language to become a new tool 
for attacking the legitimacy of colonial rule. Ōyama’s interpretation of the man’s 
remarks was perhaps colored by an earlier encounter he had had with Japanese 
teachers in Korea. There, Korean students had taken to demonstrating their flu-
ency by asking, in perfect Japanese, “When will you let Korea become indepen-
dent?”31 The content—that is, questions about independence and jibes at Japanese 
rule—was troubling. Yet the mode of delivery—polite, fluent Japanese—made it 
all the more troubling, for had not this been the goal of colonial policy in the first 
place?
SPEECH,  L ANGUAGE,  NATION
In evaluating their fellow countrymen’s Japanese, imperial travelers adopted the 
official posture of the Ministry of Education vis-à-vis the Japanese language, 
namely, that there was a single Japanese language that could be spoken either cor-
rectly or incorrectly. Prior to the 1890s, only the written form of Japanese, known 
as literary Japanese, bungotai, was taught in schools. Literary Japanese, a mix of 
Chinese characters and Japanese classical grammar, bore little relation to spoken 
Japanese, which varied dramatically by region. The differences between spoken 
Japanese in different parts of the islands were so great that Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 
the last shōgun, once remarked, “[I had] a terrible time in meeting with someone 
from Satsuma. No matter what he said, I could not understand him at all. . . . Higo 
people are almost as hard to make out as Satsuma people.”32
By the 1880s, a movement to reform written Japanese began to build 
strength. Seeking to use the new compulsory educational system to standardize 
literacy across all classes, the campaign sought to reform written Japanese so 
that it reflected a colloquial rather than literary form. Led by the minister of 
education, Mori Arinori, the movement published new Japanese-language text-
books for elementary schools that used the colloquial form.33 The movement 
became official in 1903, when the Ministry of Education began issuing its own 
standard textbooks, including a primer written in colloquial Japanese. By this 
point, however, the movement to reform written Japanese had morphed into 
an even larger project to unify and standardize written and spoken Japanese so 
that, for the first time, writing reflected speech and vice versa. Thus, the 1903 
textbook explicitly aimed to disseminate a “standard form of Japanese.”34 Yet, 
in an archipelago characterized by linguistic diversity rather than unity, what 
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version of Japanese speech would qualify as “standard” Japanese? The ministry 
adopted the Tokyo dialect as the basis for standard Japanese and the colloquial 
written form.
Speaking “standard Japanese” did not come naturally to most students in the 
metropole, many of whom were forced to wear “dialect tags” (hōgen fuda) as a 
punishment for slipping into their native tongue at school.35 Yet this disconnect 
between Japanese subjects and their supposedly shared national language did 
little to trouble Japanese linguistic nationalists, who argued that the strength of 
the Japanese nation lay in its unified tongue. This was particularly true after the 
1894–95 Sino-Japanese War, which—among linguists and nationalists—touched 
off jingoistic paeans to the unity of the Japanese language across classes and re-
gions.36 Some argued that the reliance on literary forms in written Chinese made 
China weak. The poet Inoue Tetsujirō, a member of the influential Association 
to Unify Speech and Writing (Genbun itchi kai), wrote in the Yomiuri shinbun 
(Yomiuri newspaper) in 1901: “the spoken and written languages are in the most 
incompatible state in Japan and China. . . . It is impossible, even for intelligent 
people, to express in written Chinese Western ideas such as logic, economics, 
and philosophy.  .  .  . The Japanese writing system is far more advanced than 
that of the Chinese; the innovation of adding kana [characters representing syl-
lables] to kanji [Chinese characters, which represent ideas] words contributed 
to the development and progress of the Japanese people. . . . [This was] one of 
the causes that brought the Japanese victory over the Chinese.”37 Shiratori Nao-
kichi, a founder of the field of “Oriental history” (tōyōshi) and prominent mem-
ber of the Tokyo Imperial University faculty, argued that Japan had emerged as 
the leading power of Asia because of its linguistic independence. In contrast 
to Korea, “Japan had gradually liberated itself from the Chinese tradition and 
valued its own language and writing. . . . Every language shares its destiny, its 
rise and fall, with its nation. .  .  . Korea was heavily influenced, politically and 
culturally, by the Chinese race, and therefore was never able to gain its firm 
independence.”38
The linguistic nationalism of the years after the Sino-Japanese War produced 
a particular language ideology among education officials and colonial planners 
that linked the creation of an ideal national people to the use of an ideal national 
language.39 Paradoxically, this meant that all Japanese people had to learn what was 
ostensibly already the national language (kokugo). In the colonies, as embodied 
by educators like Isawa Shūji, the chief of the Bureau of Education in Taiwan, the 
national language campaign (kokugo undō) was stripped of its irony and put forth 
as a self-evident process of assimilating colonize subjects into an already existing 
Japanese nation and national language.
Wielded in the context of empire, language was a double-edged sword. Out-
side of the official and highly controlled domains of education and policy, 
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Japanese-language speech remained highly variable. Though the Hiroshima stu-
dents equated the use of Japanese in Dairen as a sign of the cozy Japanese-ness of 
the foreign port city, they also found a comforting Japanese-ness in nonstandard 
forms of Japanese. At Tōkōshi (C. Tanggangzi) Hot Springs, the group stayed at 
the Seirinkan, a Japanese-style inn operated by Japanese settlers and managed, it 
seemed to the diarist, by their seven-year-old daughter, Atsuko. “Uncle, let’s go 
for a walk!” she said to him. The accent of her speech affected him, “She became 
even cuter as [her] Kyūshū accent (namari) mixed in with the beginning of each 
word.”40 Staring out into the Manchurian plains at dusk, he found it hard to recon-
cile the severity of the landscape with the bell-like nature of the seven-year-old. “In 
truth, I never thought I’d spend such a beautiful night in the wastelands of Man-
churia,” he sighed.41 Though Atsuko’s Japanese was nonstandard, the Hiroshima 
student nonetheless found it praiseworthy and comforting.
In their evaluation of Japanese-language speech in the colonies, imperial 
travelers deployed this common double standard: colonized subjects could 
demonstrate their ability and willingness to join the Japanese nation only by 
speaking national language properly; Japanese people, however, could demon-
strate their authentic Japanese-ness by speaking it improperly. Students from 
the 1931 Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School trip fell over laughing when 
Mr.  Yamada, a tour guide who also hailed from Miyazaki Prefecture, broke out 
in Miyakonojō dialect (Miyakonojō kotoba) as he introduced his lecture on the 
Manchurian silver market: “Since I came to Manchuria ten years ago, the hair 
on this head [indicating his own] has turned white, because I looked at the re-
ports on the silver exchange in the newspaper every day and suffered until my 
head hurt. Everyone, please look at this head.”42 It was a little taste of home for 
the travelers—indeed, it was so local that the only reason I am able to include 
this translation is because the diarist himself provided a translation, knowing 
that his audience would not be able to make much sense of the dialect. Yet the 
Miyakonojō students were not as forgiving of other localized styles of Japa-
nese speech. Encountering a group of Korean elementary school children on 
the train to Jinsen (K. Inch'ŏn), the boys asked them questions while giving 
them candy. “Their Japanese was skillful,” the diarist reported, but “the majority 
of them couldn’t pronounce the voiced consonants (dakuon), so, for example, 
densha [train] became tensha, gojuppun [ten minutes] became goshuppun.” 
Worse: “Moreover, when they talked among themselves, they spoke in Korean 
(Chōsengo).” While remarkably similar to his experience with Mr.  Yamada, 
from such evidence, the student surmised that the Korean students had the po-
tential to become good imperial subjects but were not there yet. “If they could 
pronounce the voiced consonants, and if they spoke Japanese even when speak-
ing to their friends, there wouldn’t be better Japanese imperial subjects (Nihon 
teikoku shinmin) than these Koreans,” he concluded.43
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THE LO CAL C OLOR OF L ANGUAGE
Imperial travelers’ representations of colonial speech show how language became 
a tool for envisioning the space of empire and nation as an unstable linguistic land-
scape. Imperial travelers expected people from certain places to speak in certain 
manners. When they did not, which was quite frequently, the travelers began to 
propose new landscapes, ones tied to their expectations that Japan was or should 
be a multiethnic imperial nation composed of essentially different ethnic groups 
who were indigenous to essentially different cultural regions.
Like the local color of cultural regions, the local color of language was a swirl-
ing mix of coercive and anticipatory expectations. In the colonies, language was 
governed by the coercive expectations of the Governments General and the South 
Manchuria Railway Company. These were official expectations with official con-
sequences: one would speak national language in official settings, one would wear 
a Japanese-style school uniform to school, and one would treat colonial officials 
with respect. Imperial travelers brought their own expectations, however, antici-
pating certain manifestations of colonial difference, such as colonized subjects’ 
inability to speak Japanese, strange customs, and questionable respect for colonial 
officials. In imperial travelogues, these rival expectations intersected, with travel-
ers expressing surprise at how the colonies were not different in the way that they 
had expected, and with them then recalibrating how to define that difference. The 
local color of language was, in other words, another measure that, like mobility, 
tracked the shift from a geography of civilization, in which assimilation was the 
presumed goal and endpoint of colonial history, to a geography of cultural plural-
ism, in which cultural difference was not only expected but enforced. It was this 
latter notion of Japan as a nation of diverse cultural regions, each of which had 
its own authentic indigenous people, that imperial travelers deployed to paint a 
picture of an imperial nation that was both united and comfortably hierarchical.
For their part, colonial boosters promoted a straightforward version of lan-
guage as local color. In the guidebooks and pamphlets that began appearing in 
the mid-1930s, colonial boosters depicted language and territory in an isomor-
phic relationship. Despite the aggressive national language campaigns that the 
Government General of Korea had enacted to stamp out the use of Korean in 
everyday life, for example, the 1934 Chōsen ryokō annai ki encouraged travelers 
to learn a few Korean phrases in order to interact more smoothly with locals. The 
phrase guide described Korean (using the term Sengo) as a local alternative within 
a territory governed by national language.44 “While nowadays national language 
has spread to the degree that there is no place where one cannot communicate 
through national language, for the person who wants to understand Korea and 
the people of Korea, it is necessary to understand Korean. Even if you only memo-
rize two or three words, you can create an extremely friendly environment.”45 The 
guidebook provided translations for “hello,” “goodbye,” “how much,” and other 
Speaking Japanese    145
 everyday phrases. The suggestion that communication between Japanese people 
and Koreans in Korean held value for both parties differed markedly from pre-
vious guidebooks, which insisted that travelers could and should use Japanese 
language with no difficulty. For example, a 1926 Korea-Manchuria Information 
Bureau guidebook claimed that, “as the mother tongue has spread throughout 
the land, travelers from the inner territory should not worry about being unable 
to communicate.”46 By 1934, regardless of whether communication in Japanese 
was possible, the guidebook suggested that one make an attempt to use Korean 
anyway.
In Manchukuo, the Japan Tourist Bureau’s Dairen Branch and the South Man-
churia Railway Company promoted the local color of storefront signage as a sym-
bol of the region’s distinct linguistic culture. The bureau’s 1941 Manshū kanban 
ōrai (Manchurian sign travel) taught travelers how to read the Manchukuoan 
cityscape. The need for colorful signs, the guidebook explained, stemmed from the 
region’s historical high rate of illiteracy. In such a context, a colorful and distinc-
tive signage had developed as a way to identify different shops and services. The 
small volume offered travelers a chance to see the region as distinctly Manchurian. 
“When you walk around picking out the signs, you forget the dirt, noise, and bit-
ter thirteen-degree-below-zero cold,” the guidebook stated. “You are made to feel 
keenly the pleasure of Manchuria.”47 Other guidebooks, such as the South Man-
churia Railway Company’s 1935 Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai also incorpo-
rated the signage prominently into their depictions of Manchuria. The inside cover 
of this edition of the railway’s guidebook showed sketches of various signs, which 
replaced the myriad transportation devices that had adorned the inside cover of 
the previous edition and the sketch of the steamer at Dairen wharf in the edition 
prior to that.48
In these representations, language evoked a concept of the local defined by the 
history and practices of a particular speech community, not unlike the concept 
of authenticity-through-language that the ethnologist Yanagita Kunio proposed 
for Japanese.49 Here, guidebooks defined speech communities by place (one spoke 
Korean in Korea), yet presented the affect of that speech community as accessible 
to outsiders if they joined it (even temporarily). In the colonial context, it is easy 
to read this representation of the local color of language as an ethno-racial rath-
er than territorial division. In colonial Taiwan, for example, anthropologist Inō 
 Kanori classified indigenous people into eight distinct “tribes” (shuzoku) based on 
language in the late 1890s.50 Similarly, in post-1932 Manchukuo, language was one 
of a slippery cast of schemes for categorizing the state’s “five races,” which also in-
cluded history, phenotype, religion, and nationality.51 Yet local language prescrip-
tions in colonial tourist guidebooks appeared simultaneously with local language 
prescriptions in guidebooks for travel in the inner territory. Thus, as the Govern-
ment General of Korea exhorted imperial travelers to speak Korean in Korea, the 
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Ministry of Railways gently suggested to metropolitan travelers that they try out 
Tōhoku dialect in Tōhoku, Kyūshū dialect in Kyūshū, Kinai dialect in Kyōto, and 
a little bit of Ainu in Hokkaidō.52 In these representations, language and ethnicity 
were not a one-to-one match—popular representations of Japanese ethnicity in 
the 1930s did not distinguish between Kyūshū and Kinai—whereas language did 
define a place, and a place, language.
In prescriptive tourist literature, the local color of language was thus a binary 
concept—the local language was either this or that. Korean or Japanese. Chinese 
or Korean. This dialect or that dialect. For imperial travelers, however, the reality 
of language use was far messier. They struggled to differentiate between people in 
ways that matched their expectation of both a spatial and ethnic differentiation of 
power and prestige within the empire.
The use of Japanese in the colonies provoked expressions of surprise and 
praise by imperial travelers. Visiting the Girls’ Higher Common School in Keijō, 
 Hayasaka Yoshio wrote that, “[Koreans’] power of memorization is really quite 
strong. What’s more, in things like their power of language, there are places where 
Japanese people can’t even compare.”53 Nagasawa Sokichi had a similar experience 
in eastern Taiwan, where, he wrote, “The savage children’s pronunciation in the 
national language practicum was perfect.”54 Yet both travelers heard the Japanese 
spoken by colonized subjects within a relative rather than binary linguistic land-
scape. For Nagasawa and Hayasaka, rather than a single language that one either 
spoke or did not speak, “national language” contained degrees of competence. “Ac-
tually,” Hayasaka continued, “their speech in Japanese and in English is clear and 
bright, and made me ashamed of our Tōhoku accent.”55 Nagasawa drew similar 
comparisons, arguing that the indigenous children’s pronunciation was perfect 
and bore “absolutely no comparison to our Tōhoku people.”56
In his landmark analysis of the 1920s education system, historian Motoyama 
Yukihiko argued that scholars should approach Japanese education history as a 
story of capitalism. Previous historians had been inclined to emphasize the policy 
divisions between the Ministry of Education’s incorporation of state ideology into 
the curriculum in the formative Meiji period (1868–1912) and the tentative “liber-
alization” of education in the Taishō years (1912–1926). In contrast, Motoyama sug-
gested that the distinction between “state-centered” and “liberal” education was a 
false dichotomy. Rather, policies from both eras shared the goal of differentiating 
the population into elites, white-collar workers, and blue-collar laborers for the 
purposes of strengthening Japanese capitalism.57 Language served a central role in 
promoting a division of labor within Japanese society. Kitamura Kae comes to a 
similar conclusion in her study of indigenous education in colonial Taiwan. Writ-
ing about the new guidelines for colonial education that appeared in 1927, which 
stated clearly that the purpose was to “develop Japanese citizens” (Nihon kokumin), 
she argues, “Just as the education center symbolized the maintenance of a separate 
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school system under Special Administration [of the “Savage Territory”], the mul-
tilayeredness that was established within the kokumin is clear. There were distinct 
differences in the reality of ‘the necessary character of a citizen’ that [students] 
were supposed to master.”58
When Hayasaka and Nagasawa stated that the Japanese spoken by Koreans and 
indigenous people was far beyond that of the people of the region of Tōhoku in 
northeastern Japan, they located Korea and the indigenous areas of Taiwan within 
a division of language that closely mirrored the empire’s geographic division of 
labor. As a region, Tōhoku provided two basic contributions to the imperial econ-
omy: wage labor, in the form of workers who traveled to the urban manufacturing 
center, and material resources, such as rice and coal.59 In a situation that elsewhere 
has been called “the development of underdevelopment,” the region provided es-
sential resources for urban industrialization while its population lived with dis-
proportionately fewer benefits from industrialization.60 It was these disparities 
that led ethnographers such as Yanagita Kunio to the northeast in the 1930s to 
document what they saw as the last remnants of the authentic everyday life of the 
Japanese people being eroded by the uneven fits and starts of capitalism. In this 
light, Nagasawa’s and Hayasaka’s insistence that indigenous people and Koreans 
spoke Japanese better than the people of Tōhoku suggested not only that Koreans 
and indigenous people could be integrated into the imperial economy as labor 
but also—perhaps more important to travelers seeking to create a national space 
under the terms of the geography of civilization—that they would not necessarily 
be consigned to the bottom rungs of the labor hierarchy.
No matter how celebratory, however, imperial travelers’ accounts of spoken 
Japanese exhibited considerable anxiety about the place of Japanese-speaking col-
onized subjects in an imperial society. For Hayasaka and Nagasawa, this anxiety 
appeared as a concern about whether these Japanese-speaking students, whose 
pronunciation was flawless, were actually comprehending (rikai) the subjects that 
they studied. Hayasaka suspected that the Korean students’ ability to produce 
Japanese did not correspond to their ability to understand subjects in Japanese. 
“What about their comprehension?” he asked. Nagasawa, too, wondered if pro-
ducing speech signified understanding. Responding to critics who suggested that 
indigenous people could not understand abstract subjects such as math, Naga-
sawa wrote, “Besides, their grades in math are also excellent.” For Nagasawa, this 
was all good news: “If you look [at the question of assimilation] from these good 
points, you can say that, of course, they are a people with the power of under-
standing (rikai).” Indeed, it placed indigenous people in a position above that of 
Taiwanese Chinese, who, in Nagasawa’s words, “have a mother country and can’t 
understand right or wrong.” “The savages,” he concluded, “have a simple character 
that should be loved [and] will be very easy to assimilate.” Meanwhile, in Korea, 
Hayasaka found that, though their skill in foreign language speech surpassed that 
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of Japanese, Korean students’ comprehension lagged behind: “I found that [their 
comprehension] is not as we imagine it to be. In general, it seems as if [Korean 
students] excel at geography, history, and national language, but they are inferior 
in math and science.”61
Students in the Hiroshima Higher Normal School group found a different, but 
still effective, method of turning the foreign-language proficiency of the  Korean 
students they encountered into a way of marking Koreans as perpetually failing 
to measure up to the Japanese. Questioning their teacher about a sign outside the 
telegraph office in Heijō Station that stated that the office would not handle mes-
sages written in “mixed sentences” (Korean and Japanese), the student wondered 
why this was necessary. Was it because they used mixed sentences to include de-
ceitful things? The student quoted the teacher’s response: “Sure, I suppose that 
there are those things. But Koreans have an extremely high aptitude for learning 
foreign languages. After four years of common school, they have basically com-
pleted [learning Japanese], and after higher common school, they don’t even use 
Korean and are completely free in their ability to speak Japanese.” Drawing on the 
popular Japanese narrative of Korean history as marred by what Japanese com-
mentators called “toadyism” (jidai shisō) (in contrast to Japan’s supposed 2,600 
years of unbroken imperial rule), the teacher enumerated two reasons for what 
he portrayed as Koreans’ extraordinarily skill with language: one, the sounds in 
 Korean are found in all other languages; two, historically, Koreans have always 
been speaking languages that were imposed by foreign countries.62
The concern with comprehension in the classroom, as well as the use of com-
prehension as a method of belittling the achievements of impressively bi- or mul-
tilingual students, had, as its flipside, the praising of pronunciation and politeness. 
For imperial travelers, using the “national language” was both a skill and an affect. 
In the terms of sociolinguistics, imperial travelers made explicit metapragmatic 
statements about how they expected colonized subjects to speak Japanese, and 
they also expected colonized subjects to perform with an implicit metapragmatic 
awareness that signaled acquiescence or consent to a hierarchy of examiner and 
examined, interrogator and interrogated.63
Consider politeness. In his 1922 account, Hayasaka reported the following con-
versation with two “beautiful Korean women” on the night train from Keijō to 
Hōten. The women, he discovered, were traveling to Heijō, where they attended 
the Heijō Girls’ Higher Common School.
By the looks of their clothing, they were, without a doubt, educated women. In that 
case, I thought, they should also understand Japanese (Nihongo). Driven by curios-
ity, I asked, “Ladies, where are you headed?” The younger of the two responded with 
a smiling face, as if she were a little embarrassed, “We are going to Heijō.” [Her] 
pronunciation was clear, and in no way inferior to [that of] a female student from 
Tokyo. . . . I asked, “What is your principal’s name?” The woman said, “He is called 
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Mr. So-and-So.” (I forgot the name.) I asked, “Are the teachers from the inner terri-
tory nice to you?” The women, “Oh yes, everyone is kind and deeply compassionate.” 
I had always thought that colonial education would not work without kindness and 
compassion, and [her statement] coincided exactly with my opinion. . . . I said, “Well, 
it is time for us to go our separate ways. If my schedule allows, I might pay a visit to 
your school.” “Goodbye,” she said. It was somehow touching. Do female students in 
the inner territory have such an easy, gentle affect? Koreans (Senjin) are not a people 
whom we should hate. Through kindness and compassion, we must guide them to 
the level of civilization.64
Hayasaka initiated the encounter using honorific forms of verbs and proper 
nouns, in this case the honorific mairu (to go) in place of iku and kijo, to refer 
to the women as “ladies” instead of “students” or “you two.” They conducted the 
remainder of the conversation in polite, upper-class Japanese. This was an explicit 
test on Hayasaka’s part. He was intrigued about their ability to comprehend (wa-
karu) Japanese, thus he spoke to them using a considerably polite and affected 
form of the language. The politeness of his inquiry to the female Korean students 
contrasted markedly with the language he used in other encounters, for example, 
with rickshaw pullers. “Hey, Mr. Rickshawman!” he reported calling out in Keijō, 
“Take me to the Higher Common School, will ya?” (Oi, shayasan! Kōtō futsū gakkō 
made itte kuren ka).65 When several rickshaw pullers in a row refused to carry him 
up the hill to the school, Hayasaka declared the entire Korean population to be 
lazy and unfit for capitalist society. In this instance, however, he interpreted the 
women’s polite response to his polite inquiry as evidence that they comprehended 
the rules of Japanese-language speech and, indeed, that they had acquiesced to—if 
not actively desired—Japanese rule.
NATIONAL L ANGUAGE AND THE  
ETHNO-LINGUISTIC DIVIDE
As these encounters demonstrate, imperial travelers drew the borders of the lin-
guistic landscape in the terms of the geography of civilization—of an expanding 
space of the nation that already did incorporate the new territories and would soon 
incorporate their peoples. At the same time, like colonial boosters’ early tourist 
guidebooks, they found ways to mark colonized subjects as “not-quite” in place in 
this new linguistic space. To mitigate the threat of colonized subjects’ mastery of 
the national language, Hayasaka posited an imaginary of a future Japanese impe-
rial nation that had divisions along class, ethnicity, and gender lines, lines that 
contradicted the official goal of national language policy and colonial education, 
which was to create a horizontal nation of national language speakers who shared 
a particular affect and “national spirit.” Politeness, the implied metapragmatic 
awareness that imperial travelers expected of colonized subjects, served to draw a 
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boundary between populations that appeared willing to assimilate and those that 
did not. But this boundary also differentiated between those populations that had 
to prove their willingness and those from whom no such demonstration was ex-
pected. Alongside the question of willingness was the question of ability, which, 
for Hayasaka and others, delineated populations capable of assimilating from 
those that, in travelers’ determinations, were not.
The same year that Hayasaka traveled the empire to investigate the conditions 
of the colonies, the Governments General of Korea and Taiwan radically altered 
the structure of colonial education. Linguistic nationalism had, since Isawa Shūji 
arrived in Taiwan in 1898 to establish his Japanese language institutes, been the 
ideology underlying the colonial and metropolitan governments’ emphasis on the 
dissemination of standard Japanese. Yet, in many ways, the maintenance of three 
different education systems undermined such an ideology by differentiating the 
nation based on class, gender, and ability in the metropole, and by race or ethnicity 
(as well as class, gender, and ability) in the colonies. The three educational systems 
were, first, the multitracked primary school system that culminated in university 
education, which was for social and academic elites in the metropole and for Japa-
nese residents of the colonies; second, the single-track “common” school system 
for colonial subjects (kō gakkō) and nonelite metropolitan subjects (jinjō gakkō) 
that ended with higher common school and that did not share teachers or facilities 
with the primary school system; and third, the “educational centers for indigenous 
children,” which were equally standalone and underfunded, and ended after only 
four years.
In 1922, the Governments General of Korea and Taiwan announced changes 
that would fully incorporate linguistic nationalism into the structure of colonial 
education by ending, in theory, the use of race and ethnicity to differentiate stu-
dent populations. Following the emergence of vociferous assimilation, self-rule, 
and independence movements across the empire, the colonial administrations 
opted to liberalize colonial education in the hopes of incorporating dissenting 
groups into the imperial nation.66 In 1922, Den Makoto, the governor general 
of Taiwan, presented the Rescript on Education, which declared that all schools 
would be open to both Taiwanese Chinese and Japanese children. Rather than 
require Taiwanese Chinese students to attend common school and Japanese stu-
dents to attend primary school, the rescript declared common schools to be “in-
stitutions for non-Japanese-speaking children” and that primary schools would 
be for Japanese-speaking children “regardless of race.”67 Primary schools were 
opened to indigenous children as well, provided that they completed four years of 
education in an indigenous education center and could demonstrate considerable 
Japanese-language fluency.
Similarly, Saitō Makoto, the governor general of Korea, presented the Revised 
Korean Rescript on Education in 1922. In the words of one historian of Korean ed-
ucation, the rescript created a “separate but equal” system for Japanese and Korean 
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education by increasing the number of years of education provided by the com-
mon schools.68 Yet here as well, the definition of “Korean” and “Japanese” bears 
close attention: as the research of Yeounsuk Lee has shown, the Revised Korean 
Rescript defined Japanese students (naichijin) as “those who always use national 
language” and Koreans (Chōsenjin) as “those who do not always use national lan-
guage,” thus opening the door for a liberal interpretation of educational policy by 
allowing a small number of Korean national language users to matriculate into the 
Japanese system.69
As it was for colonial boosters advocating “harmony” through the promotion 
of a multiethnic spatial imaginary of Japan, the stakes for colonized subjects at-
tempting to matriculate into the colonial education system were high. As we saw 
in chapter 1, the Japanese education system was consciously designed to produce 
labor for industrial production as well as future leaders who would govern the 
nation-state. The majority of students completed their education after six years 
of compulsory elementary school. The metropolitan educational system was thus 
both meritocratic and explicitly elitist, designed as it was to divide the population 
into managers and workers.70 In the colonies prior to the integration rescripts, the 
Governments General discarded meritocracy in favor of ethnic hierarchy, though 
they continued to espouse liberal rhetoric about the necessity of education for 
social advancement. In Taiwan, the Government General encouraged Taiwanese 
Chinese to enter the professional classes as either teachers or doctors. At the Tai-
hoku Medical School or the Teachers’ College, elite Taiwanese Chinese students 
received training from Japanese instructors and licenses to practice on the island. 
Yet these schools remained the culmination of a distinctly inferior and circum-
scribed track when compared to that offered to Japanese students, who could rise 
through the primary, middle, and higher schools in Taiwan and then attend a uni-
versity or specialty school (senmon gakkō) in the metropole.71 In contrast to the 
path made available to Taiwanese Chinese students in Taiwan, the path for Japa-
nese students in Taiwan carried significantly increased options for professional 
specialization and access to university education, which was over the course of the 
early twentieth century an increasingly important prerequisite for membership 
in the new middle class and access to elite, metropolitan political, economic, and 
social networks.
The 1922 integration rescripts “intensified the contradiction between liberal 
culture and ethnic inequalities” in the education system, particularly in the fields 
that had been reserved for colonized subjects.72 In Taiwan, the integration rescripts 
made the previously Japanese-only primary schools open to Taiwanese Chinese 
students. Yet, as Ming-Cheng Lo has pointed out, it also made the previously Tai-
wanese Chinese–only medical school open to Japanese students. In Korea, a robust 
private education sector dampened somewhat the social effects of the discrimina-
tory public education system. Yet, in Korea too, Japanese students used the edict 
to enroll in the best of the formerly Korean-only institutions, thus  further mar-
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ginalizing Korean students in the public education system.73 While the integration 
edicts ostensibly removed official practices of ethnic discrimination from colonial 
education, in practice, they introduced far more pernicious methods of unofficial 
discrimination. For example, Japanese students entering medical college after five 
years of preparatory education did not have to take an entrance exam. Yet, after 
initially ruling that Taiwanese Chinese students would also be exempt, the Taihoku 
Medical School reinstated entrance exams for them.74 While these exams cov-
ered many topics, the language of the integration edicts provided the measure by 
which any non-Japanese applicant could be excluded, regardless of their technical 
competence in a given subject: fluency in the Japanese language. For this reason, 
E. Patricia Tsurumi argues that, after the integration edicts, language became the 
locus of discrimination within the colonial education system.75 After the inte-
gration edicts, those who used Japanese in everyday life could to go “Japanese” 
schools. In practice, however, “Taiwanese [Chinese] pupils who participated in 
this form of coeducation never exceeded one percent of those Taiwanese [ Chinese] 
who received elementary education.”76 Contrary to the stated intention of its pro-
moters, the integration edicts altered (rather than eliminated) the mechanism of 
ethnic and racial discrimination in education by creating a situation in which lin-
guistic competence needed to be evaluated prior to inclusion. These evaluations 
were differentially applied: “Japanese language backwardness” was routinely used 
as a reason to limit the matriculation of Taiwanese Chinese students into primary 
schools, despite the fact that a secret 1923 study by the Government General of 
Taiwan showed that Taiwanese Chinese students were performing at or above the 
level of their Japanese counterparts.77
Among imperial travelers, language encounters in the post-integration 
empire reinforced the new ethno-linguistic hierarchy. Rather than represent 
Japanese-speaking colonized subjects as evidence of the promise of assimilation 
or as flawed but capable future imperial subjects, imperial travelers enhanced their 
attention to the “appropriateness” of colonial speech. Though the 1930s have been 
described as a time when the “vulgar” racism of the early colonial period was 
discarded in favor of a more “polite” racism,78 imperial travelers used expectations 
based on race, ethnicity, and gender to define the boundaries and hierarchies of the 
imperial nation more explicitly than before.79 This was particularly true for travel-
ers to Taiwan, who continued to be surprised and fascinated by Japanese-language 
encounters with indigenous people, yet also troubled by the potential consequenc-
es of such linguistic competence.
To be sure, imperial travelers did not see themselves as doing anything to lan-
guage or to the linguistic landscape. Rather, they used conversations with colo-
nized subjects as a way of emphasizing their own authority as first-hand witnesses 
to colonial conditions. In contrast to prescriptive materials, which adopted the 
voice of the omniscient third-person, imperial travelers represented their travel-
ogues as a series of “I statements” that documented the traveler’s lived experiences. 
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No experience was more immediate—and more unavailable to nontravelers—than 
actual conversations with colonized subjects in the colony itself. In other words, 
for imperial travelers, reporting speech in the form of direct quotations was one 
of the most valuable ways of representing the entire narrative as both authoritative 
and uniquely informative.
In these representations of dialogue, imperial travelers engaged in content po-
licing and promoted theories of ethnic opacity that incorporated essentialized eth-
nic boundaries into the linguistic landscape of empire. The policing of what colo-
nized subjects should or should not say had as much to do with imperial travelers’ 
expectations of whether colonized subjects could (or should) transcend their place 
of origin and the cultural characteristics travelers ascribed to it as it did with more 
explicitly political subject matters, such as the question of independence. Ōyama, 
as we recall, flinched when he heard Korean students using their national language 
skills to ask when Korea would become independent. Yet imperial travelers had 
strong expectations more broadly about the kinds of statements colonized sub-
jects should or should not make. Matsuda Kiichi, a middle-school student from 
Osaka who traveled to Okinawa and Taiwan in 1937, had two entirely different 
reactions to the Japanese-language speech of indigenous peoples. At Kenbō Shrine 
in Taihoku, Matsuda encountered an indigenous man paying his respects to the 
dead. Quoting the man directly, he wrote, “The savage prayed and then expressed 
the following words, ‘Kenbō Shrine is the place where those who have worked 
and died for the emperor are celebrated. I always knew that members of one of 
our tribes who worked and died for Japan during the Musha Incident were also 
celebrated here. But, I had not imagined it would be this magnificent of a shrine. 
I suppose our tribe must be very satisfied that they are celebrated in such a mag-
nificent place.’ ”80
Somewhat surprisingly (to this historian), this statement elicited no further 
comment from Matsuda. Rendered in polite but not honorific forms, the state-
ment demonstrated considerable linguistic and cultural fluency on the part of its 
speaker. Perhaps this form of competence and this register of imperial subjectivity 
were now in the realm of the expected for Matsuda.
Later, however, Matsuda represented indigenous speech entirely differently on 
a visit Taroko Gorge in eastern Taiwan. In the words of the popular song “Taroko 
bushi” (Taroko melody), Taroko was the home of friendly Taroko maidens:
Taiwan’s Taroko, what is its specialty?
Gold sand, gourds, Taroko paper, paulownia sandals of plums and 
silk floss,
a Taroko maiden’s “hello”81
The image is similar to what Hayasaka conjured with his conversation with the 
“beautiful Korean women” on the train to Heijō: politeness and deference to the 
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terms of Japanese rule through the proper use of Japanese language. Well known 
for its scenic beauty (Taroko would become one of Taiwan’s three national parks 
the following year), Taroko increasingly attracted imperial travelers in the 1930s. 
Yet Matsuda objected when indigenous people stepped outside of their defined 
role as part of the scenery. Arriving at Taroko, two “savages” (banjin) offered to 
take a photo with him for ten sen each. Matsuda found this both exciting and 
troubling. “On the one hand, I felt very happy to find that savages also understand 
the value of money. They don’t have tattoos, and they are wearing yukata and red 
obi—they are just like Japanese (naichijin)!” Similar to other imperial travelers, 
Matsuda thought the logic of capitalism to be foreign to colonized subjects and 
particularly to indigenous people, who were thought to not understand how mon-
ey worked. The men’s request for money might, Matsuda suggested, mean that 
they were now Japanese. But he quickly found a way to reinscribe difference as 
ethno-racial rather than linguistic: “But the threateningness of their eyes and their 
black faces are parts that just can’t be disputed.”82
Like Matsuda, imperial travelers often paired expectations about the content of 
speech with expectations about the nature of difference within a multiethnic nation. 
For Matsuda, faced with indigenous people speaking in a Japanese register, lan-
guage could (suddenly) no longer overcome race. Other imperial travelers similarly 
reified ethno-racial difference by conceiving of language as a bridge between dis-
tinct peoples rather than as the manifestation of a national spirit. For these travel-
ers, speech served as a conduit yet did not reveal the internal essence of the  speaker. 
Travelers imagined that, with or without Japanese-language speech,  Koreans, 
 Taiwanese, Chinese, and especially indigenous people could not be known.
Whereas indigenous minds were once expected to be incoherent (“they 
speak!”), by the 1930s, imperial travelers expected fluency. Yet this fluency did not 
signify, as it had previously, the incorporation or inclusion of indigenous people 
within the Japanese nation. Language training did not make them Japanese. In-
stead, language training moved the definition of what Japanese was. By the 1930s, 
colonial officials in Taiwan treated Japanese-language speech by indigenous peo-
ple as a performance of a bridge between two immutably different peoples. As Sav-
age Manager (ribanka) Suzuki Tadashi explained in 1932, the purpose of national 
language education was to create a shared language that made clear the “shared 
consciousness” of Japanese and indigenous people, but which also fostered “close 
friendship” between the two peoples.83 The first half of the sentence implied the 
possibility of a Japanese nation and national spirit that fully incorporated indig-
enous people. Yet the second half of the sentence undermined the first, represent-
ing the two peoples as essentially different.
The utility of language went both ways. In a report on its publication of training 
materials for “savage language” (bango), the Taihoku Prefectural Department of 
Savage Management noted the recent rise in the use of native languages by savage 
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managers. While the increase in communication was a positive trend, the depart-
ment insisted that savage managers persist in setting the expectation that national 
language would be used at all times.84 Language education was not for the purpose 
of increasing communication per se. Rather, national language education made 
possible the performance that Japanese travelers and colonial officials expected of 
indigenous people in order to prove what—it was presumed—could not be proved 
by sight alone: their submission to the power and norms of Japanese rule.
The “troubled, ill-defined” boundary between full and differential inclusion, 
between unselfconscious access and precarious performance, was precisely the 
 expectation that indigenous people had to prove their fitness for inclusion.85 But, 
as we see from the shifting expectations that both imperial travelers and the colo-
nial governments applied to the Japanese-language speech of colonized subjects, 
this was an impossible task. If under the geography of civilization, the measure 
was pronunciation, comprehension, and the performance of obedience, under 
the geography of cultural pluralism, imperial travelers introduced explicitly ra-
cialized expectations that marked colonized subjects as unable to speak Japanese 
“like a Japanese person” even as they carried on conversations with colonized sub-
jects in perfect Japanese. The expectation of difference became the imposition of 
 difference.
SILENCE,  VIOLENCE,  AND THE OPAQUE MIND
Under the geography of cultural pluralism, colonial boosters, imperial travelers, 
and even colonial policy styled language as a bridge that brought people together 
into a community of shared consciousness. But it did so by first constituting them 
as worlds apart. Linguistic anthropologists argue that the idea that other minds 
are “opaque” is a form of language ideology prevalent in local, non-Western com-
munities. Indeed, the “opacity of other minds” is often treated as a cultural clash 
between a Western language ideology in which speech is a transparent reflection 
of intention (speech as equivalent to intention) and particular or local language 
ideologies that assume the impossibility of knowing what is going on in somebody 
else’s head, regardless of what they say.86 What is abundantly clear from the treat-
ment of colonial Japanese-language speech is that Japanese colonial boosters and 
imperial travelers styled their speech as transparent in opposition to the opacity of 
the colonized. To rephrase the dichotomy, self-styled modern cultures have ideas 
about the distinct difference of Others, the first and foremost of which is the in-
ability of language to make clear their intentions.87
The inscrutability of indigenous people appeared in imperial travelers’ accounts 
of Taiwan as a fear of silence and expectation of violence. In the early years of 
colonialism, travelers portrayed Japanese-language greetings as a signal of safety. 
Ishikawa, for example, noted that the indigenous men who greeted him did so 
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while gripping their “savage swords.” Yet after being greeted with a polite hello, he 
relaxed and marveled at the bright future of colonialism and assimilation. Twenty 
years later, however, speech could not erase the fear of violence. “While it’s to be 
expected that savage women and children will be polite,” Matsuda Kiichi wrote 
after an encounter with a mother and child, “when you meet a savage man in his 
prime, you wonder, will he just not greet me or will he also pierce my body [with 
his sword]?”88 Silence engendered a panic in Itagaki Hōki’s account too. Writing 
in 1931, he used the silence of indigenous people to signify danger. Stopped in the 
car on their way to the town of Keishū (C. Xizhou), Itagaki asked the driver why 
they were stopped.
When I asked the [Taiwanese] malaria assistant (mararia joshu), he avoided an ex-
planation with frighteningly simple Japanese:
 “Connection. Connection.”
 The sun was blazing down, and it was very hot, so we settled into the middle of the 
car. As soon as we did so, a person peered into the car. We looked up: it was a savage. 
And not just one, but three or four, each doing his own painstaking investigation. I 
felt chills on my neck, as if our necks were being evaluated for head-hunting, just as 
the books on head-hunting said.
 “Connection. Connection.”
 What was the malaria assistant thinking?89
In the end, Itagaki discovered that the assistant had stopped the car in order to 
transfer Itagaki and his wife to a different one, hence his statement of “connection, 
connection” (renraku renraku). But the other car had not arrived before a group 
of indigenous men arrived and examined the car’s inhabitants, leading Itagaki to 
wonder, “How long will we be pilloried for the savages?”90
The fear that Matsuda and Itagaki expressed was, in part, a response to an 
unexpected, violent, and widely reported anti-Japanese uprising in the village 
of Musha (C. Wushe) on October 27, 1930. On this day, a group of Atayal tribe 
members killed 134 Japanese officials and residents. Prior to the incident, Musha 
had been known as a model, “tamed” village. As one Government General of Tai-
wan publication put it in 1925, Musha offered an experience of the “magnificent 
beauty” of the savage world, “bathed in the atmosphere of the savage highlands.”91 
After the Musha Incident (Musha jiken), however, Musha became a site of un-
canny silence. The actual village was destroyed, and its remaining residents were 
moved to a neighboring village. Tourist literature portrayed the Japanese-language 
voices of the village’s past inhabitants as ghostly sounds, whose comprehensibility 
was shattered by the unexpected violence. The 1935 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai 
described the village before the incident as occupying an important position in 
Taiwan’s  “savage management” system, economy, and transportation network—a 
place where Japanese, islanders, and indigenous people lived together and where 
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indigenous children “happily puppeted national language and sang ‘Kimi ga yo’ 
[the imperial anthem].”92
But to use the Musha Incident to divide the history of colonial Taiwan into 
two periods, one in which imperial travelers believed assimilation possible and 
one in which they recognized its futility, suggests the truth of the inscrutability 
thesis—that the actual inscrutability of the indigenous was just waiting to be dis-
covered by the Japanese. Instead, it is far more accurate to point out that there 
had been violence between indigenous communities and the colonial government 
throughout the colonial period (much of it instigated by the colonial govern-
ment). Moreover, as the comments by early Japanese travelers such as Ishikawa 
indicate, the idea that indigenous people were violent people, and in particular of 
indigenous people as “head-hunters,” had been a central component of colonial 
discourse since the initial colonization of Taiwan.93 What we see in post-1930 ac-
counts of linguistic encounters is not the recognition of an extant opacity made 
apparent by sudden violence. Rather, we see the construction of a narrative of 
inscrutability, with the Musha Incident as its central evidence.
Tourist guidebooks and imperial travelers treated the Musha Incident as evi-
dence of the impossibility that indigenous people could ever be fully incorporated 
into the Japanese nation. As the 1935 guidebook explained, Musha had been a place 
of Japanese-language conversation and interaction. But in the end, speech was not 
enough to prove the loyalty of the indigenous community. The guidebook assured 
travelers that the colonial government had exacted swift and overwhelming retri-
bution to reassert Japanese authority. Following the uprising, the colonial govern-
ment killed over one hundred Atayal people and removed nearly three hundred 
“submissive” indigenous people to a neighboring village.94 For Nakanishi Inosuke, 
the village became a place of silence. He cut off sound by placing a transparent 
barrier between himself and indigenous people in a conversation with his travel 
companion:
Musha! [. . . . ]
“I’d like to see it one time. Are there still savages from that time alive?”
“I think so. Over that mountain . . . in place called Kawanakashima. . . . ”
When the car passed by Hori [C. Puli], the figures of savages were visible through 
the car window.95
After Musha, imperial travelers routinely incorporated the idea that language 
signified transformation. But it was only a partial one, which could not fully 
overcome ancestry. Chōnan Kuranosuke, a member of the All-Japan Geography 
and History Teachers’ Association who traveled with the group to Taiwan in 
1932, brought this lens to bear on his encounter with indigenous students in 
Kappanzan, a popular stop for travelers to Taiwan. The group witnessed a spe-
cial Japanese-language class. “If you listen to their speaking, they speak in fluent 
158    chapter five
Figure 12. School for indigenous children at Kappanzan, c. early 1930s. The students’ clothing 
and haircuts emphasized their Japanification, in contrast to other representations, which ex-
oticized the customary dress and tattoo practices of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. Schools were 
a central component of the imperial tourist circuit for Taiwan and a key site where imperial 
travelers would engage indigenous peoples in Japanese-language conversations. Digital image 
courtesy of East Asia Image Collection, Lafayette College Libraries, Easton, PA. Image ip1532.
standard Japanese (hyōjungo) with the correct pronunciation and no bad habits, 
not even an accent,” he wrote.96 The students carried the travelers’ bags like they 
were their uncles. “It was cute!” he exclaimed.97 For Chōnan, the enthusiastic and 
proper speech of the children signified their willingness to be part of the imperial 
nation. Yet it was an inclusion that was incomplete, as he also insisted on seeing 
the children as representatives of a local ethnic group first and as Japanese second: 
“You wouldn’t believe that they were the children and grandchildren of the fierce 
and bloodthirsty Atayal tribe that we heard so much about.”98
C ONCLUSION
Like local color, imperial travelers used language to put colonized peoples and their 
lands in place within a multiethnic and complementary Japanese nation. Imperial 
travelers used reports of their conversations with colonized subjects to represent 
the empire as a linguistic landscape. The landscape’s borders were drawn along 
the lines of class, place, gender, ethnicity, and race. Increasingly, as the linguis-
tic nationalism of the early imperial period gave way to a feeble  multilingualism, 
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 imperial travelers drew the boundaries along racial and ethnic lines that drew 
more from their expectations about how people from particular places should 
speak rather than how they did speak.
In these accounts, the Japanese language was supposedly the glue that would 
bind the empire’s disparate populations into a single nation. But speaking the 
language was a marker of inclusion that colonized subjects could never achieve. 
Rather, in the face of colonial fluency, imperial travelers differentiated language 
into, in the words of Osa Shizue, “both a culture and a skill.”99 Imperial travelers 
used the concepts of “proper” speech, content policing, and ethno-linguistic opac-
ity to create a new hierarchy of imperial culture that situated imperial travelers as 
the examiners of linguistic skill and appropriateness, and colonized subjects as the 
examined. Imperial travelers placed colonized subjects in the category of the per-
petually “not-quite” as “perfect speech” increasingly became an accomplishment 
that could be obtained only through study in the sterile linguistic environment 
of classroom, while Japanese people from the metropole demonstrated their au-
thenticity through the deployment of dialect and jargon. Even if perfect Japanese 
speech was attained, it marked colonized subjects as colonial.
Local color and local language offered a distinctly pluralistic rather than genu-
inely multicultural vision of empire. Both sought to place colonized land, peoples, 
and cultures within imperial society without upsetting the fundamental basis for 
imperial rule, that is, the disenfranchisement of one political society at the hands 
of another.100 They did this by treating culture as fixed and territorial and people as 
scenery; by defining certain peoples and cultures by locality, and others (the more 
powerful) by their mobility; and by representing language as a performance of 
political submission and a bridge between fundamentally different communities. 
The result was a new map of empire, one whose borders were drawn not along the 
lines of inner and outer territory, but along the intertwined axes of region, class, 
and ethnicity. It was also one from which, no matter how fluid, imperial travelers 
did not allow their objects to escape. While the categories they used to draw the 
maps changed over time, the fact that the map was drawn unilaterally and used in 
service of a narrative of imperial nationalism did not.
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The shift from empire as a project of territorial acquisition to empire as a proj-
ect of territorial maintenance altered the meaning of colonial difference at the 
same time that it altered the meaning of what it meant to be Japanese. Imperial 
travelers and colonial boosters struggled over the course of the Japanese Empire 
to place colonized lands within the Japanese nation without abandoning colo-
nial hierarchies. For them, these acts of placing aimed to reorder the space of 
Japan, to turn Taiwan and Korea into subregions of a Japanese nation-state, and 
Manchuria into a region (and later state) that was outside of China and in  a re-
lationship of natural complementarity with Japan. After World War I, imperial 
travelers and colonial boosters redefined the space of the nation. Under the geog-
raphy of cultural pluralism, colonial boosters argued that Japan was a composite 
of  diverse regions, with each territorial unit representing a distinct cultural and 
ethnic homeland that, when taken together, made up a multinational Japanese 
state and multiethnic Japanese nation. Acts of placing went beyond representa-
tions of land. Indeed, imperial travelers used techniques of placing to fix and refix 
social hierarchies of language and ethnicity as well as economic hierarchies with 
an imperial division of labor.
In their endeavors to construct a social and spatial imaginary of the nation 
that could inhabit colonized lands and incorporate colonized subjects, imperial 
travelers and colonial boosters promoted a worldview rooted in the tensions be-
tween liberal capitalist idealism, anti-imperial nationalism, and global imperial-
ism. They shared with their readers a social imagination of imperial Japan that 
was conceived of as a space of complementary diversity—of labor, resources, and 
cultures—yet was, at the same time, unified through the operation of history. 
Conclusion
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From inner and new territories to commensurable cultural regions, imperial 
travelers and colonial boosters used concepts of place to locate Korea, Manchu-
ria, and Taiwan and their populations within a shifting imperial social, political, 
and economic hierarchy. It was not the worldview that critics such as Nakani-
shi Inosuke wanted imperial travelers to have, nor was it the end to the uneven 
territorial-administrative structure of empire that anticolonial activists such as 
Cai Peihuo sought. It was, instead, a worldview that sustained unequal relations 
between colonizer and colonized—the “newness” of colonized lands, in the words 
of Nitobe Inazō—through the production of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria/
Manchukuo as unique places within the empire and within the world. Such rheto-
ric rationalized inequality as a feature of cultural predispositions and natural re-
sources, and it transformed the space of the nation and empire into a self-evident 
hierarchy of natural complementarity.
Place was a mechanism through which imperial elites reproduced a social 
imaginary that served their interests even as the basic conditions of empire 
changed. The elite students who embarked on the first school trips to Korea and 
Manchuria in 1906 experienced empire primarily as a matter of territorial con-
quest, which demonstrated and bestowed national strength. Yet by 1915, the next 
generation of travelers began to grapple with empire as an ambiguously tempo-
rary stage in historical development, which raised innumerable questions about 
how the nation of the future would fuse the territories and their populations, 
and how best to facilitate the resolution of this issue in the present. Travelers 
in the 1930s encountered empire as yet a different set of concerns, this time as 
a problem of how to maintain the legitimacy of colonial rule while, at the same 
time, decentering the inner territory as the cultural and social pinnacle of the 
nation. Weaving together each generation’s concerns was the common thread 
of articulating concerns about the future of imperial society in the language of 
place: Where were Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan located within the space and 
time of the Japanese nation? The territory of the Japanese state? What about 
their peoples?
Each generation of imperial travelers and colonial boosters territorialized dif-
ferent configurations of a Japanese nation on colonized land and used these senses 
of place to internalize and naturalize their own identities as “good” citizens of an 
imperial nation. By using the tools of tourism to shape how travelers observed and 
experienced the landscape itself, placing became a powerful strategy for repro-
ducing a sense of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria as acceptable exceptions to the 
professed norms of the nation and to the liberal international system. Indeed, as 
the shift from surprise over the continued presence of recognizable markers of co-
lonial difference (e.g., white robes) in the 1910s and 1920s to the expectation of such 
regional difference in 1930s shows, imperial tourism and its associated discourses 
of placing were quite successful in that endeavor.
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PL ACING,  EMPIRE,  AND HISTORY
For imperial travelers and colonial boosters, place worked to naturalize an un-
equal political system by presenting social problems as problem places. The take-
away is not that travel writing distorted and therefore deceived or manipulated 
Japanese travelers into becoming willing participants of empire. Such a conclusion 
suggests that there were nonpolitical concepts of place that existed elsewhere. If 
place is part of how people imagine themselves within a society—and how they 
imagine the boundaries and contours of that society—then place is also always 
already political. Rather than treating certain manifestations of place as distorted, 
we are better off thinking of concepts of place as situational.1 Acts of placing are 
extraordinarily political yet nonetheless fictive frameworks for ordering space into 
meaningful units and these units into meaningful relationships.
Writing about the relationship of nations to the territories they inhabit without 
recreating empire’s spatial politics presents a challenge to the historian of the mod-
ern world. Empire continues to operate as a project of territorial maintenance. In 
the case of Japan, for example, previously colonized lands, such as Hokkaidō, are 
represented as the “national exotic,” which, just as it did for Japanese travelers in 
the 1930s, justifies the differences between the histories and cultures of the region’s 
peoples and those of the colonizing nation but, at the same time, domesticates 
the act of conquest by representing it as an element of a dead past. The result, 
as Michele Mason argues, is the representation of colonized cultures as facets of 
Japanese history—and the detachment of the modern moment from the fact and 
consequences of dispossession by treating it as an event in Japanese history rather 
than a living struggle.2
The challenge that this book poses for such a deeply rooted, institutionalized 
practice is to show how, over the course of a global shift from a world of empires to 
a world of nation-states, the act of placing took on powerful political overtones. In 
its narrative, affective, and material registers, imperial tourism constituted a body 
of national subjects with personal memories of and emotional ties to colonized 
territories. An imperial traveler claimed a sense of self as a member of a national 
people—the kokumin—who were anchored in a particular national land—the 
kokudo. From this perspective, the territorialization of the nation was an ongo-
ing process rather than an outcome that, once achieved, was settled.3 It required 
reproduction across generations and across different political circumstances.4 In-
deed, as scholars of tourism, colonialism, and empire have shown, placing was 
not a strategy limited to the Japanese Empire. Rather, hegemonic powers around 
the globe used tourism to naturalize imperial socio-spatial imaginaries through-
out the twentieth century as anticolonial groups or other powers challenged their 
control over colonized land.5 Recognizing the existence of such an ongoing spatial 
politics suggests that progressive historians must shoulder a particular burden: to 
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approach place as a question, a debate, and a tool rather than a spatial container 
for the unfolding of an internal historical narrative.
For historians of Japan and the Japanese Empire, the history of spatial politics 
presented here suggests at least two concrete interventions into the writing of the 
history of the Japanese Empire. One, analyzing the history of colonial discourses 
and representations in the aggregate—that is, in the trans-colonial manner that 
we have done here—is as important as analyzing these phenomena in isolation. 
There is no better example than Manchuria/Manchukuo, which has been long 
singled out in the history of the Japanese Empire as a discursive outlier due to the 
uniquely informal or semicolonial nature of Japan’s imperial endeavor there. Ex-
amined in conversation with the spatial discourses of Taiwan and Korea, however, 
the uniqueness of Manchuria and Manchukuo begins to erode. The tendency to 
focus studies of Manchuria on the post-1932 period, that is, the era of Manchukuo, 
obscures the way in which Manchuria was the object of considerable ideological 
production as early as 1906 and the fact that the idea of Manchuria as a uniquely 
multinational space began to appear in South Manchuria Railway Company guide-
books from at least as early as 1929. In fact, the South Manchuria Railway Company 
was late to the project of territorializing subnational ethnic identities—what I have 
called the spatial politics of “fromness”—which, at least in the context of imperial 
tourism, the Government General of Taiwan inaugurated in 1927. What we learn 
from analyzing Manchuria through a trans-colonial and longitudinal methodol-
ogy is that colonial boosters’ representations of Manchuria and Manchukuo re-
flected a much broader, empire-wide, and global shift from a spatial politics based 
on a geography of civilization and monocultural nationalism to a spatial politics 
based on a geography (and ethics) of cultural pluralism. Moreover, the particular 
spatial ideology that the Manchukuoan state adopted to legitimate its territorial 
claims relied on the emplacement of Manchukuo within a broader spatial order of 
territorialized ethnic identities that existed beyond the borders of the state. In this 
sense, analyzing the spatial politics of Manchukuo in a trans-colonial frame illu-
minates not the uniqueness of Manchukuo but rather the interrelationship of the 
dominant spatial imaginaries of Japan and Manchukuo in the 1930s. The particular 
spatial politics of Manchukuo’s universal, multinational state relied on the idea 
that the state’s “five races”—in particular, the Chinese—had authentic, territorial 
homelands elsewhere. Thus the spatial politics of Manchukuo, which emphasized 
the migrant and/or miscegenated nature of each of its ethnic groups, represent a 
mirror image of the spatial politics of 1930s Japan, where colonial boosters argued 
that a universal, multinational Japanese state represented the interests of the many 
ethnic nations and peoples who had authentic territorial claims to regions within 
the borders of the state.
Two, the spatial components of Japanese discourses of imperial nationalism and 
multinationality—what I have called the geography of cultural  pluralism—were 
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constitutive elements of the history of Japanese imperialism and the history of 
modern Japan. Analyses of the relationship of colonialism to the formation of 
modern Japanese national identity have neglected an analysis of spatial politics 
in favor of an emphasis on questions of race and ethnicity. The spatial component 
of the social imaginary has largely been treated as an aside to a larger intellec-
tual history of “the national polity,” what was known as the kokutai. Yet, in his 
path-breaking study of discourses of Japanese national identity under empire, 
Oguma Eiji noted that the idea of Japan as a multinational state appeared first 
and most emphatically in geography textbooks around 1918—just before Japanese 
officials began to impose a new round of mobility restrictions on colonized sub-
jects and the newly domesticated imperial tourism industry began to advertise 
intra-imperial tourism as the right and duty of all imperial citizens. That insight 
was not followed up on, however, leaving the question of why it was that the de-
termination of a spatial imaginary was so important to the determination of the 
social imaginary unanswered. What emerges from the present study is the fact 
that the social imaginary of the nation was inseparable from the spatial identity 
and spatial order of the nation. The territoriality of national identity had been 
a concern of the Japanese government from the first days of the modern Japa-
nese nation-state, and this concern increased markedly following the acquisition 
of Manchuria in 1906. Thus the appearance of the geographic representation of 
multinational statehood that Oguma noted in 1918 was not the first instance, but 
rather the latest iteration in the ongoing project of territorializing a Japanese na-
tional identity in the face of expanding state borders, an industrializing economic 
structure, and the rise of liberal internationalism as the moral and institutional 
core of global politics.
But the 1918 textbook changes did reveal a significant shift in the spatial poli-
tics of empire. If, in the earlier era, spatial politics had relied on a geography of 
civilization that territorialized a Japanese national identity on colonized land by 
marking colonized subjects as out of place on that land, by the 1920s, spatial poli-
tics had adopted a geography of cultural pluralism, which argued that colonized 
subjects had a legitimate place in the nation, but one that was defined in terms of 
the contribution of colonized lands and peoples to an imperial whole. The domi-
nant social imaginary of the Japanese nation in the post–World War I era was thus 
an inherently spatial one, which posited the existence of discrete ethnic identities, 
rooted in particular regions, that the state would bring together in relations of 
complementarity. It was this spatial component of the social imaginary that struc-
tured the conceptualization and enactment of colonial difference as the politics of 
“fromness,” which came to inform and legitimate the exploitation of migrant Ko-
rean and Chinese laborers, the denial of Taiwanese Chinese demands for self-rule, 
and the imagination of an essential, internal difference between Japanese and colo-
nized subjects that the use of a national language could bridge but not ameliorate.
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RE-PL ACING JAPAN
The end of the Japanese Empire came suddenly in September 1945. The local color 
imaginary of Japan as a culturally pluralistic empire survived in the concept of 
Japan as a homogenous cultural region that was the authentic homeland of the 
Japanese ethnic nation. Yet the political space of Japan changed dramatically. The 
occupation government—in name a collaboration of all the Allied powers, but in 
practice a project directed mainly by U.S. forces under the leadership of Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur—severed 
Japanese control over Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. Korea was quickly placed 
under the jurisdiction of its own U.S Occupation, which, in many cases, governed 
out of the same civil buildings and military bases that had anchored Japanese colo-
nial rule.6 Taiwan came under the control of the Kuomintang Nationalist govern-
ment, led by Chiang Kai-Shek. Here, too, Taiwanese Chinese people quickly found 
themselves embroiled in a different, yet no less imperial, standoff as the United 
States began to draw the line of containment around Taiwan, Korea, and Japan in 
the burgeoning Cold War. Using language strikingly similar to that of the Japa-
nese Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
called for the United States to establish a “great crescent” of allied countries in 
Asia to prevent the expansion of Communism.7 Manchukuo, invaded initially by 
Soviet forces, quickly became a battlefield between the Chinese Communist and 
Nationalist forces and, in 1949, came under the control the new People’s Republic 
of China.
By the time war broke out in Korea, in June 1950, the political geography had 
changed to such a degree that a minor publishing industry emerged in Japan to 
educate Japanese citizens about the new map of East Asia. Books with titles such 
as Futatsu no Chūgoku: tsuketari Nanboku-Sen Firipin (The two Chinas, including 
North and South Korea and the Philippines) promised to bring Japanese readers 
up-to-date on the political status and recent history of China, Korea and Taiwan.8 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea contributed its own voice to the proj-
ect, publishing a colorful illustrated tourist pamphlet in 1959 entitled, Chōsen no 
meishō (The famous sights of Korea).9
The former new territories were not the only territories that needed to be 
re-placed in the aftermath of empire. Japan itself also had to be situated within a 
new spatial order—no longer the cultural and economic center of a vast empire, 
the Japanese government and the U.S. Occupation agreed that the new era re-
quired a new understanding of Japan’s place in East Asia. Contrary to the actions 
of many Japanese people, who sought through travel writing to explore the rela-
tionship between the ghostly remnants of the imperial spatial imaginary and the 
new post-imperial map, the U.S. Occupation government moved quickly to erase 
all of Japan’s ties to its former empire and to define Japan as a uniquely “peaceful” 
nation-state within East Asia.
166    Conclusion
One element of this project was the denaturalization of former colonized sub-
jects residing in the inner territory. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff found it difficult 
to place Koreans and Taiwanese Chinese in the turbulent geopolitical milieu. As 
the initial post-surrender instructions to General MacArthur stated: “You shall 
treat Formosans-Chinese and Koreans as liberated people in so far as military se-
curity permits. They are not to be included in the term ‘Japanese,’ . . . but they have 
been Japanese subjects and may be treated, in case of necessity, as enemy nationals. 
They should be identified as to nationality, place of residence, and present loca-
tion. They may be repatriated if they so desire under such regulations as you may 
establish.”10
The Occupation government encouraged the three million Koreans and Tai-
wanese residing in Japan to “repatriate” to territories many had never known. By 
the end of 1945, 1.3 million Koreans had left for Korea. Only able to carry with them 
one thousand yen (about 20 packs of cigarettes at that time) and faced with an out-
break of cholera in Korea, over six hundred thousand Koreans opted to stay. Mem-
bers of the Japanese Diet and Occupation government often treated the Koreans 
who remained as criminals, blaming them for the spread of the black market and 
for promoting illegal migration. The 1947 Constitution and subsequent National-
ity Law placed Koreans and Taiwanese Chinese people firmly outside of Japanese 
society by defining Japanese nationals as holders of Japanese household registra-
tions. Koreans and Taiwanese Chinese residing in Japan lost the right to vote. In 
the words of the Ministry of Justice in 1952, the effect of the law was dramatic: 
“All Koreans and Taiwanese, even those on the home islands, lost their Japanese 
nationality. . . . In order for a Korean or Taiwanese person to become Japanese, he 
will need to undergo the same naturalization process as any other foreigner. The 
fact that he used to be a Japanese subject or is a person who had lost his Japanese 
citizenship makes no difference.”11
The Occupation and Japanese government’s move to denaturalize former colo-
nized subjects was paired with the troubled re-naturalization of Japanese settlers. 
Former settlers found themselves subject to scorn and derision as they traveled 
back to the metropole. Over five million repatriates poured into the country from 
Korea, Taiwan, and most especially Manchuria between September 1945 and 
 December 1946. The metropolitan press referred to them as “overseas brethren” 
(kaigai dōhō). But reports also circulated that described how the repatriates were 
being treated as a “distinctive kind of people.”12 The word “repatriate” (hikiagesha) 
contained the distinction within it—repatriates were people who were coming back 
to the patria; they were people who had been “lifted and landed” back in  Japan.13 
They were out of place. Kazuko Kuramoto, who wrote about her experience as a 
repatriate in her memoir, Manchurian Legacy, described her first encounter with 
the sense of difference contained in the word hikiagesha: “[My cousin] Taro always 
referred to us as ‘repatriates,’ as if we were of another race, not ‘real’ Japanese. I had 
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first heard this term, hiki-age-sha, at the Sasebo Port when we had arrived in Japan. 
The man who welcomed us had said, ‘Welcome home my fellow repatriates.’ He 
had not said, ‘Welcome home, my fellow Japanese.’ ”14
Japanese geography textbooks also struggled with how to define the past and 
present of East Asian geography. One 1954 middle-school textbook positioned Ja-
Figure 13. “Nihon han’i no shukushō to yon dai shima no mensekizu” (The reduction of the 
area of Japan and area map of the four main islands). The 1954 textbook map of Japan shaded 
the former colonial territories (Taiwan, Korea, and Karafuto) to mark the extent of the prewar 
territory of Japan.
source: Muramatsu Shigeki, Chūgaku shakai: Nihon to sekai: Chiriteki naiyō o omo to suru mono (Tokyo: Teikoku 
shoin, 1954). Courtesy of Teikoku-Shoin, Co., Ltd.
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Figure 14. “Nihon no ichi” (The place of Japan). The 1974 textbook map of Japan shaded only 
the current territory of Japan, with the islands of Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū, and 
Okinawa marked in orange. There was no mention of the former empire.
source: Nō Toshio, Yazawa Taiji, Tanabe Ken’ichi, and Satō Hisashi, Chūgaku shakaika chiri hatsu teiban (Tokyo: 
Teikoku shoin, 1974). Courtesy of Teikoku-Shoin, Co., Ltd.
pan in East Asia in relation to its former territories—the map shaded in Korea and 
Taiwan and marked them as “prewar territories.” Not until 1974 did this textbook 
series show Japan in East Asia as an “island nation” (shimaguni).15 Place names, 
too, presented a particular challenge to textbook publishers. One 1955 textbook 
dealt with the issue by writing Korean and Chinese place names in kanji (charac-
ters) and then including the former Japanese pronunciation and the present-day 
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pronunciation as furigana (superscript) above the characters. Seoul, for example, 
appeared as 京城 with Keijō written on one side in hiragana (the syllabary used 
for Japanese words) and Seoul written on the other side in katakana (the syllabary 
used for foreign words). In the entry on Manchuria (which all textbooks contin-
ued to treat as a distinct region within China), the textbook included a helpful 
mnemonic for those who still oriented themselves to the imperial map: the text 
represented Shenyang in characters, with the katakana and hiragana pronuncia-
tion on either side, followed by the statement in parenthesis “the former Hōten.”16 
Only in 1964 did the publisher revise this practice, opting instead to represent 
now-foreign place names in katakana and including the Japanese characters only 
as superscript above the name.17
THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF POST-IMPERIAL  
TOURISM
In the midst of this massive reordering of the spatial politics of East Asia, the 
Occupation government partnered with the Japan Tourist Bureau to reintroduce 
Japan as a tourist destination. For Occupation planners and the Japan Tourist 
 Bureau, the biggest appeal was economic. Public opinion in the United States 
stood against the revival of Japanese industry. As a February 1950 memo from 
the Economic and Scientific Section to the Occupation’s General Headquarters 
(GHQ) stated, “The tourist industry . . . is probably the only industry which Japan 
can actively  advertise and promote without being subjected to attack by special 
pressure groups abroad.”18 For its part, the Japan Tourist Bureau supported GHQ’s 
plan to revive Japan’s foreign tourism industry. Commissions on ticket sales had 
made up over 80 percent of its prewar income. With the end of leisure travel under 
the Occupation, the bureau found itself in such dire financial circumstances that it 
considered selling romance novels and magazines to keep its doors open.19
Without the resources or desire to revamp the entire permit system that gov-
erned the entry and exit of foreign nationals in Occupied Japan, the promotion 
of tourism occupied a relatively minor place on the Occupation’s hierarchy of 
needs in 1948. Yet as GHQ focused on stabilizing Japan’s internal economy and 
resource pool, transportation companies scrambled to get a jump on the emerg-
ing market for tourism. On January 15, 1948, for example, Northwest Airlines 
submitted to GHQ a proposal to initiate tourist travel to Japan, precipitating 
a study by members of GHQ’s Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) as to the 
feasibility of opening the country to tourist travel.20 Whereas in October of 1947, 
the Civil Transportation Section (CTS) had declared that “fostering tourism is 
not feasible at this time,”21 by June 1948, SCAP approved “the idea” of tourist 
travel and set representatives of ESS, CTS, and Public Health and Works (PHW) 
to work on figuring out the details. Stumbling blocks included, but were not 
limited to, logistical support for nonofficial travel, entry procedures, and the lack 
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of available hotel beds in the Tokyo metropolitan area (the Western-style ho-
tels were full of GIs). To minimize these potential problems and any potential 
drain on the limping Japanese economy, it was decided that “logistic support, 
including fuel oil and tires for motor vehicles, [would be] provided by the SCAP 
Revolving Fund.” Furthermore, tour groups were limited to twenty-four people, 
as opposed to the initially proposed twenty-five, so that they would fit in one 
rail carriage. SCAP also began the arduous process of rearranging the alloca-
tion of hotel space in the Tokyo area in order to liberate the rooms that tourists 
would require.22 On June 25, 1948, SCAP sent a memo to the Japanese govern-
ment’s Board of Trade and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, signaling 
approval of the Japan Tourist Bureau’s plan to conduct seven-day tours for up to 
twenty-four individuals.23
The opening of Japan to foreign visitors did not immediately result in a tour-
ism boom. Yet, here and there, a few tourists arrived for the regular seven-day 
itinerary or a “special tour” whose details had been prearranged with Japan Tourist 
Bureau and SCAP. Joe Merider and Olive Boxley participated in one such special 
tour, which had been arranged for them by Pan-American Airlines and the Japan 
Tourist Bureau. The two-day tour took Merider and Boxley first on a motor tour of 
Tokyo, including the Imperial Palace, Diet Building, and the Nihonbashi shopping 
area. On the second day, Merider and Boxley visited the Hachiman Shrine and 
Stone Buddha at Kamakura before returning to Tokyo. The Japan Tourist Bureau 
conducted “overland” tours as well for passengers of steamships. A two-day over-
land tour for passengers of the S.S. President Wilson began with the Imperial Pal-
ace Grounds and Heian Shrine in Kyōto and ended the second day with a motor 
coach tour of Kamakura.24 By the end of 1949, SCAP had approved standard two-, 
three-, seven-, thirteen-, fourteen-, twenty-three-, and thirty-one-day itineraries.25 
In January of 1950, the Japan Tourist Bureau’s English-language publication, Travel 
News, reported that nine thousand foreign tourists had visited Japan in 1949.26 
Following the rise in tourist traffic and expecting further increases, Pan-American 
proposed the construction of a one-thousand-room hotel in Tokyo in March of 
1950.27
Only three years removed from the end of World War II—and surrounded by 
civil and anti-imperial wars—“peaceful Japan” became the overarching message 
of the GHQ/Japan Tourist Bureau tourist narrative.28 As the Tourism Division of 
the Ministry of Transportation (Un’yushō kankōkakari) wrote in 1948, “Because 
at heart, even looking historically, we are a people who love peace, the tourism 
industry can work to recover our reputation in the world. Though the nation 
(kokumin) known as the Japanese people for a very short time became conceited 
and committed a grave mistake, we still have not thrown it [peace] away.”29 Tour-
ist pamphlets published by the Japan Tourist Bureau emphasized the “peaceful” 
character of Japan. The cherry blossoms on the cover of one pamphlet “ symbolize 
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Peaceful Japan.” Another pamphlet even suggested that “Peaceful Japan” was a 
particular place, not to be confused with other Japans out there: “Now the proce-
dures to secure entry to peaceful Japan are very simple,” it stated, and laid out how 
to arrange for a Japan Tourist Bureau package tour through a steamship or airline 
travel agent.30
The emphasis on the peacefulness of the country was not just for foreign con-
sumption. The Ministry of Transportation combined peace with the promotion of 
Japan’s history of grassroots democracy in its revisions to the Japanese-language 
Nihon annai ki (Guide to Japan), with the central goal of removing all references 
to militarism or warrior prowess and increasing the number of sights and empha-
sis on popular movements and peaceful, “cultural” history. The revised editions 
abounded with references to churches, none of which were included in the 1932 
version, and the Ministry of Transportation removed many references to the im-
perial line. Statements such as, “the founding of the country by Jimmu Tennō” be-
came “the myth of the founding of the country” with no reference to Jimmu Tennō, 
the mythical first emperor of Japan.31 The new guidebooks also translated imperial 
calendar years into Western calendar years (i.e., “Meiji 43” became “1910”).32
References to Japan’s empire disappeared as well. While it makes sense that 
the Japan Tourist Bureau and Ministry of Transportation ceased publishing on 
travel to Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan—given the impossibility of any Japa-
nese travelers actually visiting these areas in the immediate postwar period—the 
 removal of references to “the empire within” is not so easily written off. For exam-
ple, the revised edition of the Nihon annai ki volume on the Kinki region, which 
 appeared in 1949, altered the significance of Kyōto’s Higashi Honganji Temple to 
reflect  Japan’s newly shrunken borders. While in 1932 Higashi Honganji consti-
tuted a significant player “in the religious world of our country, spreading the 
faith in first the inner territory, Korea, and Manchuria, then China and even as 
far as North America,” in 1949 Higashi Honganji had been reduced to “constitut-
ing an important role in the religious world of our country and endeavoring to 
proselytize.”33
THE C OUNTRY THAT IS  B OTH CLOSE AND FAR AWAY
Despite GHQ’s attempt to distinguish Japan from the rest of East Asia, Japanese 
commentators grappled publically with the past places of the Japanese Empire and 
their significance for the present moment. In the 1949 introduction to Futatsu no 
Chūgoku: tsuketari Nanboku Sen, Firipin, Mizuno Masanao argued that despite 
the restructuring of political relationships in the immediate postwar, Japan’s future 
still lay with East Asia: “Although Japan is in the special state of being under oc-
cupation, Japan is an East Asian nation-state and cannot help but be significantly 
influenced by how the situation in East Asia changes.”34
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In the early years of the postwar period, the theme of imperial travel served as 
a site for plumbing the fraught question of how to define social relations between 
a newly constructed and confined Japanese nation (made up of metropolitan Jap-
anese and repatriates) and the peoples of the former colonized territories. Was 
there a relationship? Writing for Tabi in 1951, novelist Kitabayashi Tōma struggled 
to articulate the responsibility that he felt toward his former Korean countrymen 
(dōhō) as they now suffered civil war. The impetus for his contribution, a recollec-
tion of a trip to a hot spring in Manchukuo, was the press coverage of the war in 
Korea: “When I hear the names, ‘Keijō,’ ‘Suiden,’ ‘Taikyō,’ ‘North Korea’s Heijō,’ and 
‘Kaijō,’ what I remember is the Korea of eighteen years ago.” Kitabayashi indicated 
that he intended for the characters of these place names to be pronounced with 
their Japanese readings to draw a link between the liberated Korea of 1951 and the 
colonial Korea he visited on his way to Manchukuo in 1933.35 Reminiscing about 
his previous travel to Korea, he wondered what had happened to the people he 
had met. The youth were probably divided into north and south, carrying guns 
and fighting. The women who wore white robes while doing the laundry on the 
banks of the Han River had perhaps fled their homes.36 “When I think of these 
things, a feeling of pain comes over my chest,” Kitabayashi wrote. He continued in 
this vein, expressing a feeling of responsibility toward Korean society, albeit one 
that borrowed more from the colonial discourse of Japanese colonialism as an 
act of rescuing Koreans from bad government than from any interrogation of the 
responsibility of ordinary Japanese citizens for the violence of imperialism: “You 
know, the Korea of that time was, in fact, peaceful. Even if we take into account 
the Manchurian Incident, which took place on the opposite side of the Yalu River, 
it had nothing to do with ordinary Koreans. Even us travelers, when I think of it 
now, were so carefree it’s funny.”37
To illustrate the contrast, Kitabayashi recounted a story of his visit to a hot 
spring known as Goryūhai in Manchuria. Upon his arrival, he found that the 
town’s sole hotel was completely booked. The scene at the station was so deserted 
that he described it like landing “in an American Western.”38 The stationmaster 
suggested that Kitabayashi try to find a place in Hōten, which Kitabayashi com-
pared to arriving in the Japanese hot spring town of Atami (near Tokyo) and be-
ing told to look for a place in Kyōto. He finally got into the hotel the next day, at 
which point he discovered that it was under near constant attack by bandits. The 
hot spring itself was nice. The whole experience, however, was strange and unset-
tling. On a tip from the hotel’s Korean maid, Kitabayashi then returned to Korea in 
search of a more relaxing hot spring adventure. He eventually settled on Kaiundai 
hot spring before “repatriating” (hikiageru) to the inner territory. He marveled at 
how he could not remember much from the peaceful, Korean portion of his trip, 
except that at the hot spring, he recalled sharing a bath with “rich-looking Koreans 
and shrinking back from the garlic smell.”39
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In contrasting “peaceful Korea” to “dangerous Manchuria,” Kitabayashi’s tale 
of hot springs adventure differed little from accounts of the Korea-Manchuria 
border during the 1930s. In his ending, however, Kitabayashi attempted to carry 
the story forward, mixing racist tropes of Korean laziness from the colonial era 
with post-imperial nostalgia and a sense of displacement. He did not, or could 
not, articulate what that future would look like. “Whatever happened to those 
people?” he wondered. “My memories and my impressions are only of calm and 
lazy people and yet, as I wrote in the beginning, I am filled with something like 
deep emotion.”40
Others tried to find a language to rearticulate memories that relied on a 
now-obsolete geography. Mizutani Chōzaburō, a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives during the 1930s and early 1940s and a two-time minister of commerce 
and industry in the postwar period, recalled how the history of socialist struggle 
against militarism and economic inequality was woven through the history of his 
travels around Japan, the empire, and the world. Perhaps because he was writing 
as one of the more well-known names of the Occupation-era  government, Mizu-
tani aimed particularly to articulate how Japan’s loss of international power and 
prestige affected the current generation of students, who would not enjoy the same 
experiences and opportunities that he had. He bridled at a statement by  General 
 MacArthur, who declared in 1945 that Japan had “fallen to a fourth-rate nation.” 
“When I was a student,” Mizutani reminisced, “it was a time when the ‘Great  Empire 
of Japan’ had joined the world’s Five Great Powers. (Today’s ‘Fourth-Rate Nation’ 
Japan is one of these five great countries only in terms of population.) When I 
compare [my life then] to the lives of students, who are pressed by part-time work, 
now, my student years seem like a total dream world. From this blessed earthly 
paradise, I spread my wings wide and flew.”41
Mizutani lamented the loss of Taiwan. Unlike Kitabayashi, Mizutani made clear 
that he held Japanese imperialism responsible for the perpetration of enormous 
social and political injustice. Yet, rather than consider the specific injustice of co-
lonialism, Mizutani lamented the violence and inequality of imperial society as a 
whole. He located the problem in the time period, not the specific relationship: 
“The police suppression tactics of that era were so unreasonable that young people 
today can not imagine even a little bit what they were like.” As a member of the 
Marxist Labor-Farmer Party, he had come “very close to being arrested” during 
the mass arrest of Communist Party members in 1928. It was under this cloud 
that he traveled to Taiwan in 1928, only to find that police suppression there was 
no better: “Because I was a member of the House of Representatives, the police 
restrained themselves with me. Instead, when I lectured at Taiwanese gatherings, 
they did harassing things like ordering my Taiwanese translator to stop translat-
ing.”42 His second trip to Taiwan, in 1941, also suffered from political unrest, in 
this case in the upset after the Minseitō political party expelled Representative 
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Saitō Takao from the Diet for questioning the legitimacy of the army’s “holy war” 
in China in 1940. Mizutani and a few others were also expelled from the Social 
Masses Party for protesting the expulsion of Saitō. Traveling together to Taiwan, 
the expelled MPs “traveled like ‘social outcasts.’ ”43
For Mizutani, the loss of empire was the loss of the potential for a power-
ful Japan to be a force for social progress in East Asia. Implicitly reflecting the 
right-wing socialist motives that had circulated through much of the argument for 
pan-Asianism and the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Mizutani critiqued 
the wealth and power of government officials, who stood between the emperor 
and the people. “When I went to Taiwan . . . the travel of the governor general was 
more ostentatious than the imperial processions of the Japanese emperor.” Perhaps 
as a result, the war was lost, and “Taiwan drifted away from the hand of Japan to 
become the land of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government-in-exile. Even my black eyes,” 
he lamented, “have come to see the extremes of fate.”44 For Mizutani, the most un-
fortunate result of such failed government was that the empire was never given a 
proper chance to succeed: “In the postwar, when I had become a minister, Taiwan 
was no longer part of the territory of Japan. So, it came to pass that I never got an 
opportunity to travel to Taiwan squarely before the eyes of the people.”45
For Japanese travel writers, past places eventually settled into a present map 
of ambiguous relations. The Japanese government normalized relations with the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1952, Korea in 1965, and the People’s Republic of 
China in 1972 (which abrogated the previous agreement with Taiwan). And once 
again, in 1964, Japanese citizens began to travel abroad for leisure. The government 
of South Korea, which had established its own National Tourism Corporation in 
1962, eagerly sought foreign tourists for the boost they would bring the Korean 
economy.46 Japanese tourists were among the largest group of foreign travelers to 
arrive in Korea, growing from fewer than two thousand in 1964 to over four hun-
dred thousand in 1973.47 More than 90 percent of these travelers were male, and a 
large number of them traveled for a combination of business and sex tourism.48 At 
the same time, many Japanese also returned to see their old homes and visit with 
former classmates.49
The lingering ties of empire that continued to trouble the place of Japan in 
Asia came to have their own name: the country that is both close and far away 
(chikakute tōi kuni). The phrase appeared first in 1956, in the title of a travelogue 
by Kinoshita Junji, and then with increasingly frequency in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
this period, it almost always referred to Korea. Such language recalled the spatial 
politics of empire and its insistence on the complementary difference of Korea and 
Japan—a place that is so different yet so close, as Kobayashi Chiyoko wrote for 
Tabi magazine in 1935. Yet by the 1970s, travel writers used the trope of being both 
far and close to ask questions about the responsibility of Japan toward its former 
colonial territories. As Satō Sanae wrote in her 1972 Dare mo kakanakatta Kankoku 
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(The Korea that nobody wrote about), “Korean attitudes toward Japanese . . . were 
not born in a single day and night.” For that reason, Satō traveled to Korea to learn 
from ordinary Koreans (shomin) about the present state of Korea and to teach Jap-
anese readers about “the faces of the neighbors who are both close and far away.” 
For Satō, who went on to become a prolific author of books on war memory and 
the Japanese diaspora, international boundaries could not erase the colonial and 
imperial past. Rather, the memory of that encounter constituted the fundamental 
subtext of Korean-Japanese relations: “To answer the question of what we are sup-
posed to do now with this country that neighbors Japan, this friendly nation, we 
must try once to go back to the starting point and think about [Korean-Japanese 
relations] again.”50
With this statement, Satō signaled that place best remained a question, an op-
portunity to explore the many layers and scales of history, rather than a frame-
work for fixing relations outside of history. For nationalists, place will continue 
to serve as a tool for rationalizing the politics of the moment. Yet for others more 
inclined to challenge rather than reproduce the status quo, attempts to fix relations 
between people by naturalizing particular spatial orders should continue to raise 
questions about the work that such placing does. As we embark on a new era of 
spatial politics—of battles over islands in the South China Sea, of independence 
movements in naturalized colonies, and of fights to right the increasingly reified 
inequalities of global economic interdependence—the history of placing in the 
Japanese Empire suggests that each attempt to produce a shared spatial imaginary 
must always be met with a simple yet powerful question: Whose map?
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Table 3 Place names.
Japanese Characters
Chinese 
(pinyin)
Korean 
(McCune-
Reischauer)
Korean 
(hangul)
Antō 安東 Andong
Arisan 阿里山 Alishan
Bujun 撫順 Fushun
Chōshun 長春 Changchun
Daidō 大同 Taedong 대동강
Daikoku 大黒山 Dahei
Dairen 大連 Dalian
Eikō 栄口　 Yingkou
Gensan 元山 Wŏnsan 원산
Harbin 哈爾濱 Ha’erbin
Heijō 平壌 P’yŏngyang 평양
Heitō 屏東 Pingtung
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Japanese Characters
Chinese 
(pinyin)
Korean 
(McCune-
Reischauer)
Korean 
(hangul)
Hokkō 北港 Beigang
Hokutō 北投 Beitou
Hori 埔里 Puli
Hōten 奉天 Fengtian
Jinsen 仁川 Inch'ŏn 인천
Kagi 嘉義 Chiayi
Kaijō 開城 Kaesŏng 개성
Kappanzan 角板山 Jiaobanshan
Keishū 
(Korea)
慶州 Kyŏngju 경주
Keishū 
(Taiwan)
渓州 Xizhou
Kinshū 錦州 Jinzhou
Kiryū 基隆 Jilong
Maruyama 円山 Yuanshan
Musha 霧社 Wushe
Nichigetsutan 
(Sun-Moon 
Lake)
日月潭 Riyuetan
Niitaka 新高 Yushan
Ryojun (Port 
Arthur)
旅順 Lushun
Pusan 釜山 Busan 부산
Puyo 扶余 Buyŏ 부여
Ryōyō 遼陽 Liaoyang
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Japanese Characters
Chinese 
(pinyin)
Korean 
(McCune-
Reischauer)
Korean 
(hangul)
Shingishū 新義州 Sinŭiju 신의주
Taichū 台中 Taichung
Taihoku 台北 Taipei
Tainan 台南 Tainan
Taroko タロコ Taroko
Tōkōshi 湯崗子 Tanggangzi
Tsugitaka 次高山 Xueshan
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Placing Empire examines the spatial politics of Japanese imperialism through a study 
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Japan, this book shows how debates over the place of colonized lands reshaped the 
social and spatial imaginary of the modern Japanese nation. In turn, this sociospa-
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enacted. The book thus illuminates how ideas of place became central to the produc-
tion of new forms of colonial hierarchy as empires around the globe transitioned from 
an era of territorial acquisition to one of territorial maintenance.
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“McDonald re-creates a geographic and social imaginary of colonial incorporation 
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scholars of Japanese empire and beyond.” LEO T.S. CHING, Duke University
“Richly researched and written in an accessible language, Placing Empire interrogates 
imperial tourism as an essential engine that drove the making of empire. McDonald 
brings into focus the mechanisms of imperial tourism to explain how colonial territo-
ries—Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan— were incorporated into the empire, not only in 
terms of geography but, more important, of social imagination. A long-awaited and 
timely contribution to the field.” HELEN J.S. LEE, Yonsei University
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